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ABSTRACT A
  Which factors determine whether a stimulus is consciously perceived or unconsciously pro-
cessed? Here, I investigate how previous experience on two different time scales – long term experi-
ence over the course of several days, and short term experience based on the previous trial – impact 
conscious perception. Regarding long term experience, I investigate how perceptual learning does not 
only change the capacity to process stimuli, but also the capacity to consciously perceive them. To 
this end, subjects are trained extensively to discriminate between masked stimuli, and concurrently rate 
their subjective experience. Both the ability to discriminate the stimuli as well as subjective awareness 
of the stimuli increase as a function of training. However, these two effects are not simple byproducts 
of each other. On the contrary, they display different time courses, with above chance discrimination 
performance emerging before subjective experience; importantly, the two learning effects also rely on 
different circuits in the brain: Moving the stimuli outside the trained receptive ﬁ eld size abolishes the 
learning effects on discrimination ability, but preserves the learning effects on subjective awareness. 
This indicates that the receptive ﬁ elds serving subjective experience are larger than the ones serving 
objective performance, and that the channels through which they receive their information are arranged 
in parallel. Regarding short term experience, I investigate how memory based predictions arising from 
information acquired on the trial before affect visibility and the neural correlates of consciousness. To 
this end, I vary stimulus evidence as well as predictability and acquire electroencephalographic data. 
A comparison of the neural processes distinguishing consciously perceived from unperceived trials 
with and without predictions reveals that predictions speed up processing, thus shifting the neural 
correlates forward in time. Thus, the neural correlates of consciousness display a previously unap-
preciated ﬂ exibility in time and do not arise invariably late as had been predicted by some theorists. 
Admittedly, however, previous experience does not always stabilize perception. Instead, previous ex-
perience can have the reverse effect: Seeing the opposite of what was there, as in so-called repulsive 
aftereffects. Here, I investigate what determines the direction of previous experience using multistable 
stimuli. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment, I ﬁ  nd that a widespread network of 
frontal, parietal, and ventral occipital brain areas is involved in perceptual stabilization, whereas the 
reverse effect is only evident in extrastriate cortex. This areal separation possibly endows the brain 
with the ﬂ exibility to switch between exploiting already available information and emphasizing the new. 
Taken together, my data show that conscious perception and its neuronal correlates display a remarkable 
degree of ﬂ exibility and plasticity, which should be taken into account in future theories of consciousness. 1
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Chapter 1
When we open our eyes in the morning aft  er a good night of sleep, we immediate-
ly have the impression of a rich, colorful and detailed world. It feels obvious to us that we 
perceive everything that surrounds us. But is this actually the case? Scientifi  c evidence sug-
gests that our feeling of seeing everything is actually an illusion. When put to the test, we 
for example blatantly fail to perceive changes in color and luminance of objects if they are in 
motion (Suchow & Alvarez, 2011). Similarly, phenomena such as change blindness or inat-
tentional blindness illustrate how poor we actually perform in consciously perceiving even 
massive changes in our environment (Kim & Blake, 2005). Th   us, it seems that we see many 
things, but many (if not most) things we do not. What happens to the stimuli that we do not 
perceive? Here, evidence is accumulating that they are not lost at peripheral stages of process-
ing, but make it all the way even up to a semantic analysis (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). Th  us, 
the mere processing of stimuli does not make the diff  erence between consciously perceiv-
ing and not consciously perceiving. What then distinguishes processing from experiencing? 
Th   is question has puzzled scientists and philosophers since centuries, and lately, the focus has 
turned to the brain as the most likely place where this distinction arises. In particular, accord-
ing to present-day belief, there must be a crucial diff  erence between the neuronal processes 
leading to conscious perception, and those that do not lead to conscious perception (Crick & 
Koch, 1990). Th   e current research program is to state a working defi  nition of consciousness, 
to operationalize it in behavioral terms, and then to measure brain activity that diff  erentiates 
perceiving a stimulus from not perceiving the identical stimulus (Searle, 1998). Th   e hope is 
that by understanding how brain activity diff  erentiates conscious from unconscious process-
ing, we also understand how consciousness arises from the activity of billions of neurons. 
Th   is strategy has led to a rapidly growing number of empirical fi  ndings (reviewed in Dehaene 
& Changeux, 2011; Tononi & Koch, 2008) and theoretical proposals (Bachmann, 2007; 
Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Edelman, Gally, & Baars, 2011; 
Lamme, 2006; Melloni & Singer, 2010; Singer, 2009). 3
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A particularly fruitful line of investigation in the “quest for consciousness” (Koch, 
2004) has been to identify the conditions that allow for conscious perception. It is now com-
mon sense that we perceive strong stimuli unless we do not pay attention to them, and that we 
can perceive even weak stimuli if we do pay attention to them. Accordingly, conscious experi-
ence is proposed to depend on two factors: the intensity of sensory stimulation and top-down 
attention (Dehaene, et al., 2006). Are these the only ways to bring stimuli into awareness? 
Conscious perception cannot solely depend on sensory evidence. For one, the informa-
tion entering our brain through the peripheral sensory organs is in itself ambiguous: For exam-
ple, it is not possible to decide whether an activation pattern on the retina of one eye represents 
an ellipse or a circle viewed with a certain slant if only the activation pattern itself is considered, 
because the retina does not represent depth information. On the other hand, stimuli are also 
oft  en degraded or camoufl  aged (by themselves), e.g., if an animal tries to hide from its predators. 
Nevertheless, perception seems eff  ortless and remarkably quick to us. How is this achieved? At 
the moment, the scientifi  c community has not reached consensus on this issue: While some 
propose that perception is driven by a rapid feed-forward architecture (Serre, Oliva, & Poggio, 
2007), others emphasize the importance of top-down signals and recurrent processing (Gilbert 
& Sigman, 2007; Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). An emergent pat-
tern, however, is an emphasis on previous experience (Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001; Kveraga, 
Ghuman, & Bar, 2007). Everyday life and laboratory experiments strongly suggest that percep-
tion is greatly facilitated when one has previous experience with the stimulus to be perceived 
or generally knows what one is looking for. For example, identifying an object in a real world 
scene is massively impaired if it does not appear in its usual place, e.g., a fi  re hydrant on a rooft  op 
rather than on the street (Biederman, 1972). From a constructivist point of view, the currently 
available sensory evidence is in fact always integrated with other, preexisting top-down informa-
tion (Gregory, 1997). Interestingly, however, this latter aspect is neglected by current theories 
of consciousness. 4
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Understanding the role of previous experience in conscious perception is the central 
topic of this thesis. In particular, I investigate how long-term experience (in the form of percep-
tual learning) and short-term experience (from the previous trial) aff  ect whether we see, how we 
see, and what the underlying neuronal mechanisms are in the human brain. To unravel how con-
sciousness arises, it is imperative to probe the brain according to this natural way of function-
ing. In its default mode, the brain integrates currently available information with prior knowl-
edge. However, in the laboratory, we usually create highly artifi  cial conditions with massively 
degraded visual input with which the subject has no prior experience. We then vary solely the 
amount of sensory evidence to manipulate visibility. By doing so, we restrict the brain to process 
sensory input in a bottom-up fashion, and by measuring only once, we don’t allow the brain to 
adapt to this situation through learning. Although the brain is able to solve this challenge and 
to generate conscious perception without contextual information, a complete understanding of 
how consciousness comes about requires that the brain is allowed to run free, i.e., to learn and 
to use prior knowledge. Th   is is because it is not the same to externally provide the brain with 
more input as it is to study how the brain itself generates appropriate conditions to decipher the 
visual world. Given that conscious perception can arise under two radically diff  erent scenarios, 
it is also conceivable that the neural correlates of consciousness will diff  er in these two settings.
SOURCES OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE
To enable the integration of previous experience with currently available information, 
the brain is equipped with a variety of plasticity mechanisms, ranging from short-term adapta-
tion to long-term structural changes in grey and white matter. It is now well accepted that the 
brain can undergo major changes in function and morphology not only during development, 
but also in the adult state. Accordingly, it has been shown that sensitivity to basic stimulus fea-
tures (Ahissar & Hochstein, 1998; Fahle, 2009; E. J. Gibson, 1963; Goldstone, 1998), but also 
various higher cognitive functions such as visuo-spatial attention (C. S. Green & Bavelier, 2003) 5
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and working memory (Olesen, Westerberg, & Klingberg, 2004) can be trained in adult subjects. 
Such learning allows the brain to acquire information on a long time scale, and this aff  ects percep-
tion. For example, computer experts that have eff  ortfully learned to categorize personal computers 
on a specifi  c rather than a general level are less prone to change blindness if the change occurs on 
a computer, while remaining insensitive to changes of other objects (Archambault, O’Donnell, 
& Schyns, 1999). But even brief encounters can have long lasting eff  ects: For example, when we 
are confronted with fragmented black and white images of an object in which the fi  gure cannot 
be clearly identifi  ed (such as the famous picture of the Dalmatian dog by Ronald C. James), we at 
fi  rst fail in perceiving the object. However, once the coherent picture is presented and aft  er explicit 
recognition has taken place, the object can be clearly seen; importantly, in future encounters, the 
object will always continue to be perceived, although the currently available information always 
stays the same. Th   ese long-term learning eff  ects are balanced by a variety of short-term eff  ects that 
endow the brain with the fl  exibility to react to an ever changing environment. Oft  en, the most 
informative source of information is what has happened just a moment ago. Th   is is for example 
evident in the phenomenon of priming. Here, a briefl  y presented, semantically or otherwise related 
prime stimulus greatly improves both the speed and accuracy of subsequent target discrimination. 
Similarly, just holding information in working memory (Soto, Wriglesworth, Bahrami-Balani, & 
Humphreys, 2010) or being pre-cued to its location (Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 2004) enhances 
the visibility of stimuli. Finally, on the time scale of phylogenesis, our brain is adapted to integrate 
incoming information with perceptual principles that seem to arise from the effi   cient exploitation 
of the statistics of our environment (Geisler & Diehl, 2002). For example, already newborn babies 
group stimulus elements according to the Gestalt law of proximity (Farroni, Valenza, Simion, & 
Umiltà, 2000). Th   is principle, namely that elements that are close to each other belong together, 
refl  ects the fact that in visual images parallel contours which are closer to each other are indeed 
more likely to belong to the same physical object (Brunswik & Kamiya, 1953; also see Geisler, 
Perry, Super, & Gallogly, 2001; Sigman, Cecchi, Gilbert, & Magnasco, 2001). 6
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Considering that many cognitive functions can be improved through practice and/or 
previous experience, one can derive the prediction that conscious perception should also be 
malleable. Th   is contrasts with the sometimes explicit, oft  en tacit view that conscious percep-
tion is a static, all-or-none phenomenon (reviewed in Corso, 1963; Eriksen, 1960). In this 
thesis I will investigate how the integration of information on a moment-by-moment basis 
and how learning over the course of several days alters and determines conscious perception. 
Th   ese two time scales of previous experience are naturally linked: Short-term experience can 
be used to form templates which are immediately available and eff  ective to aid conscious per-
ception. If such templates are repeatedly  requested  and  confi  rmed, they can be permanent-
ly  laid  down  in  the  brain  through  learning.  Furthermore, short-term experience must be 
integrated with knowledge already acquired through long-term learning. Th  us,  the  creation, 
testing and updating of knowledge forms a continuous loop in which the most valuable predic-
tions are stabilized in brain structure and function. 
DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENTS
Before describing the experiments, I will defi  ne several terms and outline how I measure 
conscious perception: I understand conscious perception as the representation of internal or 
external changes that are accessible to introspection or direct report. Accordingly, I will regard 
an event as consciously perceived whenever a subject can report the presence or absence of a 
stimulus or its identity. With regard to measurement, I take the stance that task performance 
alone cannot be considered an exhaustive measure of awareness. Rather, subjective measures 
need to be taken seriously (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Lau, 2008a; Merikle, Smilek, & East-
wood, 2001; Wiens, 2007). Th   is conviction is based on conceptual and empirical arguments. If 
one is interested in what can be considered the key aspect of conscious experience, namely the 
subjective impression of the subject, it is crucial to acquire subjective measures of experience, 
because only the subject itself has access to its own sensations. Also, it has been demonstrated in 7
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carefully designed experiments that subjective and objective measures can dissociate, not only in 
patients with blindsight (reviewed in Cowey, 2004; Stoerig, 2006), but also in healthy subjects 
(e.g., Lau & Passingham, 2006). Th   us, although we need to be aware of the potential pitfalls of 
subjective measures (e.g., their sensitivity to response bias), they constitute our prime indicator 
of whether a stimulus was consciously perceived or not. In contrast, task performance is most 
parsimoniously explained by processing, but not necessarily experiencing stimuli. 
CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION AS A RESULT OF LONG-TERM   
  EXPERIENCE
In Chapters 2 and 3, I will present studies on how perceptual learning changes not only 
our capacity to process (and thus to discriminate) stimuli, but how it also changes our subjective 
experience of these stimuli. Perceptual learning is broadly defi  ned as “any relatively permanent 
and consistent change in the perception of a stimulus array following practice or experience with 
this array” (E. J. Gibson, 1963). Although perceptual learning is a well-studied phenomenon, 
the question of how it changes our subjective experience has not been addressed. Do we actually 
“see more” aft  er training? Research in this fi  eld has mostly concentrated on how subjects learn 
to distinguish between two or more stimulus alternatives that are repeatedly presented over the 
course of many thousand trials. For example, aft  er suffi   cient practice, participants’ sensitivity to 
discriminate the alignment of Vernier stimuli signifi  cantly increases, even into the hyperacuity 
range (Poggio, Fahle, & Edelman, 1992). Psychophysical (Karni & Sagi, 1991; Schoups, Vogels, 
& Orban, 1995) as well as brain imaging work in humans (Schiltz et al., 1999; S. Schwartz, Ma-
quet, & Frith, 2002; Yotsumoto et al., 2009; Yotsumoto, Watanabe, & Sasaki, 2008) and elec-
trophysiological studies in monkeys (Raiguel, Vogels, Mysore, & Orban, 2006; Schoups, Vogels, 
Qian, & Orban, 2001; Yang & Maunsell, 2004; Zohary, Celebrini, Britten, & Newsome, 1994) 
point to early visual areas as the most likely stage at which such perceptual learning occurs. 
However, although such increases in sensitivity have been dubbed “learning to see” (Crist, Li, & 8
Chapter 1
Gilbert, 2001; Sagi & Tanne, 1994), this is somewhat a misnomer, as it is evident that objective 
performance in a task and awareness of the stimuli on which the task is performed can dissoci-
ate: For example, subjects can learn to discriminate the orientation (Seitz, Kim, & Watanabe, 
2009) or motion direction (Watanabe, Nanez, & Sasaki, 2001) of stimuli without awareness of 
the learning material neither during nor aft  er the training. Hence, if a subject learns to discrimi-
nate stimuli, it does not immediately follow from this that the stimuli were also experienced.
Here, I explicitly test the relationship of processing and experiencing a stimulus during 
long-term perceptual learning. In particular, I test whether it is necessary and/or suffi   cient to 
see a stimulus in order to discriminate it, whether learning to discriminate and learning to see 
exhibit the same or diff  erent learning curves, and whether they depend on the same circuits in 
the brain. 
CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION AND SHORT-TERM EXPERIENCE
In Chapter 4, I investigate how knowledge acquired on a moment-by-moment basis af-
fects conscious perception. In particular, I study how such knowledge can be used to generate 
predictions about upcoming events and how this aff  ects the neural correlates of consciousness. 
Despite the complexity of our visual environment and the fact that visual input tends to be oc-
cluded, ambiguous, unclear, or presented from an infi  nite number of diff  erent points of view, we 
usually have the impression to see well. Th   is might also be because our visual environment con-
tains many sources of prediction: objects stay in the visual fi  eld for a relatively long time; they 
move predictably; even newly appearing objects are mostly predictable due to their context. 
Predictions then serve the purpose of aiding perception of degraded input. Although theories 
that highlight the role of predictions in brain functioning are gaining acceptance (Engel, et al., 
2001; Friston, 2010; Mumford, 1992; Rao & Ballard, 1999), current theories of consciousness 
do not explicitly model the infl  uence of such prior knowledge on experience. Here, I study the 
eff  ect of short-term experience and ensuing predictions by taking advantage of a phenomenon 9
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called ‘hysteresis’. ‘Hysteresis’ is a term taken from physics, which denotes the propensity of a 
dynamical system to remain in a state once it has acquired that state. A classic example in vision, 
already noted by Helmholtz (1867, p. 728f.), comes from stereopsis: If the two images in the 
stereoscope are initially placed such that they match and can easily be fused, and subsequently 
pulled apart, depth can still be perceived even if the monocular images are further apart than 
the interpupillary distance (Fender & Julesz, 1967). Th   us, perceiving the fused images stabilizes 
the percept against later disruptions of sensory information. To specifi  cally investigate the eff  ect 
of previous experience on conscious perception and its neuronal correlates, I create hysteresis by 
gradually revealing a visual stimulus from noise until it is fully visible and subsequently decrease 
stimulus visibility. Under such conditions, once the stimulus has been recognized, the knowl-
edge of stimulus identity can be used to make predictions about the upcoming stimulus which 
then interact with bottom-up information and aids perception. Perception is thus stabilized 
against the reduction in available information. 
Th   is paradigm constitutes a straight forward test for models that view conscious percep-
tion as the result of evidence accumulation, similar to what has been proposed for decision making 
(Smith & Ratcliff  , 2004). In such models, the decision process constitutes a race between stimulus 
alternatives, in which evidence is gathered from noisy input until a response criterion has been 
reached. Providing the system with prior information could in principle lower the decision thresh-
old (Smith & Ratcliff  , 2004), accelerate the rate of evidence accumulation (Brown & Heathcote, 
2005), or give one of the possible interpretations of the visual input a head start (Carpenter & 
Williams, 1995). In the context of conscious perception, however, the eff  ects of prior information 
are not considered. Rather, it is proposed that evidence for a coherent conscious percept is always 
accumulated from various preconsciously operating modules until it has reached a decision bound 
(Dehaene, 2008). Th   is decision is then broadcasted throughout the brain, which occurs at the 
end of evidence accumulation, and thus late. Such late correlates of consciousness have oft  en been 
observed empirically, occurring around 300 ms post stimulus (Del Cul, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2007; 10
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Gaillard et al., 2009). In fact, some even propose the occurrence of late activity as the sole marker of 
conscious experience (Lamme, 2006). However, when previous knowledge is taken into account, 
a straightforward prediction is that the processes leading to conscious perception should speed up 
accordingly, potentially shift  ing the neural correlate of consciousness in time. Th   is directly leads 
to the question whether the neural correlate of consciousness is attached to one particular brain 
process, or whether this link can vary depending on how conscious experience comes about. Here, 
I investigate these questions using electroencephalography, because this method off  ers an exquisite 
temporal resolution to investigate the sequence of neuronal events leading to a conscious percept. 
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE CAN MAKE CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION  
  GO TWO DIFFERENT WAYS
Admittedly, however, previous experience does not always stabilize perception. In-
stead, previous experience can have the reverse eff  ect: Seeing the opposite of what was there. 
In particular, prolonged viewing of a stimulus oft  en leads to so-called repulsive aft  ereff  ects. 
For example, exposure to one direction of motion causes subsequently viewed stimuli to ap-
pear moving in the opposite direction, an aft  ereff  ect also known as the “waterfall illusion” 
(Purkinje, 1820). Similar eff  ects can be observed when viewing oriented lines (J. J. Gibson & 
Radner, 1937), color (Webster & Mollon, 1991), alphanumeric characters (Whitaker & Mc-
Graw, 2000), and even faces (Leopold, O’Toole, Vetter, & Blanz, 2001; Webster & MacLin, 
1999). Such aft  ereff  ects are usually attributed to neuronal adaptation (e.g., Anstis, Verstraten, 
& Mather, 1998). It is important to note that adaptation is no longer conceived as simple 
neuronal fatigue, but instead as a computational strategy that serves to optimally code and 
transmit information (Barlow, 1990; Barlow & Földiák, 1989; Cliff  ord, Wenderoth, & Spehar, 
2000; Wainwright, 1999). Furthermore, adaptation is not confi  ned to the single neuron, but 
constitutes a complex network phenomenon (Felsen et al., 2002; Gutnisky & Dragoi, 2008; 
Hansen & Dragoi, 2011). 11
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Given that previous experience can apparently make conscious perception go two dif-
ferent ways, stabilizing what we saw before (hysteresis) or seeing the opposite of what was there 
(adaptation induced aft  ereff  ects), I investigate what determines the direction of the eff  ect of 
previous experience in Chapter 5. To this end, I use multistable stimuli because they allow iso-
lating the eff  ect of conscious experience itself from the eff  ects of mere stimulus processing in 
hysteresis and adaptation. When multistable stimuli are presented intermittently, perception 
on a given trial depends on the one hand on which interpretation has been perceived in the trial 
before, and on the other hand on the amount of stimulus evidence that was provided in the trial 
before. Th   e former dependency allows studying hysteresis, while the latter allows studying adap-
tation. I track these two eff  ects in behavior, and, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, 
in the brain, where I ask the question whether hysteresis and adaptation arise from the same cor-
tical networks. Th   is enables me to address a recent debate on whether hysteresis and adaptation 
can be explained by a single mechanism (Gepshtein & Kubovy, 2005) or by two mechanisms 
(Brascamp, Pearson, Blake, & van den Berg, 2009; Noest, van Ee, Nijs, & van Wezel, 2007; Wil-
son, 2007), and whether what enters consciousness is what is predicted or what was unexpected. 
More generally, this pertains to the still unresolved question of how the brain maintains the bal-
ance between exploiting redundancies and staying sensitive to new information.
A THEORETICAL EMBEDDING
Can the long- and short-term eff  ects of previous experience be summarized under a 
single theoretical framework? Here, I propose that this is possible using a Bayesian model of 
perception (for recent reviews, see Geisler, 2008; Vilares & Körding, 2011; Yuille & Kersten, 
2006). In this framework, perception is the result of an inference, in which the available sen-
sory information is compared to a prediction derived from previous experience. Importantly, 
a central assumption is that evidence is not deterministically, but probabilistically related to 
perception: Given that input is noisy and ambiguous it is the task of our perceptual apparatus to 12
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estimate the likelihood by which a certain feature or object was present in a scene. Th   us, a neural 
representation would not be of a feature or object, but an estimate of the probability that this 
feature or object was present. Th   is calculation takes both the currently available information 
and all prior information into account, which is why the Bayesian framework is so valuable in 
understanding the role of previous experience in conscious perception. In formal terms, percep-
tion depends on the probability distribution of the available evidence on the one hand, and on 
a prior (the expectation that the world will be in a particular state) on the other hand. What 
we perceive is the result of the application of Bayes’ rule (1763) to the likelihood function and 
the prior, resulting in the so-called posterior distribution. Empirical support for this framework 
stems from studies showing that human perception indeed approximates the behavior of Bayes-
ian Ideal Observers (Fiser, Berkes, Orban, & Lengyel, 2010).  
A recent proposal for a neural implementation of the Bayesian framework posits that the 
brain actively tries to optimize its priors in order to reduce the error that arises when priors and 
incoming evidence do not match (Friston, 2010; also see Lee & Mumford, 2003; Rao & Ballard, 
1999). In particular, it is proposed that within a hierarchical system, higher order brain areas gen-
erate predictions (corresponding to the priors), which are tested against the incoming evidence in 
lower areas. Th   e mismatch (or “prediction error”) is signaled back to the higher areas, which then 
revise their predictions. Th   is naturally entails an online learning process through which priors are 
continuously updated and refi  ned. Th   us, using previous experience on the long- and short-term 
scale is a crucial ingredient of perception. As will be outlined in detail in Chapter 5, the opposing 
eff  ects of hysteresis and adaptation can be understood as refl  ecting changes in the prior and in the 
likelihood function, respectively. Evidence that the brain indeed performs hierarchical Bayesian 
inference is accumulating mostly in human brain imaging studies (Alink, Schwiedrzik, Kohler, 
Singer, & Muckli, 2010; Garrido, Kilner, Stephan, & Friston, 2009; S. O. Murray, Kersten, Olshau-
sen, Schrater, & Woods, 2002; Summerfi  eld, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008), but re-
cently also in electrophysiological recordings in animals (Berkes, Orban, Lengyel, & Fiser, 2011). 13
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SUMMARY
In summary, the human brain is an adaptative and active system which modifi  es the way 
it processes input through learning by exploiting previous experience and ensuing predictions. 
Th   is fact is clearly underappreciated by current theories about consciousness and its neuronal 
correlates. In my thesis, I aim to fi  ll this ostensible gap. In particular, I investigate how previ-
ous experience on a long time scale, based on extensive perceptual learning, and how previous 
experience on a short time scale, i.e., predictions based on information from a previous trial, 
aff  ect conscious perception at threshold. I ask whether consciousness is malleable by practice, 
like other cognitive functions, or whether the threshold for conscious perception is fi  xed. If con-
sciousness is something that we can learn, we might also be able to recover it in case it is lost, for 
example in patients with brain lesions. I also examine what distinguishes processing from experi-
encing, and whether they rely on the same brain networks. Th   is directly pertains to the question 
whether we can localize the neural correlates of consciousness to a particular place in the brain. 
On a short time scale, I study how previous experience might speed up conscious perception. 
Here, the question is whether the neural correlate of consciousness can be regarded as an event 
fi  xed in time, or whether its occurrence is fl  exible. Finally, I address why previous experience can 
make us sometimes more likely and sometimes less likely to see something (again). Th   is serves to 
tackle the problem of how we see something expected while staying receptive to the unexpected. 15
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Can practice effects on unconscious stimuli lead to awareness? Can we “learn to see”? Recent evi-
dence suggests that blindsight patients trained for an extensive period of time can learn to discriminate 
and consciously perceive stimuli that they were previously unaware of. So far, it is unknown whether 
these effects generalize to normal observers. Here we investigated practice effects in metacontrast 
masking. Subjects were trained for ﬁ ve consecutive days on the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) that 
resulted in chance performance. Our results show a linear increase in sensitivity (d’) but no change in 
bias (c) for the trained SOA. This practice effect on sensitivity spreads to all tested SOAs. Addition-
ally, we show that subjects rate their perceptual awareness of the target stimuli differently before and 
after training, exhibiting not only an increase in sensitivity, but also in the subjective awareness of the 
percept. Thus, subjects can indeed “learn to see”.
SENSITIVITY AND PERCEPTUAL 
AWARENESS INCREASE WITH PRACTICE 
IN METACONTRAST MASKING16
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It is well accepted that the brain is a highly plastic organ that can undergo major changes 
in function and morphology not only during development, but also in an adult state. Th  is  plas-
ticity has been intensively investigated in studies of perceptual learning and it has been shown 
that the sensitivity to stimulus features can be drastically improved with practice (Ahissar & 
Hochstein, 1998; Goldstone, 1998). Furthermore, not only basic perceptual skills are subject to 
practice-dependent changes, but also higher cognitive functions such as visuo-spatial attention 
(C. S. Green & Bavelier, 2003) or working memory (Olesen, et al., 2004). However, the poten-
tial plasticity of another characteristic of the human brain, namely its capacity to produce per-
ceptual awareness (PA), has not been thoroughly investigated. Specifi  cally, it is so far unknown 
whether practice can render a previously invisible stimulus visible, whether we can “learn to see”. 
In a clinical context, this is an important question, as patients with acquired impairments of 
conscious perception, such as blindsight patients, might be trained to become conscious again. 
Th   e very essence of blindsight is a dissociation between chance performance for simple yes-no 
responses (a subjective measure of awareness) and above chance performance in forced-choice 
procedures (an objective measure of awareness). Practice can lead to improved performance in 
forced-choice procedures in human blindsight patients (Bridgeman & Staggs, 1982; Chok-
ron et al., 2008; Henriksson, Raninen, Näsänen, Hyvärinen, & Vanni, 2007; Raninen, Vanni, 
Hyvärinen, & Näsänen, 2007; Stoerig, 2006; Zihl, 1980; Zihl & Werth, 1984) as well as in 
monkeys with bilateral ablation of primary visual cortex (V1) (Dineen & Keating, 1981; Hum-
phrey, 1974). Although very high levels of accuracy can be reached in forced-choice tasks, the 
dissociation between objective and subjective measures oft  en remains unchanged (Sahraie et 
al., 1997). However, without a concomitant increase in subjective awareness the psychological 
strain of acquired blindness is not alleviated, and blindsight capabilities are not used in everyday 
life. A recent systematic study in a sample of 12 cortically blind human subjects who carried out 
daily discrimination training over a period of three months found not only an increase in sensi-
tivity deep in the blind visual fi  eld, but also an increase in reported PA of the stimuli (Sahraie et 17
Sensitivity and perceptual awareness increase with practice in metacontrast masking
al., 2006; also see Zihl & von Cramon, 1985). Th   ese results are interesting because they indicate 
that cortical blindness resulting from brain damage is at least partially reversible. Furthermore, 
the result that - apart from sensitivity - acknowledged awareness of the stimuli increases with 
practice points to the possibility that not only basic visual functions, but also awareness itself 
is trainable. If that should indeed be the case, it would be an indication that the “threshold of 
visual awareness” is not fi  xed, even in the case of permanent cortical damage. However, it is so 
far unknown whether such training eff  ects generalize to normal observers.
A common practice in the study of unconscious perception is to use masking in order to 
present stimuli at or below the threshold of visual awareness. In metacontrast masking (Alpern, 
1953), a trailing, non-overlapping mask is used to render a stimulus that precedes the mask invis-
ible. Depending on the task and the stimuli used, a U-shaped function of performance is usually 
obtained, with a minimum at a positive, non-zero stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between 
stimulus and the subsequent mask (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2006, p.43ff  ). Metacontrast mask-
ing has been used to study unconscious perception in normal subjects, for example to induce 
conditions of “relative” blindsight (Lau & Passingham, 2006), subliminal priming (Neumann 
& Klotz, 1994; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2004), and to investi-
gate the relationship between attention and awareness (Kentridge, Nijboer, & Heywood, 2008). 
Part of the attraction of metacontrast masking stems from the huge database accumulated over a 
century of behavioural research (for a recent review, see Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2006).
Here, we used metacontrast masking to study the eff  ects of training on sensitivity and 
awareness in normal subjects. We hypothesized that if the information of the target stimulus 
is available to the visual system although the stimulus is not consciously perceived, and if the 
“threshold of visual awareness” is not fi  xed, training should render previously invisible stimuli 
visible (also see Kanwisher, 2001). To test this hypothesis, we fi  rst measured sensitivity as a func-
tion of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) in a two alternative forced-choice (2AFC) form dis-
crimination task in individual subjects. We then chose the SOA that yielded zero sensitivity and 18
Chapter 2
continued to train our subjects on this SOA for fi  ve consecutive days. To test the upper limits 
of the eff  ects of training, we also trained an individual subject over a period of 24 days. Aft  er 
training, we assessed the subjects’ performance over a wide range of SOAs and at a non-trained 
transfer position. Additionally, we measured the PA of the stimuli that subjects reported before 
and aft  er training. Using Signal Detection Th   eory (SDT) we fi  nd that subjects not only improve 
linearly in sensitivity (while their bias is largely constant), but that their reported PA of the 
stimuli also increases aft  er training. Th   ese improvements are still detectable aft  er several months. 
We thus hypothesize that awareness itself is indeed trainable.
0.02°
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Figure 2-1. Stimuli. A square (0.41°×0.41°) and a diamond (0.63°×0.63°) were used as target stimuli. Th  e  out-
lines of the targets were 0.02° wide. Th   e mask stimulus was a star-shaped fi  gure made up of two squares and two 
diamonds directly neighboring the positions of the target stimuli on their inside and outside borders (gap width 
0.02°).19
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METHODS
Participants
Eight subjects (fi  ve male, mean age 24, range 22-27) participated in the main experi-
ment lasting fi  ve sessions, and one additional subject (female, age 23) was trained over a period 
of 24 sessions. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological 
and/or psychiatric disease. Handedness was assessed using the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfi  eld, 
1971). Th   e mean laterality quotient was H=74.49 (range 58.3-91.6), indicating that all nine 
subjects were right-handed. All subjects gave written informed consent.  
Stimuli
Stimuli were displayed on a CRT monitor (Sony GDM 5502, resolution 1024×768) 
at a refresh rate of 100 Hz. Subjects viewed the screen from 1 m distance. Th   e visible screen size 
was 21.05°×16.17°. Stimulus presentation and response recording were controlled by Presen-
tation soft  ware (version 10.3, www.neurobs.com), running under Microsoft   Windows 98. All 
stimuli were presented on a dark gray background (6.26 cd/m2). A white fi  xation cross (53 cd/
m2, 0.56°×0.56°) was displayed at the center of the screen. 
Stimuli were presented at 3.2° either above or below fi  xation (position was counter-
balanced across subjects). A square (0.41°×0.41°) and a diamond (0.63°×0.63°) were used as 
target stimuli. Th   e outlines of the targets were 0.02° wide and had a luminance of 34.42 cd/m2. 
Th   e mask stimulus was a star-shaped fi  gure made up of two squares and two diamonds directly 
neighboring the positions of the target stimuli on their inside and outside borders. Th  e  mask 
outlines had a width of 0.065° on the outside and a width between 0.043° and 0.086° on the 
inside (with regard to the stimuli). Th   e mask had the same luminance as the target stimuli. En-
larged versions of targets and mask can be seen in Figure 2-1. 
A combination of para- (forward) and metacontrast (backward) masking has been 
shown to be especially eff  ective with regard to masking (Macknik & Livingstone, 1998). We 20
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thus used such a combination to mask our target stimuli in order to create conditions where we 
would obtain a d’=0 and to avoid potential ceiling eff  ects. Each trial started with a fi  xation pe-
riod of variable length (between 1000 and 1500 ms). Subsequently, the paracontrast mask was 
presented for 50 ms. Aft  er a fi  xed inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 30 ms, the target was present-
ed for 10 ms. Th   e metacontrast mask was presented for 50 ms at stimulus onset asynchronies 
(SOA) ranging from 20 ms to 160 ms (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160 ms) for the threshold 
estimation or at an individually determined SOA during the training sessions. Responses were 
recorded only aft  er mask off  set.
Procedure
Th   e main task was to discriminate the two target stimuli (square from diamond) in a 
forced-choice procedure: Subjects were instructed to quickly press the button “S” on a keyboard 
whenever they saw the diamond and to press the button “L” whenever they saw a square. Accu-
racy and not speed was emphasized. Subjects were also informed that both stimulus alternatives 
would appear in a randomized order but with equal probabilities and that there were no catch 
trials. In addition to the discrimination task, subjects rated their PA of the stimuli on a three-
point-scale (see below). 
Subjects were asked to maintain fi  xation on the center of the screen throughout the ex-
perimental sessions. Instructions were given in both verbal and written form. Th  e  experiments 
were conducted in a darkened room. Constant head position was assured by the use of a chinrest 
with forehead support. 
Th   e experiment took place over a period of fi  ve consecutive days. On the fi  rst day, we 
assessed for each subject the SOA that would yield the maximal masking in a typical threshold 
experiment. Th   is SOA was then used for the training. Th  e  fi  rst training session was conducted 
directly aft  er the assessment of the critical SOA on the fi  rst day. On days two to four, only train-
ing sessions were conducted. On the fi  ft  h and last day, the last training session was administered. 21
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Aft  er this last training session, we again assessed the masking threshold, followed by the transfer 
task. Each part of the experiment will be described in detail below. 
Th  reshold  estimation
Before threshold estimation, subjects carried out practice trials of “slow motion” ver-
sions of the upcoming experimental trials in order to familiarize them with the stimuli and with 
the task. For the threshold estimations, we presented target stimuli at SOAs ranging from 20 
ms to 160 ms. Each target was presented 40 times at each SOA, yielding 80 trials per SOA and 
a total of 640 trials. Aft  er every 160 trials, we introduced a break of variable length. Th  e  occur-
rence of SOAs was randomized but counterbalanced over blocks. Th   e sequence of target stimuli 
was fully randomized and no feedback was given. 
In addition to target discrimination, subject rated their PA of the respective stimulus on 
a three-point-scale aft  er every trial. To this end, we presented a screen with the question “How 
visible was the stimulus? Invisible / unclear / clearly visible” aft  er the subject’s forced-choice 
response. Subjects were instructed to respond with key presses for “invisible” if they did not 
see the stimulus, for “unclear” if they saw something but could not identify it, and for “clearly 
visible” if they unmistakably saw the stimulus. Th   ese questions were not aimed at the subjects’ 
confi  dence in their reports, but at their phenomenal impression of the stimulus. Th   us, our scale 
diff  ers from previously used scales that either assessed only confi  dence (Persaud, McLeod, & 
Cowey, 2007; Wilimzig, Tsuchiya, Fahle, Einhäuser, & Koch, 2008), or a compound of confi  -
dence and PA (Wessinger, Fendrich, & Gazzaniga, 1999). Th   is is an important distinction, be-
cause it has been shown that confi  dence and awareness are not equivalent measures and recover 
diff  erently aft  er repeated exposure in blindsight patients (Sahraie, Weiskrantz, & Barbur, 1998). 
Our operationalization of PA was discussed with the subjects before the fi  rst threshold estima-
tion. It was further pointed out to the subjects that there were neither right nor wrong answers 
to the question and that they should rate only their perception of the target stimulus and not the 22
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whole stimulus sequence or the mask stimulus. Th   e threshold estimation took approximately 1 
h. Th   resholds and PA were estimated before the fi  rst and aft  er the last training session.
Training sessions
From the threshold estimation, we extracted the SOA with the lowest performance in-
dividually for each subject. Th   is SOA was then used in the training sessions. Data from the PA 
rating was not used to choose the training SOA, and no rating of PA was required during train-
ing. Subjects engaged in the forced-choice discrimination task for 600 trials per training session 
(a total of 3000 trials). Aft  er every 100 trials, a break was introduced. Subjects received feedback 
(correct / incorrect) aft  er every response as well as aft  er every block of 100 trials (percentage cor-
rect). Correct / incorrect feedback was displayed at fi  xation for 1000 ms in green letters (font 
Arial, font size 20 pt, 37.68 cd/m2) or red letters (9.05 cd/m2), respectively. A training session 
lasted approximately 30 min. 
To ensure stable high motivation across subjects, we developed a pay-off   scheme based 
on monetary reward. Subjects would receive €5 for each of the training sessions. If they im-
proved in their performance by at least 10%, they could earn an additional €2 per day. However, 
if they showed no gain or even a decrease in performance as compared to the previous day, they 
would lose €2. Performance levels (in percentage correct) were written down aft  er each training 
session and subjects were reminded of their previous performance as well as the pay-off   scheme 
before each training session. Also, subjects were reinstructed about the discrimination task.  
Transfer task
On the last day of the experiment, we assessed whether the exercise on the trained 
stimulus position would transfer to another position. To this end, we switched the stimulus 
position to its mirror position above or below the fi  xation cross. For instance, if a subject had 
been trained on the position above the fi  xation cross, the new stimulus position would now be 23
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below the fi  xation cross. Subjects had no prior knowledge that the stimulus position would be 
switched. We employed the same SOAs and the same procedure as during the other training ses-
sions (see “Training sessions”). Subjects could earn an additional €2 if they reached at least the 
performance of the last session on the originally trained position. 
Retest
During the retest session, which took place between fi  ve and ten months aft  er the last 
training session, we again assessed objective and subjective thresholds, followed by a test of sen-
sitivity at the transfer position (procedure as for the initial transfer task). Subjects received 15€ 
for their participation in the retest.
Analysis
In order to calculate d’ and c values, square trials were considered signal trials and dia-
mond trials were considered noise trials (Wickens, 2002, p.114). For the threshold data, this 
yielded 40 signal and 40 noise trials per SOA. We calculated d’ and c for each SOA indepen-
dently, thus the values indicate discriminability of signal and noise trials at a given SOA and not 
discriminability between SOAs. For the training data, 300 signal and 300 noise trials were avail-
able per session. To correct for extreme false alarm or hit rate proportions, we used the loglinear 
correction. In this approach, 0.5 is added to the number of hits and false alarms, and 1 is added 
to the number of signal trials and the number of noise trials. Th   e loglinear correction reduces 
bias in the calculation of d’ when corrections have to be applied in order to avoid infi  nite z score 
values (Hautus, 1995). 
2AFC tasks are usually considered to be bias-free. However, this assumption does not 
always hold true (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005, p.170ff  ). Furthermore, it has been shown 
that perceptual learning can lead to changes in sensitivity as well as bias (Wenger, Copeland, 
Bittner, & Th   omas, 2008; Wenger & Rasche, 2006; also see Seitz, Nanez, Holloway, Koyama, 24
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& Watanabe, 2005). Th  us, we in-
cluded a measure of bias into our 
analysis. For the calculation of bias, 
three possible measures can be cal-
culated: the criterion location c (the 
distance between the criterion and 
the point at which the signal over 
the noise distribution cross), the 
relative bias c’ (the criterion loca-
tion relative to the corresponding 
d’), and the likelihood ratio β (the 
ratio of the heights of the signal and 
the noise distribution). We chose 
to calculate c for our purposes, be-
cause it is the only measure of bias 
that is orthogonal to but associated 
with sensitivity (d’) and fulfi  lls the 
monotonicity condition at and be-
low chance levels (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 1990). Furthermore, the 
range of c is similar to that of d’; this 
eases the comparison of the change 
in the two measures. 
Data from the PA rating 
could not be analyzed in a SDT 
framework, because we did not in-
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Figure 2-2. Average sensitivity (d’) and bias (c) from threshold 1 
and threshold 2. Errors bars represent the standard error of the 
mean.25
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clude catch trials in our paradigm. Th   us, given that the PA rating aimed at subjective impression 
of both the square and the diamond target stimuli, we did not have noise trials in this measure. 
Further, the data could not be analyzed as a type 2 task as the decision axis was not the decision 
in the 2AFC task but the stimulus itself (Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003). We instead 
calculated mean PA rating values at each SOA for correct responses, errors, and pooled correct 
responses and errors (see below). 
In all analyses of variance (ANOVA) with more than one degree of freedom we used the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction (McCall & Appelbaum, 1973). We report adjusted degrees of 
freedom and adjusted p values.
RESULTS
Discrimination performance
First threshold
Metacontrast masking yields either functions that show a linear relationship to SOA (type A 
masking) with maximal masking at a SOA of 0 ms or U-shaped functions of SOA (type B masking) 
with a maximal eff  ect at a time point greater than 0 ms. Usually, these functions are obtained from the 
hit rates. In order to assess whether our combination of para- and metacontrast masking yielded com-
parable functions in our paradigm with combined forward and backward masking, we fi  rst analyzed 
d’ and c values in repeated measures ANOVAs with the factor SOA (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 
160 ms). For d’, we indeed found a signifi  cant eff  ect of SOA (F(3.394,  23.757)=5.620, p=0.0036, 
η2=0.445), whereas for c, the eff  ect of SOA did not reach signifi  cance (F(4.003, 28.018)=1.178, 
p=0.342, η2=0.144). Th   is indicates that the experimental manipulation of the SOA led to changes in 
sensitivity, but not to changes in bias. As can be seen from Figure 2-2, both d’ and c vary with SOA 
in a complex way. To ease the interpretation of the results, we aligned the SOAs to the SOA at which 
the individual subject was subsequently trained. We then centered our analysis on the trained SOA 
per subject and further included one neighboring SOAs above and below, respectively. Five subjects 26
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were trained at a SOA of 80 ms, two 
at a SOA of 100 ms, and one at a SOA 
of 60 ms. As can be seen from Figure 
2-3, the reordering yielded a clearly 
U-shaped function of SOA for d’, but 
not for c. 
An additional ANOVA of 
this reduced sample of SOA (un-
trained below, trained, untrained 
above) confi   rmed the signifi  cant 
eff   ect of SOA for d’ ( F(1.513, 
10.591)=11.186, p=0.004, η2=0.615) 
and its non-signifi  cant  eff  ect  for  c 
(F(1.504,10.526)=0.378,  p=0.636, 
η2=0.051). Additionally, a within 
subjects contrast showed a signifi  cant 
quadratic trend of SOA for d’ (F(1, 
7)=50.178,  p=0.0002, η2=0.878). 
Th  us, the obtained functions of sen-
sitivity are comparable to U-shaped 
type B metacontrast masking func-
tions. 
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Figure 2-3. Sensitivity (d’) and bias (c) from threshold 1 and thresh-
old 2, individually aligned to the trained SOA. Errors bars represent 
the standard error of the mean.
To make sure that subjects were trained on a SOA that was at the objective threshold 
of conscious perception, we ran a two-sided t-test of their sensitivity values at that SOA against 
0. We indeed found that the d’ of the trained SOA was not signifi  cantly diff  erent from 0 (mean 
diff  erence 0.067, T(7)=0.620, p=0.555), indicating that subjects were objectively unaware of 27
Sensitivity and perceptual awareness increase with practice in metacontrast masking
the stimuli. By contrast, the sensitivity at the two neighboring untrained SOAs was signifi  cantly 
higher than 0 (below: mean diff  erence 0.4323, T(7)=4.448, p=0.003; above: mean diff  erence 
0.4472, T(7)=3.907, p=0.0058). Th   us, at these SOAs the subjects were objectively aware of the 
stimuli. 
A two-sided t-test of the corresponding values of c against 0 was also not signifi  cant at 
any of the three SOAs (all p>=0.3842). Th   is indicates that subjects were not biased to respond 
with either response alternative at these SOAs, as would be expected from a 2AFC task with 
equal probabilities for the two response alternatives.
Training sessions
To assess whether subjects improved in their performance throughout the training ses-
sions, we entered d’ and c values of the fi  ve training sessions into a repeated measures ANOVA. 
For d’, we found a signifi  cant eff  ect of session (F(1.824, 12.767)=15.578, p=0.0004, η2=0.690); a 
within subjects contrast yielded a signifi  cant linear trend (F(1, 7)=21.737, p=0.0023, η2=0.756) 
and a quadratic trend that approached signifi  cance (F(1, 7)=5.214, p=0.0564, η2=0.427). Fig-
ure 2-4 shows that subjects improved linearly in their sensitivity in the course of the training 
sessions, with a trend towards reaching a plateau for the two fi  nal sessions. Sensitivity increased 
on average by a d’ of 1.16 (SD 0.74) from the fi  rst to the fi  ft  h session.
For c, we did not fi  nd a signifi  cant eff  ect of session (F(3.283, 22.983)=0.852, p=0.488, 
η2=0.109). In fact, none of the c values obtained for the individual sessions diff  ered signifi  cantly 
from 0 (two-sided t-tests, all p>=0.2655, uncorrected). Th   us, while subjects improved linearly 
in sensitivity, their bias to respond with one or the other response alternative did not change 
during the training (also see Figure 2-4). 
Th  e  average  d’ for the fi  rst training session was 0.51 (SD 0.32) and signifi  cantly dif-
ferent from 0 (T(7)=4.470, p=0.0029). To address the question of when during the training 
session the subjects crossed the objective threshold, we split up the fi  rst session into six blocks 28
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of 100 trials (50 signal trials and 50 noise trials) each. Aft  er applying the loglinear correction, 
we tested d’ for each block against 0 using two-sided paired t-tests. Only the fi  rst block was 
not signifi  cantly diff  erent from 0 (mean diff  erence 0.3614, T(7)=2.219, p=0.0708). However, 
when two subjects were excluded that had a d’>1 already in the fi  rst block, we found that for 
the remaining subjects, the fi  rst as well as the second block were not signifi  cantly diff  erent from 
0 (fi  rst block: mean diff  erence 0.1278, T(5)=1.272, p=0.2594; second block: mean diff  erence 
0.3009, T(5)=1.740, p=0.1424). Th   us, the subjects crossed the objective threshold early during 
the fi  rst session. 
Perceptual learning is oft  en characterized by an initial rapid learning phase that is later 
followed by slow, sustained learning. To characterize the learning during the fi  rst session, we 
analyzed the average d’ of all subjects in each of the six blocks by means of a linear regression. We 
found that on average, d’ increased linearly not only over all sessions, but also within the fi  rst ses-
sion, ranging from d’=0.36 (SD 0.48) in the fi  rst block to d’=0.59 (SD 0.38) in the sixth block. 
Block number explained a signifi  cant proportion of variance in d’, R2=0.6601, F(1,4)=7.7677, 
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p<0.05. When we excluded the two subjects that had a d’>1 in the fi  rst block, similar results 
were obtained (R2=0.7906, F(1,4)=15.0987, p<0.02). Here, the average d’ ranged from d’=0.13 
(SD 0.25) in the fi  rst block to d’=0.49 (SD 0.40) in the sixth block. Linear regressions for the re-
maining sessions 2-5 were all non-signifi  cant (all p>0.083). Th   us, learning was characterized by 
a steep linear increase in sensitivity during the fi  rst session, followed by a more variable, gradual 
increase over the remaining sessions. 
Second threshold
Aft  er the subjects had signifi  cantly improved in their sensitivity to discriminate the two 
stimuli during the training sessions, we now tested how this improvement aff  ected the objective 
threshold as a function of SOA. We hypothesized that the training eff  ect could either be specifi  c 
to the trained SOA, aff  ect all SOAs, or aff  ect only a subsample of the SOAs. Th   us, we analyzed 
the performance in the second threshold estimation for both the full range of SOAs as well as 
the SOAs aligned to the trained SOA. 
For the full range of SOAs, we ran a repeated measures ANOVA with factors session 
(fi  rst, second) and SOA (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160 ms), again for both the d’ and the c val-
ues. For d’, we found a signifi  cant main eff  ect of session (F(1, 7)=27.311, p=0.0012, η2=0.796), 
and a signifi  cant main eff  ect of SOA (F(3.121, 21.849)=6.467, p=0.0024, η2=0.480), but no 
signifi  cant interaction (F(3.115, 21.805)=0.359, p=0.7903, η2=0.049). Th   us, training led to a 
signifi  cant improvement in the forced-choice discrimination task that aff  ected all SOAs, and 
not only the trained SOA (see Figure 2-2). 
Th  e same analysis for c yielded a signifi  cant main eff  ect of session (F(1, 7)=8.084, 
p=0.0249, η2=0.536), a signifi  cant main eff  ect of SOA (F(3.535, 24.746)=8.090, p=0.0003, 
η2=0.536), as well as a signifi  cant interaction of session and SOA (F(4.004, 28.027)=3.204, 
p=0.0275, η2=0.314). Post-hoc two-sided t-tests (uncorrected) revealed that the bias changed 
signifi  cantly with training only for the two shortest SOAs (20 ms: mean diff  erence -0.4375, 30
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T(7)=-3.628, p=0.0084; 40 ms: mean diff  erence -0.2030, T(7)=-2.512, p=0.0403; all other 
p>= 0.0651). Hence, for the two shortest SOAs, subjects became more biased to respond with 
“diamond” aft  er the training (also see Figure 2-2b).
Following our approach from the analysis of the fi  rst threshold, we again aligned the 
SOAs with the trained SOA and analyzed these data with repeated measures ANOVAs for both 
d’ and c. For d’, we confi  rmed the signifi  cant main eff  ect of session (F(1, 7)=30.553, p=0.0009, 
η2=0.814) and a signifi  cant main eff  ect of SOA (F(1.343, 9.402)=7.702, p=0.0158, η2=0.524), 
but no interaction between session and SOA (F(1.640, 11.480)=2.301, p=0.1494, η2=0.114). 
As can be seen from Figure 2-3a, the obtained function of SOA moves up and changes its shape, 
which indicates that no signifi  cant masking took place anymore aft  er the training. For c, we 
found no signifi  cant eff  ect or interaction (all p>=0.0907). 
Post-hoc t-tests revealed that the d’ values for the trained SOA indeed signifi  cantly dif-
fered before and aft  er the training (mean diff  erence -1.114, T(7)=-5.122, p=0.001, two-sided, 
uncorrected), and that the d’ for the trained SOA was signifi  cantly diff  erent from 0 aft  er the 
training (mean diff  erence 1.1821, T(7)=5.009, p=0.0007, one-sided, uncorrected). Th  e  cor-
responding estimate of c did not diff  er between the two thresholds (mean diff  erence -0.0964, 
T(7)=-1.214, p=0.264, uncorrected, two-sided), nor did it diff  er from 0 aft  er training (mean 
diff  erence 0.0209, T(7)=0.318, p=0.760, uncorrected, two-sided). Th  e  diff  erences in d’ and c 
for the trained SOA between the fi  rst and second threshold are displayed in Figure 2-5 for each 
subject individually.
Transfer task
In order to evaluate whether the training on one stimulus position showed transfer to 
another stimulus position, we compared d’ and c of the transfer task with the results from the 
fi  rst and last training sessions in paired two-sided t-tests. We reasoned that if the results from 
the transfer task were signifi  cantly lower than the results from the last session and lower than or 31
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Figure 2-5. Diff  erences in sensitivity (d’) and bias (c) for the trained SOA between threshold 1 and threshold 2 per 
subject.
equal to the results from the fi  rst session, this would argue for no transfer to an untrained stimu-
lus position. However, if the results from the transfer task were equal or higher than the results 
from the last session, this would point towards independence of the training eff  ects from the 
stimulus position. In the case of partial transfer, we would expect the results from the transfer 
task to lie somewhere between the results from the fi  rst and last training session. 
Th  e  average  d’ reached in the transfer task was 1.02 (SD 0.68), while the average c was 
-0.10 (SD 0.24). Th   is indicates that for d’, the results from the transfer task were signifi  cantly 
better than the results from the fi  rst training session (mean diff  erence 0.5068, T(7)=-2.895, 
p=0.0232), while there was no signifi  cant diff  erence between the transfer and the fi  ft  h training 
session (mean diff  erence -0.6579, T(7)=2.219, p=0.0620). Upon further inspection of the data, 
we found that the individual subjects’ diff  erences between the d’ values from the fi  ft  h session 
and the transfer session were negative in six out of eight cases. In the two remaining cases, the 
diff  erences were positive (0.34 and 0.30). When we excluded these two outliers, we found that 
the remaining subjects performed signifi  cantly worse in the transfer task as compared to the last 
training session (mean diff  erence -0.9854, T(5)=3.522, p=0.0169). Th   us, most subjects showed 
partial but not full transfer of the training eff  ects to the untrained stimulus position. Data for all 
subjects is displayed in Figure 2-4.
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For c, a two-sided t-test against 0 for all subjects revealed that the bias was not signifi  -
cantly diff  erent from 0 in the transfer task (mean diff  erence -0.1043, T(7)=-1.210, p=0.2655). 
Furthermore, the diff  erences between the bias in the transfer task and the bias in the fi  rst and 
in the last session were both not signifi  cantly diff  erent from 0 either (fi  rst session: mean dif-
ference -0.0776, T(7)=-0.854, p=0.4212; fi  ft  h session: mean diff  erence -0.1074, T(7)=-1.209, 
p=0.2660). Th   is indicates that a change of the stimulus position did not lead to a signifi  cant 
change in bias. 
Perceptual awareness rating
For the PA rating, our analyses aimed at three questions: 1. Do the PA ratings follow 
the same or a similar function of SOA as the objective measures that we obtained in the two 
alternative forced-choice task? 2. Do PA ratings increase as a result of training? 3. Do the PA rat-
ings diff  er depending on accuracy? We reasoned that the mean PA rating for correct responses 
should be higher than the mean PA rating for errors before as well as aft  er the training if there 
was a genuine increase in PA, whereas no diff  erence in the PA rating for correct and incorrect 
responses would indicate biasing eff  ects such as over- or underconfi  dence. Th  ese  three  questions 
where fi  rst addressed in a repeated measures ANOVA with factors session (fi  rst, second), ac-
curacy (correct responses, errors), and SOA (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160 ms). We found a 
signifi  cant main eff  ect of session (F(1, 7)=7.869, p=0.0263, η2=0.529), a signifi  cant main eff  ect 
of accuracy (F(1, 7)=18.730, p=0.0034, η2=0.728), and an eff  ect of SOA that only approached 
signifi  cance (F(2.770, 19.391)=3.021, p=0.0580, η2=0.301). Furthermore, we found a signif-
icant interaction of session and accuracy (F(1, 7)=21.890, p=0.0023, η2=0.758) as well as a 
signifi  cant interaction of accuracy and SOA (F(3.524, 24.669)=3.509, p=0.0249, η2=0.334), 
but no interaction of session and SOA (F(3.662, 25.635)=1.122, p=0.3652, η2=0.138), and 
no interaction of session, accuracy, and SOA (F(3.686, 25.805)=0.729, p=0.5702, η2=0.094). 
Th   ese results indicate that the mean PA ratings do not diff  er between SOAs, but that they do 33
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diff  er before and aft  er training, and 
that this diff  erence is modulated by 
accuracy. To further elucidate these 
results, we fi  rst split up our data set 
by session in order to investigate 
whether the mean PA rating was 
higher for correct than for incorrect 
responses both before as well as af-
ter the training. Th   is was confi  rmed 
for the data from the fi  rst threshold 
by means of a repeated measures 
ANOVA with factors SOA (20, 
40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160 ms) 
and accuracy (correct responses, 
errors). We found a signifi  cant ef-
fect of accuracy (F(1, 7)=9.321, 
p=0.0185, η2=0.571), but no eff  ect 
of SOA (F(3.574, 25.015)=2.107, 
p=0.1158, η2=0.231), and no inter-
action (F(3.551, 24.858)=0.771, 
p=0.5406, η2=0.099). Th   us, the PA 
rating was sensitive to variations in 
accuracy at each SOA before the 
training, showing higher PA for 
correctly identifi   ed stimuli than 
for incorrectly identifi  ed  stimuli 
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(mean diff  erence 0.1056, SE 0.35). Th   e same analysis for the PA scores of the second threshold 
yielded identical results: We found a signifi  cant eff  ect of accuracy (F(1, 7)=23.6, p=0.0018, 
η2=0.771), but no eff  ect of SOA (F(3.891, 27.237)=1.858, p=0.1480, η2=0.210), and no in-
teraction (F(3.177, 22.236)=2.352, p=0.0967, η2=0.252). Th   us, the PA scores retained their 
sensitivity for accuracy even aft  er the training, with higher scores for correct responses than for 
errors (mean diff  erence 0.2482, SE 0.51). Th   e results from the fi  rst and second threshold are 
illustrated in Figure 2-6 b and c.
Based on the previous analyses, we now continued to split up the PA ratings by accuracy 
for further analyses. In order to answer the question whether subjects become more aware of 
the stimuli aft  er the training we analyzed the mean PA rating only for correct responses in a re-
peated measure ANOVA with factors session (fi  rst, second) and SOA (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 
140, 160 ms). We found a signifi  cant eff  ect of session (F(1, 7)=10.459, p=0.0144, η2=0.599) 
as well as a signifi  cant eff  ect of SOA (F(2.817, 19.719)=7.729, p=0.0015, η2=0.525), and no 
interaction between these two factors (F(2.966, 20.760)=2.672, p=0.0745, η2=0.276). Th  ese 
results indicate that subjects became more aware of the stimuli that they also correctly identi-
fi  ed (see Figure 2-6a). Th   is seems to be the case not only for the trained SOA, but also for the 
untrained SOAs, thus paralleling the fi  ndings from the forced-choice task. To further elucidate 
the origin of the increase in PA for correct responses, we also calculated the proportion of “invis-
ible”, “unclear” and “clearly visible” responses for correct responses for the fi  rst and the second 
threshold at the trained SOA. To this end, we normalized the amount of the respective PA 
ratings by the amount of hits and compared these values for the two thresholds. As can be seen 
from Figure 2-7, the number of “unclear” correct responses did not change signifi  cantly from 
the fi  rst to the second threshold (mean diff  erence 0.0557, T(7)=0.5340, p=0.6099), while the 
number of “invisible” responses dropped to almost the same extent (mean diff  erence 0.2044, 
T(7)=2.4506, p=0.0441) as the number of “clearly seen” responses increased (mean diff  erence 
0.26, T(7)=2.8121, p=0.0261).35
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Figure 2-7. Proportion of perceptual awareness ratings for hits from threshold 1 and threshold 2. 
We also conducted a repeated measure ANOVA with factors session (fi  rst, second) and 
SOA (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160 ms) for erroneous responses. A higher awareness for er-
rors would be diffi   cult to interpret, but can be taken as an indication of a more liberal use of the 
scale or overconfi  dence aft  er the training. We only found an eff  ect of session that approached 
signifi  cance (F(1, 7)=5.361, p=0.0538, η2=0.434). Th   us, the PA for incorrectly identifi  ed stim-
uli did not change signifi  cantly, however, an eff  ect of overconfi  dence with regard to the PA rat-
ing cannot fully be ruled out, given the statistical trend in the data for errors. 
Retest
Four of the eight trained subjects could be retested between fi  ve and ten months aft  er 
their last training session. For the threshold performance, we compared d’ and c between the 
three data sets over all SOAs at the single subject level. At a signifi  cance level of p=0.05, we 
found the sensitivity over all SOAs to be signifi  cantly lower in the fi  rst threshold session than 
in the retest in all four subjects, while the sensitivity in the second threshold session was signifi  -
cantly higher than or equal to the sensitivity reached in the retest in three out of four subjects. 
Th   is indicates that the subjects retained some but not all of their training eff  ects. Th  e  criterion 
c was not signifi  cantly diff  erent from 0 in three out of four subjects. For the transfer position, 36
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we found neither sensitivity nor criterion to be signifi  cantly diff  erent from the previous assess-
ment (d’: mean diff  erence -0.1607, T(3)=-1.681, p=0.1913; c: mean diff  erence -0.0367, T(3)=-
0.2694, p=0.8041). For the PA rating, we found that the mean PA rating for correct responses 
over all SOAs was signifi  cantly lower in the fi  rst threshold session than in the retest in three out 
of four subjects. Th   e mean PA rating for correct responses was signifi  cantly higher in the second 
threshold than in the retest in three subjects as well. However, the mean PA rating for correct re-
sponses was signifi  cantly higher than the mean PA rating for errors in only two subjects, while it 
was signifi  cantly lower for one subject, and not signifi  cantly diff  erent for another subject. Th  us, 
although the subjects preserved high sensitivity levels even without further practice, the diff  er-
ential eff  ect of training for correct responses and errors on the PA rating was not fully retained 
in all subjects aft  er a period of fi  ve to ten months. 
Individual subject 
We also trained an individual subject for 24 consecutive sessions (14400 trials) to ob-
tain an approximation of the upper limit of the training eff  ects. Figure 2-8 shows the results of 
the fi  rst and second threshold estimations at the upper stimulus position. Th   e SOA yielding the 
lowest d’ value in the fi  rst threshold was 120 ms (d’=0.06, c=0.03). Th   e subject was subsequently 
trained on this SOA. Th  e  d’ reached in the fi  rst session was 1.05 (c=0.14), and 2.48 in the last 
session (c=0.19). We used a linear regression to analyze the development of d’ and c during the 
course of training. We found that session number explained a signifi  cant proportion of vari-
ance in d’, R2=0.908, F(1,22)=216.960, p<0.0001. Session number also explained a signifi  cant 
proportion of variance in c, R2=0.422, F(1,22)=16.090, p=0.001. However, session number ex-
plained only about half of the variance in c, while it explained most of the variance in d’. Also, 
d’ showed substantial improvement, reaching from 1.05 to 3.04 (range 1.99). At the same time, 
c stayed close to the unbiased 0 point, reaching from -0.06 to 0.30 (range 0.37). We interpret 
these results as to be in agreement with the results from the bigger sample trained for fi  ve con-37
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secutive sessions: While there is a 
signifi  cant linear improvement of 
sensitivity, the bias shows little or 
no systematic change in the course 
of training (see Figure 2-9).
As can be seen from Fig-
ure 2-8a and in agreement with the 
results from the bigger sample, we 
found an increase in sensitivity (d’) 
at almost every SOA for the second 
threshold. Th   is increase was especial-
ly pronounced for the trained SOA 
(fi  rst  threshold  d’=0.06, second 
threshold     d’=3.25). Th   e subject also 
became more biased to respond with 
“diamond”: Whereas the criterion 
at the trained SOA was 0.03 for the 
fi  rst threshold, it increased to 0.62 
for the second threshold (see Figure 
2-8b). 
For the transfer, d’ dropped 
to 0.62 (c=0.37). Th  e results from 
the transfer task were lower than 
the results from the last session 
(d’=2.48) and lower than the results 
from the fi  rst session d’=1.05). Th  is 
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Figure 2-8. Sensitivity (d’) and bias (c) from threshold 1 and thresh-
old 2 for an individual subject trained for 24 sessions.38
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result points towards no transfer of the increased sensitivity to the untrained stimulus position for 
this subject. 
To elucidate whether the individual subject became more aware of the stimuli as a result 
of the training, we calculated the mean PA ratings per SOA for correct responses and errors for 
each of the two thresholds. As in the larger sample of subjects, we fi  rst compared the PA rat-
ings for correct responses and errors of the fi  rst threshold. Th   is was done by means of a paired 
two-sided t-test, using each SOA as a sample. As the mean PA rating in the fi  rst threshold was 
higher for correct responses than for errors only in four out of eight SOAs (20, 40, 100, 160 
ms), the result of this test was not signifi  cant (mean diff  erence 0.0114, T(7)=0.492, p=0.6378). 
Nevertheless, we went on to compare the PA rating for correct responses and the PA rating for 
errors of the fi  rst and second threshold, again using paired two-sided t-tests using each SOA as 
a sample. Th   e PA rating for correct responses was signifi  cantly higher in the second than in the 
fi  rst threshold (mean diff  erence -0.2189, T(7)=5.287, p=0.0011), while the PA rating for er-
rors did not change (mean diff  erence -0.0930, T(7)=2.003, p=0.0852). Also, the PA rating for 
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Figure 2-9. Sensitivity (d’) and bias (c) over the training sessions and for the transfer task for an individual subject 
trained for 24 sessions.39
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correct responses was signifi  cantly higher than the PA rating for errors in the second threshold 
(mean diff  erence 0.1373, T(7)=4.608, p=0.0025). Th   us, the individual subject trained for 24 
sessions became more aware of the correctly identifi  ed stimuli, while she showed no change 
in PA for incorrectly identifi  ed stimuli aft  er the training. Th   e subject was also retested aft  er 
eight months. At a signifi  cance level of p=0.05, the sensitivity was signifi  cantly lower in the fi  rst 
threshold session than in the retest, while there was no signifi  cant diff  erence between the second 
threshold session and the retest. Th   us, the training eff  ect on sensitivity was retained. However, 
the criterion c was signifi  cantly higher than 0 over all SOAs in the retest, thus indicating that 
the subject was now biased to respond with “diamond”. For the PA rating, we found that the 
mean rating for correct responses was signifi  cantly higher during the retest than during the fi  rst 
threshold session, and signifi  cantly higher during the second threshold session that during the 
retest. Th  e  diff  erences in the mean PA rating for errors and the mean PA rating for correct re-
sponses only approached signifi  cance (p=0.0585). Th   ese results indicate that a limited amount 
of the improvements in PA were retained even aft  er eight months, which is in agreement with 
most of the other retested subjects.
DISCUSSION
Th   e results of this experiment show that subjects’ sensitivity to discriminate between 
two metacontrast-masked stimuli improves rapidly with practice in a linear manner. Th  is  eff  ect 
is not specifi  c to the trained timing of the stimuli, but generalizes to other timings as well. Fur-
thermore, some limited training eff  ects can be observed for a mirror-symmetric position relative 
to the horizontal meridian. Critically, when subjects are asked to report their PA of the masked 
stimuli, an increase in subjective PA can be measured aft  er the training. Th   e training eff  ects for 
both the objective as well as the subjective measure persist to a limited extent over a period of 
several months. We thus hypothesize that awareness is trainable, a conclusion that is in accor-
dance with recent fi  ndings in blindsight patients (Sahraie, et al., 2006). 40
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Improvements in objective measures
A number of studies have reported improvements in performance aft  er training under 
conditions of impaired conscious perception in normal observers. For example, training eff  ects 
have been shown to exist in forward (Coyne, 1981) and backward pattern masking paradigms 
(Braff  , Saccuzzo, Ingram, McNeill, & Langford, 1980; Hertzog, Williams, & Walsh, 1976; Mae-
hara & Goryo, 2003; Schiller, 1965; Schubö, Schlaghecken, & Meinecke, 2001; Ward & Ross, 
1977; Wolford & Kim, 1992; Wolford, Marchak, & Hughes, 1988), as well as under condi-
tions of crowding (Chung, 2007; Huckauf & Nazir, 2007). Our results are also consistent with 
previous reports on learning eff  ects in metacontrast masking. Hernandez and Left  on (1977) 
observed improvements in sensitivity and no changes in response bias over twelve sessions in a 
foveal metacontrast detection task. Similarly, Hogben and Di Lollo (1984) reported improve-
ments in a target location identifi  cation task over fi  ve sessions. However, none of these stud-
ies specifi  cally investigated whether subjects can become objectively aware of stimuli that they 
were previously unaware of. Accordingly, initial thresholds were above d’=0 in both previous 
metacontrast masking experiments (although no statistics are provided regarding this issue). 
Additionally, in these two studies subjects were not trained on the SOA that yielded the worst 
performance, but concurrently on all SOAs. Th   us, learning could have taken place at a SOA for 
which the target stimulus was consciously perceivable, and then transferred to other SOAs. 
Contrary to our and the above fi  ndings, two studies investigating subliminal priming un-
der metacontrast masking conditions observed no change in discrimination performance (d’=0) 
aft  er training with feedback. In a study by Klotz and Neumann (1999), subjects were required 
to discriminate whether or not a specifi  c target stimulus was present in any of two locations. 
Even though feedback was given and motivation was upheld by fi  nancial reward, subjects failed 
to improve signifi  cantly in their discrimination performance over up to 640 trials. In a similar 
study Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, and Schwarzbach (2004) found no improvements 
in the ability to discriminate the direction of a metacontrast masked target over more than 3000 41
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trials with error feedback. What might account for the diff  erences between these two studies 
and our results? In the study of Klotz and Neumann subjects had to attend to two potential 
target locations, whereas subjects were attending to just one location in our task. It has been 
shown that perceptual learning can occur without awareness of the target stimuli under certain 
conditions (Watanabe, et al., 2001). However, if attentional resources are further limited (by 
the attentional blink) learning does not occur anymore (Seitz, Lefebvre, Watanabe, & Jolicoeur, 
2005). Th   us, the combination of impaired awareness and distributed attention might have pre-
cluded improvements in discrimination performance. In the study by Vorberg and colleagues, 
subjects were instructed to withhold their responses for 600 ms, whereas in our study, subjects 
could respond as soon as the mask turned off  . It has been argued that subject can be briefl  y aware 
of a stimulus, but that delaying the response to a stimulus can lead to rapid forgetting and thus 
to an underestimation of initial awareness (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992; Lachter & Durgin, 
1999; Lachter, Durgin, & Washington, 2000). If improvements in discrimination performance 
do not go along with an improvement in memory, this diff  erence in task might account for the 
diff  erence between our study and the study by Vorberg and colleagues.
How might the improvements in sensitivity observed in our study come about? One 
possibility is that subjects learned to suppress the masks. Studies in pattern masking, where it is 
possible to change the mask while keeping the target stimulus constant, have shown that subjects 
can learn to suppress specifi  c masks with training, and that this eff  ect breaks down when the 
masks, but not when the target stimuli are changed (Schubö, et al., 2001; Wolford, et al., 1988). 
Th  ese  fi  ndings are in line with recent evidence from monkey inferotemporal cortex, where sup-
pression of the single unit response to the mask was the most consistent fi  nding when monkeys 
were trained to identify masked objects (Op de Beeck, Wagemans, & Vogels, 2007). In meta-
contrast masking, it has been shown that the suppression of the metacontrast mask by a second 
mask can lead to target recovery (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2006, p.254ff  ). Th   us, it is not unlikely 
that mask suppression is contributing to the observed improvements in target discrimination. 42
Chapter 2
Another possibility is that the signal of the target stimulus was strengthened (Gold, Bennett, & 
Sekuler, 1999). In discrimination tasks, an ideal observer would correlate input with templates 
of the possible targets, and respond according to the best fi  t. Refi  nement of the templates leads 
to less overlap, thus increasing discriminability. Accordingly, in monkeys trained to discriminate 
orientations the orientation selectivity of V1 neurons increases (Schoups, et al., 2001). 
Learning could also have taken place in the time domain. Th   ere is good evidence that 
observers can improve substantially in their ability to discriminate short time intervals between 
visual stimuli (Westheimer, 1999) and two-fl  ash discrimination performance improves aft  er 
practicing masked letter recognition (Wolford, et al., 1988). Similar conclusions were drawn by 
Ventura (1980) with respect to training eff  ects on brightness ratings under foveal metacontrast 
conditions. Th   us, subjects may have learned to discriminate visual events in time that they per-
ceived as one perceptual event before the training in our paradigm as well. Alternatively, subjects 
may have learned to use the fi  xed-interval forward mask as a temporal marker for the upcom-
ing stimulus, thus facilitating the allocation of temporal attention in a specifi  c time window 
(Rolke, 2008; Rolke & Hofmann, 2007). Attention has been shown to attenuate metacontrast 
masking (Boyer & Ro, 2007; Tata, 2002; also see Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2006, p.243ff   for a 
critical discussion of attentional eff  ects in metacontrast masking), and eff  ects of training on 
attention have also been hypothesized to be the basis of perceptual learning (Vidnyanszky & 
Sohn, 2005). All four proposed mechanisms can in principle explain the improvement in objec-
tive performance at the trained position, as well as the transfer eff  ects from the trained SOA to 
other SOAs. Th   e location specifi  city of training eff  ects in metacontrast masking has so far not 
been investigated. Transfer to other stimulus locations is oft  en used to make inferences upon 
the cortical area where perceptual learning takes place. If transfer is abolished by small stimulus 
displacements, this is usually taken as evidence for training eff  ects in a lower visual area with 
small receptive fi  elds (e.g., Karni & Sagi, 1991). In our study, we found evidence for a limited 
transfer of improvements in sensitivity to another stimulus location. However, because of the 43
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large separation of the tested stimulus locations, the rather special position of the stimuli on the 
vertical meridian, and the mirror-symmetric transfer location no inferences on the likely site of 
learning are possible (Dill, 2002). 
Whatever the specifi  c mechanism is, the crossing of the “threshold of visual awareness” 
with training indicates that some attribute of the representation of the target stimuli must have 
changed in order to become accessible to conscious perception. It has been hypothesized that 
conscious representations are stronger, more stable and more distinct than unconscious rep-
resentations (Cleeremans, 2008). In principle, training could have led to a strengthening, sta-
bilization and (most importantly) increased distinctiveness of the representation of the target 
stimulus. In this framework, a representation becomes available to phenomenal consciousness 
and report once it has reached suffi   cient quality through learning. Alternatively, mechanisms 
that read out representations might have become more tuned to the elusive representations of 
the target stimuli, or more able to use specifi  c features of the target stimuli to discriminate be-
tween them. Both accounts require that a representation of the masked target stimulus was ac-
tually available even though masking took place. Th   is assumption is supported by at least three 
lines of evidence: First, even when the target stimulus is perceptually invisible due to metacon-
trast masking, forced-choice detection can still result in above chance performance (Schiller & 
Smith, 1966; but see Otto, Ogmen, & Herzog, 2006). Second, the orientation of metacontrast 
masked targets can be recovered from V1 activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(Haynes & Rees, 2005). Th   ird, experiments in subliminal priming under metacontrast masking 
conditions consistently fi  nd evidence for access to target information in the absence of conscious 
target perception (Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Vorberg, et al., 2004). 
Improvements in subjective measures
Our subjects showed improved discrimination of stimuli as a result of training. When 
adopting an operationalization of consciousness that relies purely on objective, forced-choice 44
Chapter 2
measures, these data already suggest that subjects can indeed become aware of stimuli that they 
were not aware of before the training. However, although commonly used, such an operational-
ization of PA has repeatedly been criticized for not taking into account the subjective experience 
of the subject (e.g., Wiens, 2007). Importantly, even when both objective and subjective mea-
sures of awareness are assessed, they do not always yield the same results. For example, Lau and 
Passingham (2006) found that subjects rated their PA of metacontrast masked stimuli higher 
for longer SOAs than for shorter SOAs at identical levels of accuracy. Similarly, the blindsight 
patient GY is able to correctly discriminate motion directions at low and at high motion speed 
in his blind hemifi  eld while reporting awareness only in the latter condition (Sahraie, et al., 
1997). Th   us, subjects’ accuracy does not always directly refl  ect their subjective awareness. Ac-
cordingly, improvements in objective measures of awareness aft  er training do not necessarily 
go along with improvements in subjective awareness: Studies in blindsight patients show that 
remarkable levels of accuracy can be reached in objective tasks in the absence of acknowledged 
awareness (for a review, see Cowey, 2004). Similarly, investigations of implicit sequence learning 
indicate that objective performance can improve with practice without conscious awareness of 
the learned sequences (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001). In masking of faces by faces, subjects 
ability to discriminate between fearful and non fearful faces increases over time as indexed by 
objective measures; however, subjective awareness does not change signifi  cantly (Szczepanows-
ki & Pessoa, 2007). Th   ese studies further corroborate the notion that high performance on a 
forced-choice task does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that subjects are aware. Although 
a dissociation of objective and subjective performance was not the focus of the current study, 
it is thus possible that subjects improved in our objective task without concomitant changes in 
subjective awareness. 
Depending on the task and stimuli employed, metacontrast masking has been shown to 
not only impair the discriminability of briefl  y presented target stimuli, but also to change the 
subjective experience of these stimuli, for example their brightness (e.g., Petry, 1978). Here, we 45
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employed PA ratings asking for stimulus clarity to test for such eff  ects. However, we did not fi  nd 
U-shaped functions of these ratings with SOA. Th   is might be due to the high initial diffi   culty 
of the task over all SOAs, a strong central tendency in the rating responses, and/or the fact that 
metacontrast masked targets are not invisible in the strict sense, but only degraded to such an 
extent that discrimination becomes impossible. Irrespective of the question whether the PA rat-
ing yields a U-shaped function, the ratings vary with accuracy before and aft  er the training. Th  is 
validates that our ratings capture an aspect of the subjective experience of the subjects, because 
on average, correct responses should correlate with higher subjective visibility than incorrect 
responses. Critically, we fi  nd an increase in subjective visibility aft  er training which is specifi  c 
for correct responses. Th  is  eff  ect indicates that the subjective quality of the percept changes, ir-
respective of the fact that the stimulus might have been noticeable (but not identifi  able) before 
the training. Whether this change result from the changes in sensitivity or whether it occurs 
independently of those remains an open question. 
It has also been proposed that PA depends on criterion setting (Lau, 2008b). In this 
framework, higher order representations of signal and noise are learned from internal signal 
and noise distributions. Th   e internal signal and noise distributions as well as the learned higher 
order distributions are separated by a criterion. Whether we report perceiving or do not report 
perceiving a stimulus (PA) depends on the criterion that separates the learned higher order sig-
nal distribution from the learned higher order noise distribution. Th   e underlying internal signal 
and noise distributions represent the effi   ciency of information processing, not PA. According 
to the theory, the internal signal distributions can be captured in 2AFC tasks and the result-
ing sensitivity measure, whereas PA ratings tap into the higher order representations. Since the 
higher order representations need to be learned, they will not always refl  ect the underlying dis-
tributions of internal signal and noise properly, and can thus lead to a bias in reported PA, while 
leaving the sensitivity measure unaff  ected. In this case, perceptual learning could lead to changes 
in sensitivity that are accompanied by changes in PA (more effi   cient information processing and 46
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higher PA), changes in sensitivity that are not accompanied by changes in PA (more effi   cient 
information processing in the absence of changes in PA), and changes in PA only. In a 2AFC 
discrimination task with equal stimulus probabilities, optimal performance can only be reached 
if a stable criterion is established around the point where the two signal distributions intersect, 
which is indeed what we observe in our data. Th   is criterion, however, is not the criterion that 
is relevant for reporting PA of the stimulus (although it may be important in learning higher 
order representations). It thus remains conceivable that perceptual learning leads to a change in 
criterion for reporting PA without a concomitant change in criterion for the 2AFC task. 
Implications for the study of consciousness
An absolute threshold is an unrealistic assumption in the study of consciousness (Erik-
sen, 1960). However, especially in the fi  eld of subliminal perception, a threshold of conscious 
perception has to be established in order to demonstrate perception without awareness. Th  is  is 
and has been a highly controversial issue. One approach to overcome these controversies has 
been the implementation of so called “objective” measures of awareness and the application of 
SDT (Holender, 1986). As in our study, a measure of sensitivity (such as d’) is calculated as 
an aggregate over many trials, and a t-test of this measure against 0 is taken as an indication of 
whether a stimulus was consciously perceived or not. However, our study shows that even a d’=0 
does not allow for the conclusion that stimuli are presented at a fi  xed threshold of conscious 
perception. If an adequate number of trials and feedback are provided, and suffi   ciently high 
motivation is assured subjects can become “aware” of stimuli that they were previously unaware 
of. Interestingly, blindsight studies in monkeys usually involve heavy training schedules aft  er 
surgery, which might explain the rarity of cases where the animals have not been found to show 
blindsight abilities (e.g., Dineen & Keating, 1981). But even without explicit training, sponta-
neous improvements in performance have for example been reported aft  er continuous testing 
over many years in human blindsight patients (e.g., Trevethan, Sahraie, & Weiskrantz, 2007). 47
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Furthermore, being able to become aware also poses a challenge to studies that aim to contrast 
consciously perceived and not consciously perceived trials (Baars, 1997, p.18ff  ). Diff  erences ob-
served between perceived and unperceived conditions might not be due to diff  erences between 
conscious and unconscious perception, but the result of insuffi   ciently trained tasks. Investigat-
ing the transition from unaware to aware states might be a valuable alternative to the contrastive 
approach. Further studies will be needed to show how the amount of training maps onto stages 
of awareness, and whether awareness itself is a trainable function or whether it is training in oth-
er functions such as perception or attention which renders previously invisible stimuli visible. 
Whatever the case may be, our results show that awareness can be modifi  ed though training, and 
that subject can indeed “learn to see”.49
Schwiedrzik CM, Singer W, Melloni L (2011). Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of the USA, 108(11):4506-11. 
Perceptual learning not only improves sensitivity, it also changes our subjective experience. However, the ques-
tion how these two learning effects relate is largely unexplored. Here we investigate how subjects learn to see 
initially indiscriminable metacontrast masked shapes. We ﬁ nd that sensitivity and subjective awareness increase 
with training. However, sensitivity and subjective awareness dissociate in space: Learning effects on perfor-
mance are lost when the task is performed at an untrained location in another quadrant, whereas learning ef-
fects on subjective awareness are maintained. This indicates that improvements in shape sensitivity involve visual 
areas up to V4, whereas changes in subjective awareness involve other brain regions. Furthermore, subjective 
awareness dissociates from sensitivity in time: In an early phase of perceptual learning, subjects perform above 
chance on trials which they rate as subjectively invisible. Later, this phenomenon disappears. Subjective aware-
ness is thus neither necessary nor sufﬁ cient for achieving above-chance objective performance.
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 
LEARNING EFFECTS DISSOCIATE IN 
SPACE AND IN TIME
350
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Our perceptual apparatus is constantly shaped by experience. Th   is has been shown, i. 
a., in experiments investigating perceptual learning, where practice on a sensory task leads to 
increases in perceptual sensitivity (Goldstone, 1998). Although perceptual learning is a well 
studied phenomenon, the question of how it changes subjective awareness has rarely been ad-
dressed. Do we actually “see more” aft  er training? Apart from anecdotal reports pointing in 
this direction, a quantitative analysis of the eff  ects of learning on subjective awareness is largely 
missing (Fahle, 2009). Th   is is due to the fact that studies in perceptual learning have almost 
exclusively focussed on objective task performance (i.e., sensitivity in terms of Signal Detec-
tion Th   eory (D. M. Green & Swets, 1966)). However, studies from a diff  erent line of research, 
namely those investigating conscious perception, have found that objective performance in a 
task and awareness of the stimuli on which the task is performed can dissociate. Such is the case 
in blindsight (Stoerig, 2006), but also in normal observers (Lau & Passingham, 2006; Meeres 
& Graves, 1990; Schärli, Brugger, Regard, Mohr, & Landis, 2003; but see Azzopardi & Cowey, 
1998). Th   is shows that these two aspects of perception cannot be treated as being equivalent. 
We have recently shown that subjects can be trained to perform on and to see stimuli that are 
initially invisible to them (Schwiedrzik, Singer, & Melloni, 2009). We thus hypothesize that 
awareness is trainable, a conclusion that is in accordance with recent fi  ndings in blindsight 
patients (Sahraie, et al., 2006). However, the time course of those learning eff  ects has not been 
explored, i.e., whether the improvements in sensitivity and subjective awareness are depen-
dent on each other. In particular, changes in sensitivity could be a prerequisite for changes 
in subjective awareness. Alternatively, it could be necessary to subjectively see a stimulus in 
order for changes in sensitivity to occur. Last but not least, training could aff  ect sensitivity and 
subjective awareness in parallel without any mutual dependence between these two aspects 
of perception. Th   e latter question is related to another issue which is still a matter of debate, 
namely whether objective performance and subjective awareness depend on the same circuits 
in the normal brain. 51
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Figure 3-1. Stimuli and experimental procedures. (a) Each trial started with a fi  xation period (1000-1500 ms). Th  e 
target was presented for 10 ms. Th   e mask was presented for 50 ms at SOAs between 20 ms and 150 ms. Subjects 
then decided between square and diamond in a two alternative forced-choice (2AFC) task, followed by a rating of 
subjective visibility of the target stimulus. (b) Th   e training location was in the upper left   quadrant at 4° eccentricity. 
Th   e isoeccentric transfer location was in the lower left   quadrant, 6.6° from the trained location. (c) A diamond and 
a square served as target stimuli, the mask was star-shaped and did not overlap with the target contours.
Here, we address both questions by training subjects on a shape discrimination task under 
metacontrast masking conditions (Figure 3-1). Stimulus parameters are such that the shapes are ob-
jectively indiscriminable before training. Th   rough continuous practice, subjects learn to discriminate 
a square from a diamond, thus crossing the objective threshold (d’=0). Additionally, subjects rate 
their subjective awareness of the stimuli on a trial-by-trial basis. Th   is allows us to measure the time 
courses of learning eff  ects on sensitivity and subjective awareness concurrently. To localize the learn-
ing eff  ects in the brain by psychophysical techniques, we change the stimulus position aft  er the fi  nal 
training session to a new stimulus location. Based on an estimate of receptive fi  eld (RF) size, this al-
lows us to test the hypothesis that early visual areas up to V4 are the sites of objective learning eff  ects. 52
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We fi nd that changes in sensitivity and changes in subjective awareness indeed dissoci-
ate: Improved sensitivity does not transfer into another quadrant, whereas subjective aware-
ness does, indicating that subjective awareness and objective performance depend on diff  erent 
brain regions. Furthermore, in an early phase of perceptual learning, subjects perform above 
chance on trials which they rate as subjectively invisible. Th  is  eff  ect disappears with practice. 
Taken together, these results support the notion that thresholds of awareness are not fi  xed, that 
subjective awareness is neither necessary nor suffi   cient for changes in sensitivity, and that the 
cortical loci of learning eff  ects in subjective awareness and in sensitivity are not identical.
RESULTS
Subjective and objective learning effects dissociate in space:
  Thresholds and transfer
Th   resholds as a function of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) were fi  rst assessed before 
training. For each subject, the SOA yielding zero sensitivity (d’=0) in this fi  rst threshold mea-
surement was subsequently used for training (see below). In order to evaluate whether improve-
ments in performance were confi  ned to the trained SOA or generalized to untrained SOAs, we 
also evaluated the full threshold function aft  er training. In addition, we changed the location of 
the stimulus to a position 6.6° away from the trained location to another quadrant at isoeccen-
tricity aft  er the training and the fi  nal threshold assessment to probe which brain regions are in-
volved in the learning eff  ects. In particular, this was done to test whether area V4, an important 
intermediate stage in the analysis of shape (Pasupathy, 2006), or any higher area in the ventral 
stream was the locus of perceptual learning in our study. Finally, to address the potential role 
of feedback in perceptual learning, half of the subjects received blockwise percentage correct 
feedback during training.
To evaluate whether subjects’ sensitivity, response bias, and subjective awareness 
changed as a function of training, we fi  rst entered their d’, c, and mean Perceptual Awareness 53
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Figure 3-2. Sensitivity (d’) as a function of SOA before and aft  er the training phase and at the untrained location. 
Sensitivity always increased linearly with SOA. Linear fi  ts of the mean d’ to the SOAs were highly signifi  cant at 
each threshold (all R2 > 0.9, all P < 0.01). Error bars represent the SE of the estimated marginal mean.
Scale (PAS, Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004) rating from the threshold assessments separately into 
repeated measures analyses of variance (rmANOVA) with the factors session (before training, 
aft  er training, transfer) and SOA (for d’ and c: 20, 30, 40, 50, 70, 90, 110, 130, 150 ms, for PAS: 
20-50 ms, see below). For the PAS data we included the factor accuracy (correct, incorrect). We 
also tested whether the presence of blockwise feedback aff  ected any of the measures (between 
subjects factor feedback). On the PAS, 1 refers to “No Experience”, 2 to “Brief glimpse (a feel-
ing that something has been shown)”, 3 to “Almost clear experience (ambiguous experience of 
the stimulus)”, and 4 to “Clear experience”, whereby PAS>=2 indexes ‘subjective detection’ and 
PAS=4 indexes ‘subjective discrimination’ (see below).
Objective learning eff  ects 
Sensitivity (d’) increased linearly with SOA in all sessions (effect of SOA, F(1.381, 
27.618)=44.794, p<0.01, η2=0.691), a signature of type A metacontrast masking (Fig-
ure 3-2). Learning clearly affected sensitivity (effect of session, F(1.603, 32.065)=9.744, 
p<0.01, η2=0.328): Mean d’ was significantly higher after the training than before (mean 
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difference 0.498, SE 0.141, p<0.01) and as compared to the transfer position (Figure 3-3a, 
mean difference 0.425, SE 0.087, p<0.01). Thus, training on a discrimination task results 
in above chance performance even if subjects initially show zero sensitivity. However, there 
was no significant difference between sensitivity before training and after training at the 
transfer position (mean difference -0.073, SE 0.131, p>0.58, uncorrected). Thus, subjects’ 
sensitivity increased at the trained position, but this improvement did not transfer to an-
other quadrant at isoeccentricity. This indicates that changes in sensitivity involve visual 
areas up to area V4 (see Discussion). Separate analyses restricted to the trained SOA and 
on the subsample of SOAs that we used for the analysis of the PAS data confirmed these 
results. Blockwise feedback did not affect performance on this task (no significant main 
effect of feedback or interactions with feedback, all p>0.41).
As for response bias (c), we found that different SOAs were not associated with dif-
ferent response biases, and importantly, response bias did not change as a result of training 
nor with the transfer (no significant main effects or interactions, all p>0.16).
Figure 3-3. Th  reshold sessions. (a) Average sensitivity (d’) and (b) subjective awareness (mean PAS rating) for 
correct and incorrect trials on the four short SOAs in the threshold sessions before and aft  er training and at the 
untrained location (transfer). (c) Average learning induced gain in subjective detection ([# of trials with PAS>=2 
posttraining] divided by [# of trials with PAS>=2 pretraining]) and subjective discrimination ([# of trials with 
PAS=4 posttraining] divided by [# of trials with PAS=4 pretraining]) on the four short SOAs at the trained and 
transfer location. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 3-4. Average subjective awareness for all nine SOAs in the threshold assessments before and aft  er the train-
ing phase and at the untrained location. Empty cells were replaced by the average PAS rating from the respective 
group (feedback/no feedback).
Subjective learning eff  ects 
For the PAS data, only the fi  rst four SOAs (20-50 ms) were entered into the analyses because 
17 out of 22 subjects had less than 10 wrong answers in at least one of the longer SOAs (70-150 ms), 
which would have rendered the factor accuracy unreliable (see Figure 3-4 for all SOAs). Ratings of sub-
jective awareness increased as a function of SOA (F(1.412, 28.240)=10.150, p<0.01, η2=0.337) and 
session (F(1.410, 28.203)=29.917, p<0.01, η2=0.599), and this increase was especially pronounced on 
correct trials (Figure 3-3b, session × accuracy interaction, F(1.764, 35.275)=6.654, p<0.01, η2=0.250). 
Importantly, the mean PAS rating for correct responses was higher than for incorrect responses in 
each session (all p<0.01). Although ratings for both correct and incorrect responses increased aft  er 
training, this increase was substantially bigger for correct responses (mean diff  erence between PAS 
rating for correct and incorrect responses pretraining: 0.37, SE 0.043, p<0.01; posttraining: 0.459, SE 
0.082, p<0.01). Comparable results were obtained when we plotted the rate of incorrect trials with 
high PAS ratings against the rate of correct trials with high PAS ratings for three levels of visibility to 
obtain Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) and calculated the Area under the curve (AUC), 
an index of how well PAS ratings predict accuracy (see Materials and Methods). Th  e  AUC was above 
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chance (0.5) before and aft  er the training both for the trained SOA (Figure 3-5, pretraining: mean dif-
ference 0.0656, T(21)=5.896, p<0.01; posttraining: mean diff  erence 0.1260, T(21)=6.907, p<0.01, 
all one-sided) as well as for the average over the 4 short SOAs (pretraining: mean diff  erence 0.0866, 
T(21)=7.579, p<0.01; posttraining: mean diff  erence 0.1329, T(21)=7.441, p<0.01, as above). Th  is 
pattern of results rules out that increases in PAS ratings were due to a bias to indiscriminately respond 
with higher ratings as learning progresses, since such behavior would erase diff  erences between correct 
and incorrect trials. We found no eff  ect of or interaction with feedback (all p>0.41).
A dissociation between sensitivity and subjective awareness was observed for the transfer task. 
Whereas moving the stimulus to another quadrant resulted in a signifi  cant drop of sensitivity, PAS rat-
ings for correct responses remained above pretraining levels (Figure 3-3b). Crucially, the diff  erence be-
tween correct and incorrect responses remained signifi  cant (mean diff  erence transfer: 0.34, SE 0.059, 
p<0.01), and PAS ratings still predicted accuracy when tested against chance (Figure 3-5, AUC trained 
SOA: mean diff  erence 0.1031, T(21)=4.976, p<0.01; AUC 4 short SOAs: mean diff  erence 0.0911, 
T(21)=6.723, p<0.01, all one-sided), confi  rming that subjects continued using the PAS ratings in a 
meaningful way. Th   us, the RFs underlying objective task performance appear to be smaller than the 
RFs supporting subjective awareness, indicating that training aff  ects diff  erent brain regions.
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Figure 3-5. Average ROC for the trained SOA for pretraining (Left  ) and posttraining (Center) and at the transfer 
location (Right). Th  e  ROC curves were obtained by fi  tting a line of 1000 points to the three infl  ection points by 
means of maximum-likelihood estimation. Th  e  resulting  AUC was signifi  cantly diff  erent from 0.5 (chance) in all 
three sessions (all P < 0.01, one-sided, Bonferroni corrected).57
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It is unlikely that the high PAS ratings at the untrained location are explainable by a 
carry-over eff  ect from the postraining threshold measurement to the transfer location. If a carry-
over eff  ect were in place then the results at the untrained location should resemble in some way 
the pattern of results obtained at the source of the carry-over eff  ect, i.e., the posttraining session. 
Th   is was not the case: Neither the absolute PAS ratings for correct and incorrect trials nor the 
diff  erence between them (trained SOA: mean diff  erence 0.11, SE 0.04, T(21)=2.2924, p<0.05; 
average of the 4 short SOAs: mean diff  erence 0.16, SE 0.04, T(21)=3.4907, p<0.01) were iden-
tical in the posttraining and transfer session (Figure 3-3b).
Th   e previous analysis revealed a gradual increase in subjective awareness with practice. 
However, it is unclear whether the observed increments refl  ect heightened subjective awareness 
of discriminant features (i.e., a clearer impression of shape), or heightened subjective detection 
ability (i.e., seeing something as opposed to seeing nothing) (Dienes & Seth, 2010), since  by 
design, the PAS encompasses both. A dissociation between subjective awareness and objective 
performance could then correspond to diff  erences in task, namely detection versus discrimina-
tion. In order to compare the subjective and objective task when both rely on shape information, 
we divided the PAS ratings into two categories: trials where subjects reported a clear impres-
sion of the shape of the stimulus (PAS=4), and trials where subjects at least reported seeing 
something (PAS>=2). For brevity, we refer to these trials as ‘subjectively discriminated’ and 
‘subjectively detected’, respectively. Th   e proportion of subjectively detected stimuli increased 
from pretraining to posttraining (trained SOA mean diff  erence -0.284, SE 0.052, p<0.01; 4 
short SOAs: mean diff  erence -0.252, SE 0.047, p<0.01), and was above pretraining levels at 
the untrained location (trained SOA mean diff  erence -0.196, SE 0.057, p<0.01; 4 short SOAs: 
mean diff  erence -0.185, SE 0.054, p<0.01). Th   e proportion of subjectively discriminated trials 
also increased from pretraining to posttraining (trained SOA mean diff  erence -0.152, SE 0.048, 
p<0.01; 4 short SOAs: mean diff  erence -0.159, SE 0.047, p<0.01, all one-sided, Bonferroni 
corrected for the number of sessions). Most importantly, it remained above pretraining levels 58
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at the untrained transfer location (trained SOA: mean diff  erence -0.072, SE 0.030, p<0.05; 4 
short SOAs: mean diff  erence -0.083, SE 0.031, p<0.05, as above), although not fully reach-
ing posttraining levels (trained SOA: mean diff  erence 0.080, SE 0.022, p<0.01; 4 short SOAs: 
mean diff  erence 0.076, SE 0.021, p<0.01, as above). Th   is shows that the dissociation between 
sensitivity and subjective awareness holds even when objective discrimination and subjective 
discrimination are directly compared. To assess whether learning eff  ects in subjective discrimi-
nation exceeded learning eff  ects in subjective detection, we calculated the respective gain for the 
trained and transfer location. Indeed, the gain for discrimination was substantially larger than 
for detection at both locations (Figure 3-3c, measure × session interaction, trained SOA: F(1, 
21)=5.117, p<0.05, η2=0.196; 4 short SOAs: F(1, 21)=8.376, p<0.01, η2=0.285). Th  us,  subjec-
tive discrimination increased with training and transferred to the untrained location, and this 
learning eff  ect exceeded the learning eff  ect in subjective detection.
Subjective and objective learning effects dissociate in time:
Training sessions 
Objective learning eff  ects 
Subjects were trained for fi  ve consecutive sessions at an SOA that was initially at the 
objective threshold, as confi  rmed by a d’ not signifi  cantly diff  erent from 0 before training nei-
ther in the feedback group (mean diff  erence: 0.15, T(10)=2.129, p>0.05, two-sided, uncor-
rected) nor in the no feedback group (mean diff  erence: 0.12, T(10)=1.873, p>0.05, two-sided, 
uncorrected). We have previously shown that practice on this task leads to increases in sensi-
tivity without changes in response bias (Schwiedrzik, et al., 2009). Here, we confi  rmed these 
results in a rmANOVA with the within subjects factor training session (session 1-5) and the 
between subjects factor feedback. We found that sensitivity increased with session (F(2.573, 
51.454)=15.830,  p<0.01,  η2=0.442), whereas response bias did not change signifi  cantly 
(F(2.179, 43.576)=0.737, p>0.49, η2=0.036). Sensitivity increased linearly (F(1, 20)=29.752, 59
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p<0.01, η2=0.598), on average by a d′ of 0.66 (SD 0.56) from the fi  rst to the fi  ft  h session (Figure 
3-6a). Blockwise feedback did not aff  ect sensitivity nor response bias in this task (all p>0.11).
Subjective learning eff  ects
To examine the time course of subjective awareness as a function of practice, we asked 
subjects to rate the stimulus visibility on a trial-by-trial basis. Subjective awareness ratings in-
creased over sessions (F(1.437, 28.742)=12.017, p<0.01, η2=0.375), with a more pronounced 
increase for correct responses (accuracy × session, F(1.941, 38.828)=7.672, p<0.01, η2=0.276), 
but no eff  ect of feedback (all p>0.26). When considering subjectively detected (PAS>=2) and 
subjectively discriminated (PAS=4) trials separately, we found that the proportions of both 
increased with session (detection: F(1.337, 28.085)=8.218, p<0.01,  η2=0.281, discrimina-
tion: (F(1.467, 30.816)=7.384, p<0.01, η2=0.260)). Th   us, practice on initially indiscriminable 
stimuli leads to improvements in objective performance and subjective awareness (Figure 3-6). 
Th  e  AUC per session was always above chance (Figure 3-7, all p<0.01, one-sided), and even in-
creased linearly with session (F(1, 20)=15.680, p<0.01, η2=0.439). Th   us, the improvements in 
subjective awareness do not simply refl  ect a change in criterion, since a bias to indiscriminately 
Figure 3-6. Training sessions. (a) Sensitivity (d’) and response bias (c) at the trained SOA during the training ses-
sions. (b) Subjective awareness (mean PAS rating) for correct and incorrect trials during the training sessions. 
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
12345
training session
m
e
a
n
 
P
A
S
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
b) subjective awareness
correct
incorrect
training session
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
(
d
‘
)
 
/
 
b
i
a
s
 
(
c
)
a) sensitivity and response bias
sensitivity
response bias
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1234560
Chapter 3
use higher ratings as learning progresses would not lead to a diff  erential increase in the ratings 
for correct and incorrect responses or to an increase in the AUC.
We then turned to the question whether objective performance was dependent on 
subjective awareness, i.e. whether subjects had to consciously perceive the stimuli in order 
to respond correctly, and whether this changed over the course of learning. We separately 
analyzed the percentage of correct responses for trials rated as invisible (PAS=1) and for 
trials rated as clearly visible (PAS=4) per session. We found that subjects performed sig-
nifi  cantly better than chance for trials that they rated invisible (mean percentage correct: 
0.57,  T(21)=2.865,  p=0.0465, two-sided, Bonferroni corrected for the number of ses-
sions), but only during the fi  rst session (Figure 3-8, all other p>0.88, as above)1. Th  is  sug-
gests that subjective awareness is not necessary for above-chance objective performance at 
the earliest stage of learning. For trials that were rated as clearly visible, the percentage of 
correct responses was always higher than chance (all p<0.02, as above). Since the number 
of PAS=1 and PAS=4 trials develops in opposite directions over sessions (Figure 3-8), the 
above chance performance for PAS=4 trials in session 1 rules out the possibility that the 
lack of above chance performance for PAS=1 trials in sessions 2-5 is due to the progressively 
smaller number of trials. Taken together, subjects were aware of some trials (correct trials | 
1   Missing values were replaced by the mean of the respective group (feedback/no feedback). Th  is 
did not change the overall pattern of results. Th   ere were no missing values for PAS=1 trials in session 1.
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Figure 3-7. Average ROC per training session. Th  e  AUC was always above chance (all P < 0.01, one-sided, Bonfer-
roni corrected) and increased linearly with session [F(1, 20) = 15.680, P < 0.01, η2 = 0.439].61
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PAS=4) even in session 1; concomitantly, they were apparently able to utilize information 
that fell below their subjective threshold for the discrimination task (correct trials | PAS=1). 
However, although subjects continued to report that some stimuli were invisible in session 
2-5, they did not continue to perform above chance in these trials. Th   us, it appears that with 
increasing awareness, information below the subjective threshold is either not available or 
not used anymore.
DISCUSSION
We found that both sensitivity and subjective awareness change in perceptual learn-
ing. However, learning does not aff  ect these two aspects of perception in the same way. Th  is 
evidences that they should not be treated as being equivalent. Subjective awareness is not 
suffi   cient for achieving or maintaining objective performance: At an untrained location in 
another quadrant, sensitivity drops back to pretraining levels, whereas learning eff  ects on 
Figure 3-8. Objective performance on invisible and clearly visible trials during training. (upper panel) Percentage 
of correct responses on subjectively invisible (PAS=1) and subjectively clearly visible (PAS=4) trials per training 
session. (lower panel) Average number of invisible (PAS=1) and clearly visible (PAS=4) trials per session. Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean, ‘n.s.’ is not signifi  cant at an α level of 0.05, Bonferroni corrected.
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subjective awareness are preserved. Th  is  diff  erential generalization of objective performance 
and subjective awareness across the retinotopic map indicates that the cortical loci of learn-
ing eff  ects in subjective awareness and sensitivity are not identical. Furthermore, subjective 
awareness is also not necessary for above-chance objective performance, as performance on 
trials which were rated as subjectively invisible was above chance for the discrimination task. 
However, this is only the case in the fi  rst training session. Th   us, the immediate use of sub-
jectively unavailable information vanishes as perceptual learning progresses. Still, changes 
in sensitivity can occur even when the stimuli used for training do not cross the threshold 
of subjective awareness. Taken together, these fi  ndings support the notion that perceptual 
thresholds are not fi  xed, and that in order to fully characterize perceptual learning, both 
objective and subjective measures need to be considered.
Progression of sensitivity and subjective awareness
Both sensitivity and subjective awareness increased with training. Comparing the pre-
training with the posttraining thresholds, we found that the learning eff  ects are not limited to the 
trained SOA, but spread in time to all other tested SOAs. Th   e training related improvements can 
have diverse reasons. Given that subjects could not infer the precise moment of appearance of the 
target (randomized fi  xation period, randomized SOAs), learning eff  ects cannot be attributed to 
an improved focusing of attention in time. Another possibility is that subjects learned to suppress 
the mask, as has been found for pattern masking (Schubö, et al., 2001; Wolford, et al., 1988). Th  is 
cannot be directly tested in metacontrast masking since the mask cannot be changed for a given 
target. However, mask suppression by a second mask has been shown to lead to target recovery in 
metacontrast masking (Breitmeyer, Rudd, & Dunn, 1981). Alternatively or additionally, the repre-
sentation of the target stimuli might have been strengthened through learning (Gold, et al., 1999).
Th  e changes in objective performance were accompanied by changes in subjective 
awareness. Th   e more pronounced increase in subjective awareness on correct than on incor-63
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rect trials and the increase of the AUC with sessions show that the higher PAS ratings were not 
due to an indiscriminate response bias towards higher scores as learning progresses. Notably, 
the learning curves for sensitivity and subjective awareness dissociate. Only in the fi  rst session, 
information remaining below the subjective threshold leads to above chance performance. Th  is 
eff  ect vanishes in the remaining sessions. Previous studies in blindsight patients as well as in 
normal observers have found similar dissociations within sessions (Lau & Passingham, 2006; 
Meeres & Graves, 1990; Schärli, et al., 2003; Stoerig, 2006). Th   us, under certain conditions, 
visual stimuli allow for correct behavior without concomitant subjective experience. Learning 
studies have also reported dissociations between sensitivity and subjective awareness: For ex-
ample, normal observers can learn to discriminate motion directions (Watanabe, et al., 2001), 
orientations (Seitz, et al., 2009), and emotional expressions in masked faces (Szczepanowski & 
Pessoa, 2007) without awareness. However, contrary to our results, practice did not improve 
subjective awareness in these studies.
Th   e above chance performance on trials which subjects rated as invisible suggests that 
information which has entered the visual system can be utilized even if this information is not 
accessible to subjective awareness. A change in subjective awareness requires that the initial rep-
resentation of the stimulus is transformed to make it accessible for subjective report. It has been 
proposed that this requires the formation of a higher order representation of the stimulus (Lau, 
2008b). In this framework, higher order representations are learned from the underlying signal 
and noise distributions upon which the discrimination task is performed. Learning-induced 
changes in the underlying distributions (as captured by d’) and/or changes in the signal and noise 
distributions of the higher order representations can then lead to increased subjective aware-
ness. It has also been hypothesized that conscious representations are stronger, more stable and 
more distinct than unconscious representations (Cleeremans, 2008). A recent fMRI study lends 
support to this proposal by showing that activity patterns in the temporal lobe elicited by con-
sciously perceived stimuli are less variable than those evoked by unperceived stimuli (Schurger, 64
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Pereira, Treisman, & Cohen, 2010; but see Cliff  ord, 2010). Accordingly, once a representation 
has reached suffi   cient quality and stability through learning, it becomes accessible to report. 
Our study expands previous fi  ndings by showing that the immediate use of subjectively unavail-
able information vanishes once a consciously accessible representation has been established.
Interestingly, objective performance on clearly seen trials was not at ceiling through-
out the training sessions. Th   is is consistent with previous masking studies (Boehler, Schoenfeld, 
Heinze, & Hopf, 2008; Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky, 2009; Summerfi  eld, 
Jack, & Burgess, 2002). Th  is  fi  nding can be accounted for by a model in which subjective aware-
ness and objective performance do not depend on each other. However, other factors, e.g., mo-
tor errors when reporting the target stimulus in the 2AFC task and/or subjective awareness 
or illusory percepts, could also account for part of the variance. In masking, it is believed that 
illusory percepts can arise when top-down processes incorrectly complete the highly degraded 
target information (Summerfi  eld, et al., 2002). Such illusory percepts should prevail with short 
Figure 3-9. Average percentage of correct PAS=4 responses per SOA. Objective performance on clearly seen trials 
increases with SOA [main eff  ect of SOA: F(4.295, 85.891) = 21.567, P < 0.01, η2 = 0.519] and is at ceiling for the 
longest SOAs, which indicates that the relationship between objective performance and subjective awareness de-
pends on the amount of available bottom-up information. Such behavior would be predicted by a model in which 
subjective awareness and objective performance rely on parallel channels with common input but independent 
source of noise: Th   e more bottom-up information is available, the lower the infl  uence of uncorrelated noise in 
the two channels. Suboptimal performance on clearly seen trials can also be attributed to motor errors or illusory 
percepts. Error bars represent the SE of the estimated marginal mean.
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SOAs when bottom-up information is scarce and the infl  uence of top-down mechanisms is 
strong (Figure 3-9). 
Different effects of a change of stimulus location
 A further dissociation between sensitivity and subjective awareness was observed for 
the transfer task. Aft  er the training and the fi  nal threshold assessment, we changed the loca-
tion of the stimulus to a position 6.6° away from the trained location to another quadrant at 
isoeccentricity. At 4° eccentricity, RFs in human area V4 are smaller than 6° (Kastner et al., 
2001). Furthermore, RFs in area V4 usually do not cross the horizontal meridian (Boussaoud, 
Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1991; Gattass, Sousa, & Gross, 1988), whereas the RFs at later stages 
in the ventral stream, such as those of the anterior inferotemporal cortex, are on average much 
larger and not constrained to an individual quadrant (Desimone & Gross, 1979). Th   e fact that 
all learning eff  ects in sensitivity were lost when the stimulus location was changed indicates that 
learning most likely involved area V4 and/or preceding areas. In support of this notion, electro-
physiological experiments in monkeys have found suppressive eff  ects of metacontrast masks on 
neuronal activity of V4 neurons (Kondo & Komatsu, 2000).
Th   e change in stimulus location did not have the same eff  ect on subjective awareness. 
In fact, subjective awareness remained close to posttraining levels at the new location. Th  is  was 
even the case when only considering trials on which subjects could subjectively discriminate the 
stimuli, showing that the dissociation between objective performance and subjective awareness 
was not solely due to a transfer of subjective detection ability or a diff  erence in task. Crucially, an 
unspecifi  c carry-over eff  ect from the postraining threshold measurement cannot easily explain 
the results since such an eff  ect should either preserve the absolute PAS ratings and/or the rela-
tive diff  erence between PAS ratings for correct and incorrect responses, which was not the case. 
Th   us, sensitivity and subjective awareness generalized diff  erently across the visual fi  eld, implying 
that the respective learning eff  ects involve diff  erent brain regions. Similar results have been ob-66
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tained for visual priming: Subliminal visual primes (aff  ecting sensitivity) are only eff  ective when 
displayed in the same quadrant as the supraliminal targets, whereas supraliminal primes (af-
fecting sensitivity and subjective awareness) are translation invariant (Bar & Biederman, 1999). 
Furthermore, our results indicate that subjective awareness is not only not necessary for correct 
responses, it is also not suffi   cient to support generalization of learning eff  ects to the untrained 
location.
A region suggested to be particularly relevant for subjective awareness is the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, Lau & Passingham, 2006). As in our study, the authors compared 
matched performance levels for diff  erences in subjective awareness. Th   is was achieved by compar-
ing two SOAs in type B metacontrast masking. Th   e DLPFC showed higher BOLD activity at 
matched performance levels for SOAs that led to more ‘seen’ responses than another SOA with 
less ‘seen’ responses. Th   e RFs of visually responsive neurons in the DLPFC are larger than 6.6° at 4° 
eccentricity (Rainer, Asaad, & Miller, 1998; Suzuki & Azuma, 1983) which would be compatible 
with the generalization of subjective awareness across space. Also, learning to discriminate visual 
objects leads to a sparsening of population activity and a sharpening of the tuning of individual 
neurons in this area (Rainer & Miller, 2000). Th   us, given its RF characteristics and malleability by 
practice, the DLPFC is a possible site of learning eff  ects for subjective awareness. 
No measurable effect of blockwise feedback
 Th   e factor feedback remained insignifi  cant in all analyses, i.e., blockwise feedback did not 
infl  uence the development of sensitivity, response bias, or subjective awareness. Previous evidence 
on the role of feedback in perceptual learning is inconclusive. While some studies have found that 
feedback is necessary (trial-by-trial; Seitz, Nanez, Holloway, Tsushima, & Watanabe, 2006) or at 
least benefi  cial (blockwise; Herzog & Fahle, 1997), others have found no eff  ects (trial-by-trial; 
Fahle & Edelman, 1993; Petrov, Dosher, & Lu, 2006). Our results indicate that repeated perfor-
mance on the stimuli is suffi   cient for learning under metacontrast masking conditions, as has also 67
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been found for learning eff  ects in blindsight patients (Sahraie, et al., 2006). However, it remains 
possible that trial-by-trial feedback is more eff  ective in driving learning in our task.
Conclusions
 Our results show that perceptual thresholds, objective or subjective, are not fi  xed, but can 
be changed through practice. Awareness is trainable. However, the dissociations between subjec-
tive awareness and objective performance show that the respective improvements are not simple 
byproducts of each other. In particular, their neuronal substrate seems to diff  er. Th   us, if we want to 
understand how perceptual learning aff  ects not only sensory processing but also higher cognitive 
functions, and unravel the brain regions involved in such training eff  ects, we will have to go beyond 
assessing performance in isolation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants 
22 subjects (8 male, mean age 24, range 19-30) participated in the experiment aft  er 
giving written informed consent. All but 3 subjects were right-handed as assessed with the Ed-
inburgh Inventory (Oldfi  eld, 1971); all reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no 
history of neurological and/or psychiatric disease. 
Stimuli
Stimuli were displayed on a CRT monitor (HP p1230, resolution 1024 × 768, visible 
screen size 30° × 22.9°) at a refresh rate of 100 Hz. Subjects viewed the screen from 75 cm distance. 
Background luminance was 3.18 cd/m2. A square (0.35° × 0.35°) and a diamond (0.53° × 0.53°) 
were used as target stimuli. Th   e outlines of the targets were 0.02° wide and had a luminance of 
25.74 cd/m2. Th   e mask (25.74 cd/m2) was star-shaped (Figure 3-1c). Its inner edges were contigu-
ous with the target stimuli from both sides without spatial overlap. In the main experiment, all 68
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stimuli were presented in the upper left   quadrant at 4° eccentricity. For the transfer, stimuli were 
presented in the lower left   quadrant, 6.6° from the trained position (center-to-center) at isoec-
centricity (Figure 3-1b). A fi  xation cross was always present at the center of the screen. Each trial 
started with a fi  xation period of 1000 to 1500 ms. Subsequently, the target was presented for 10 
ms. Th   e mask was presented for 50 ms at stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) ranging from 20 ms 
to 150 ms (20, 30, 40, 50, 70, 90, 110, 130, 150 ms) for the threshold estimation or at an individu-
ally determined SOA during the training sessions (Figure 3-1a).
Procedure
 Subjects had to discriminate whether they saw a square or a diamond by pressing 
one of two buttons on a keyboard (counterbalanced within groups). Additionally, they had 
to rate the subjective visibility of the respective stimulus on the four point Perceptual Aware-
ness Scale (PAS, Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004) on a trial-by-trial basis by a button press. On 
this scale, 1 corresponds to “No Experience”, 2 to “Brief glimpse (a feeling that something has 
been shown)”, 3 to “Almost clear experience (ambiguous experience of the stimulus)”, and 4 
to “Clear experience of the stimulus”. Subjects were asked to maintain fi  xation on the center 
of the screen throughout the experimental sessions. Th   e experiments were conducted in a 
darkened, sound attenuating chamber. Constant head position was assured by the use of a 
chinrest with forehead support. 
Th   e experiment took place on fi  ve consecutive days. On the fi  rst day, we determined 
at which SOA a given subject performed the discrimination task at chance (20 ms: 7 subjects, 
30 ms: 10 subjects, 40 ms: 4 subjects, 50 ms: 1 subject). Th   is SOA was then used for the train-
ing. Th  e  fi  rst training session was conducted directly aft  er the threshold measurement. On 
day two to four, only training sessions were conducted. On the fi  ft  h day, the last training ses-
sion took place. Aft  er this training session, we again assessed the masking threshold, followed 
by a threshold measurement at the transfer position.69
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For all threshold measurements, each target was presented 40 times at each SOA, yielding 
80 trials per SOA and a total of 720 trials. Aft  er every 180 trials, we introduced a break of variable 
length. Th   e occurrence of SOAs was randomized and counterbalanced over blocks. Th  e  sequence 
of target stimuli was fully randomized and no feedback was given.
Aft  er the initial threshold measurement, subjects were randomly assigned to either a 
feedback or a no feedback group. Subjects in the feedback group would receive blockwise per-
centage correct feedback during the training sessions. Subjects completed 600 trials per train-
ing session (a total of 3000 trials). Aft  er every 100 trials, a break was introduced. Th  e  number 
of squares and diamonds was balanced per block. Subjects were paid 15 € per hour. To assure 
constant motivation during the training sessions, subjects received a bonus of 2 € if they im-
proved by 10% from the previous training session, or a fee of 2 € if they did not improve.
Analysis
 Squares were considered signal trials and diamonds were considered noise trials. Th  is 
yielded 40 signal and 40 noise trials per SOA for the threshold estimates and 300 signal and 
300 noise trials per training sessions. For the calculation of sensitivity (d’) and response bias 
(c), we used the loglinear correction to correct for extreme false alarm or hit rate propor-
tions (Hautus, 1995). For subjective awareness, we calculated the mean PAS rating for correct 
and for incorrect responses, respectively. Th   e mean PAS rating is suited to assess how subjec-
tive awareness changes gradually with learning. Furthermore, we split the PAS ratings into 
trials on which the target stimulus was minimally detected (PAS>=2) and trials in which 
the subjects clearly saw the target stimulus (PAS=4) and thus, task-relevant information was 
subjectively available. For brevity, we refer to these splits as ‘subjective detection’ and ‘subjec-
tive discrimination’, respectively. Splitting the data this way allows us to investigate whether 
increases in subjective awareness are due to improved subjective detection and/or improved 
subjective discrimination. Furthermore, it allows for a more stringent comparison of the ob-70
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jective discrimination task with the subjective ratings, since objective discrimination can be 
directly compared to subjective discrimination. 
To directly evaluate the size of the learning eff  ects in subjective detection and sub-
jective discrimination, we calculated the respective gain at the trained and untrained loca-
tion, which takes into account the pretraining levels of subjective awareness: ([# of trials with 
PAS>=2 for posttraining or transfer] divided by [# of trials with PAS>=2 pretraining]) for 
subjective detection, and ([# of trials with PAS=4 for posttraining or transfer] divided by [# 
of trials with PAS=4 pretraining]) for subjective discrimination. 
We also plotted the rate of incorrect trials against the rate of correct trials at three 
levels of visibility to obtain ROC curves. Th   is allows us to determine how well PAS ratings 
predict accuracy. Here, the ‘hit rate’ refers to the percentage of correct trials with a high PAS 
rating, and the ‘false alarm rate’ refers to the percentage of incorrect trials with a high PAS 
rating. Th   is is similar to the procedure known as Type II ROC analysis (Galvin, et al., 2003), 
where the relationship between confi  dence in one’s response and the accuracy of that response 
is investigated by plotting the rate of correct responses with a high confi  dence rating (hits) 
against the rate of incorrect responses with a high confi  dence rating (false alarms). By varying 
the criterion at which a PAS rating is considered high (PAS=1 vs. PAS=2, 3, 4; PAS=1, 2 vs. 
PAS=3, 4; PAS=1, 2, 3 vs. PAS=4), we obtain three infl  ection points, to which we fi  tted ROC 
curves using a proper binormal model (Metz & Pan, 1999; Pesce & Metz, 2007) in ROCkit 
(Kurt Rossmann Laboratories for Radiologic Image Research, http://xray.bsd.uchicago.edu/
krl/). Th   is model assumes likelihood ratio as the decision variable. From the ROC curves, we 
calculated the Area under the curve (AUC), which indexes how well correct responses can be 
distinguished from incorrect responses based on PAS ratings. Cells for which the maximum 
likelihood estimation in ROCkit did not converge were replaced by the average AUC of the 
respective group for further analyses. 
In all rmANOVA with more than one degree of freedom we used the Greenhouse-71
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Geisser correction and report adjusted degrees of freedom and p values. All p values for t-tests 
are Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons, unless otherwise stated.73
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Previous experience allows the brain to predict what comes next. How these expectations affect conscious 
experience is poorly understood. In particular, it is unknown whether and when expectations interact with 
sensory evidence in granting access to conscious perception, and how this is reﬂ ected electrophysiologi-
cally. Here we parametrically manipulate sensory evidence and expectations while measuring event-related 
potentials (ERPs) in human subjects to assess the time course of evoked responses which correlate with 
subjective visibility, the properties of the stimuli, and/or perceptual expectations. We found that expectations 
lower the threshold of conscious perception and reduce the latency of neuronal signatures differentiating 
seen and unseen stimuli. Without expectations, this differentiation occurs around 300 ms and with expecta-
tions around 200 ms post stimulus in occipito-parietal sensors. The amplitude of this differentiating response 
component (P2) decreases as visibility increases, regardless of whether this increase is due to enhanced 
sensory evidence and/or the gradual build up of perceptual expectations. Importantly, at matched perfor-
mance levels, responses to seen and unseen stimuli differed regardless of the physical stimulus properties. 
These ﬁ ndings indicate that the latency of the neuronal correlates of access to consciousness depend on 
whether access is driven by stimulus saliency or by a combination of expectations and sensory evidence.
EXPECTATIONS CHANGE THE SIGNATURES AND 
TIMING OF ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF 
PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS
474
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Conscious perception is not solely determined by stimulus saliency. Strong stimuli can 
remain unnoticed if attention is deployed elsewhere as shown in the attentional blink or change 
blindness paradigms, and weak sensory stimuli can be readily perceived if they are attended 
to (Carrasco, et al., 2004). Consequently, perceptual awareness is proposed to depend on two 
factors (Dehaene, et al., 2006): the intensity of sensory stimulation and top-down attention, 
which enhances sensory processing. However, evidence suggests that attention may not be the 
only top-down factor that determines perception. Everyday experience indicates that recogni-
tion is greatly facilitated if one knows what to expect. In laboratory settings, when subjects are 
confronted with fragmented black and white images of an object, they may fail in perceiving the 
object. However, once the object has been identifi  ed it pops out and will henceforth be recog-
nized immediately (the Eureka eff  ect, Ahissar & Hochstein, 2004; Dolan et al., 1997). Similarly, 
providing subjects with the name or category of the object in anticipation of the stimulus low-
ers the threshold for its visibility (Eger, Henson, Driver, & Dolan, 2007; Esterman & Yantis, 
2010). In patients with visual extinction due to parietal lesions, information held in working 
memory can reduce the eff  ects of extinction on awareness (Soto & Humphreys, 2006). Th  ese 
observations suggest that perceptual thresholds depend not only on attention but also on a pri-
ori knowledge. Such top-down eff  ects agree with theories that consider perception as a Bayes-
ian process in which sensory information is matched with priors, i.e., with prior knowledge 
and expectations (Friston, 2010; Gregory, 1997; Kveraga, et al., 2007). An increasingly popular 
implementation of this Bayesian integration is predictive coding, in which the brain construc-
tively predicts upcoming sensory input rather than passively registering it (Friston, 2005; Rao & 
Ballard, 1999): Top-down predictions “explain away” lower level representations through recur-
rent interactions such that the mismatch between expected and observed evidence (prediction 
error) is minimized. Accordingly, weaker neural responses to anticipated than to unexpected 
stimuli have been reported (Alink, et al., 2010; Garrido, et al., 2009).
Here, we test whether the threshold of perceptual awareness is modulated by previous 75
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experience. In particular, we examined how sensory evidence and top-down expectations, respec-
tively, infl  uence the threshold of awareness, and whether the two factors modulate brain activity 
diff  erently. To this end, we measured electroencephalographic (EEG) activity in a visual paradigm 
in which we generated perceptual hysteresis by parametrically increasing and then decreasing the 
sensory evidence for an initially hidden stimulus. Under these conditions, an expectation is built 
up once the subject has perceived the stimulus and this in turn increases the visibility of subsequent 
lower contrast stimuli. Th   is allows for contrasting brain states with and without expectations and 
with perceived and non-perceived stimuli for identical stimulation conditions. Th   e results confi  rm 
that expectations lower the threshold for perceptual awareness and provide new evidence on the 
electrophysiological signatures associated with conscious perception.  Importantly, the amount of 
prior knowledge and ensuing expectations determine whether the electrophysiological signatures 
of awareness occur early or late aft  er stimulus presentation. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Sixteen volunteers participated in the main EEG study (mean age 26± 2 years; 10 female; 
14 right-handed). Of those, nine participants also took part in a control EEG experiment (5 female, 
8 right-handed). Ten additional participants took part in a behavioural control experiment (mean 
age 26± 5 years; 5 female; 9 right-handed). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vi-
sion and had no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Participants gave written informed 
consent before the experiment. Th   e study protocol was conducted in accordance with the declara-
tion of Helsinki and approved by the local ethics committee.
Material 
Stimuli were presented on a TFT monitor (resolution 800×600) at a refresh rate of 
60 Hz and located approximately 1 meter from the subjects. Th  e visible screen size subtended 76
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16.197°×12.615° in the horizontal and vertical plane. Presentation soft  ware (version 10.3) was used 
for stimulus presentation and response collection. 
Stimuli were either letters, numbers or symbols embedded into a background fi  eld of 
random noise (Figure 4-1a). We parametrically manipulated stimulus visibility by modifying 
the dot density of the target shape, while keeping the dot density of the background constant. 
Th   is results in a parametric modulation of the signal to noise ratio, based on which we created 
six diff  erent visibility levels. For the lowest visibility level target dot density was similar to that 
of the surrounding background, creating the perception of just a fi  eld of random dots.  Visibility 
was increased by linearly decreasing the dot density of the target. Diff  erences in dot density be-
tween target and background provide a grouping cue for segmentation allowing to perceive the 
illusory contours of the target. To avoid sensory adaptation the location of the dots and of the 
target were randomized on each trial (i.e., the presentation of each stimulus). All stimuli were 
created using Matlab (Th   e MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA, USA). 
Stimuli were displayed at the center of the screen surrounded by a grey background 
and comprised 13.134°×10.626°. Forty diff  erent stimuli were used (25 letters, 9 numbers and 
6 symbols). In addition, target stimuli were presented in three diff  erent sizes, with an absolute 
vertical extent of the target of 75 pixels, 100 pixels, and 125 pixels, corresponding to a height of 
approximately 1.637°, 2.182°, 2.726° visual angle, respectively. 
Procedure
In all experiments, the subjects’ task was to rate the visibility of the target stimuli on the 
four-point Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS, Overgaard, Rote, Mouridsen, & Ramsøy, 2006): 
“1” corresponds to “No experience of the stimulus, “2” corresponds to “Brief glimpse of the 
stimulus but could not recognize what it was”, “3” corresponds to an “Almost clear impression of 
the stimulus” and “4” corresponds to a “Clear Impression of the stimulus”. Th   ese questions were 
aimed at the subjects’ fi  ne-grained phenomenal impression of the stimulus. Th   us, our scale dif-77
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fers from previously used scales that assessed only confi  dence (e.g., Wilimzig, et al., 2008). We 
provided subjects with verbal as well as written instructions. In order to assure similar criteria 
between participants, we extensively discussed the operationalization of PA with the subjects 
before the experiment started. In particular, we emphasized the distinction between point 2 
and point 3 on the scale, the criterion separating no recognition from explicit recognition of the 
target. Furthermore, we pointed out that they should rate only their perception of the target, 
and that there were neither right nor wrong answers. Responses were given by button presses on 
a keyboard, with a stress on accuracy rather than speed. In order to verify that subjects used the 
PA scale properly, some of the stimuli were clearly visible which should lead to high visibility 
500 ms
Until Subject Response
Random (1-1.5 secs)
?
A)
 B)
P. A. SCALE: 
1 = No Experience
2 = Brief Glimpse
3 = Almost Clear Impression
4 = Clear Impression
Trial sequence & degradation level
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
Ascending Sequence
Descending Sequence
Figure 4-1. Experimental design. (a) Th   e task was to rate the visibility of target stimuli embedded in a fi  eld of ran-
dom noise. Aft  er a fi  xation cross of variable length was presented, the target stimuli appeared for 500 ms, followed 
by a question mark indicating subject to give their visibility ratings. To assess visibility we used the Perceptual 
Awareness Scale (Overgaard, et al., 2006). (b) Bottom-up information was manipulated by degrading the stimulus 
visibility. Six degradation levels were used. Degradation was achieved by decreasing the dot density of the target 
stimuli while keeping dot density of the background constant. Th   e successive increases and decreases in stimulus 
degradation are referred to as "sequence". For the main experiment, the same stimulus was used during a given se-
quence, whereas in the control EEG experiment, the stimulus was varied every trial.78
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ratings, whereas highly degraded stimuli that could not be perceived should be reported as invis-
ible. Th   is allowed us to assess the reliability of the subjects’ judgments.
A trial started with a fi  xation cross presented on a grey background for a random dura-
tion of 1000-1500 ms. Th   en, the random dot fi  eld containing the target (letter, number or sym-
bol) was presented for a duration of 500 ms. Aft  er that, a response screen containing a question 
mark indicated to the subjects that they should rate the visibility of the target (Figure 4-1a).
To study the diff  erential eff  ects of sensory evidence and expectancy, in a fi  rst experi-
ment, we presented the targets in a sequence of 11 trials (for simplicity we will refer to this as 
‘sequence’). Th   e same target was used throughout the sequence. Th   e visibility of the target pro-
gressively increased, from trial 1 to 6 and then decreased again until trial 11 (Figure 4-1b). Th  us, 
once the target became visible on the ascending part of the sequence, subjects could generate 
target specifi  c expectancies, the eff  ect of which could be tested in the descending part (hysteresis 
eff  ect; Kleinschmidt, Büchel, Hutton, Friston, & Frackowiak, 2002). Th   e generation of target 
specifi  c expectancies can also be regarded as a form of priming (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Mar-
tin, 2006). We presented 120 sequences that were divided into six blocks (20 sequences each). 
Aft  er each block a break of variable length was introduced. 
To distinguish the specifi  c contribution of the expectancy from the sequential change in 
sensory evidence, we ran a control experiment in which we used the same sequences but changed 
the identity of the target in each trial, preventing the generation of target specifi  c expectancies. 
If changes in visibility are related to expectancy and prediction about stimulus identity, and not 
to a mere sequence eff  ect, no signs of hysteresis should be observed in this case. Stimuli were 
identical to those used in the previous study and were repeated for an equal number of times 
throughout the experiment. In total, 120 sequences were presented, divided into six blocks. For 
both studies we collected EEG data while subjects performed the task. 
To further evaluate whether target specifi  c expectations lead to changes in the threshold 
of perceptual awareness or changes in response bias, we ran a behavioral experiment in which we 79
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presented stimuli, only in descending order of visibility, in three conditions: (i) random sequence, 
(ii) predictable sequence, and (iii) interrupted sequence. In the random sequence, target identity 
was randomly changed for each successive degradation level, precluding any form of target specifi  c 
expectations. In the predictable sequence, the same target was presented at all degradation levels. 
In the interrupted sequence, one unpredicted target per sequence was introduced with a probabil-
ity of 20% at one of the degradation levels. Th   is creates a scenario of high certainty regarding the 
future target (80% probability) which is unfulfi  lled in some trials.  In other words, predicted and 
interrupted sequences only diff  er in that one unexpected target was introduced per sequence. Th  e 
six degradation levels were presented in descending visibility order only (from degradation level 
L6 to L1) promoting the development of target specifi  c expectations. Random and predictable se-
quence diff  ered from the second position in the sequence onwards, whereas predictable and inter-
rupted sequences could diff  er from the third position in the sequence. Th   is was done to assure that 
subjects develop target expectations and thereby allowing us to evaluate the associated visibility to 
an unexpected target. In total, we presented 180 sequences: 20 random, 80 expected and 80 inter-
rupted sequences (20 unexpected trials per degradation level), divided into four blocks.  Th  e  three 
types of sequences were randomized throughout the experiment.  Th   e same stimuli were used for 
all sequences, and they were the same as those used in the two experiments described above.
Our rationale for these control experiments was that if subjects have a tendency to respond 
with higher visibility ratings (response bias) simply because they think they know what will be 
seen next, we would expect higher ratings for unexpected stimuli in the interrupted sequence. 
Conversely, if expectations truly augment visibility, the ratings of these unexpected stimuli should 
be the same as those presented under the random sequence.
Data Acquisition
All experiments was conducted in an electrically shielded, sound-attenuated, and dimly 
lit cabin. A TFT monitor was placed outside the cabin behind an electrically shielded window. 80
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All devices inside the cabin were battery operated to avoid interference of the line frequency. For 
study 1 and 2, EEG was recorded with a QuickAmp amplifi  er (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, 
Germany) using a custom 128-channel elastic cap (Easy Cap GmbH, Herrsching-Breitbrunn, 
Germany), with average reference and a forehead ground electrode. Th   e electrodes were equally 
spaced over the whole head and symmetrically placed between both hemispheres. Th  e  inferior 
row of electrodes was placed down to a line from the low cheeks back to several centimeters be-
low the inion, thus providing suffi   cient coverage of the lower parts of the head. Two additional 
electrodes were placed on the infra-orbital ridges of the left   and right eye, respectively, and two 
further electrodes were placed on the neck below the edge of the electrode cap. Data were sam-
pled at 1000 Hz and analogue fi  ltered between 0.01 and 100 Hz during recording. Electrode 
impedances were kept below 10 kΩ. Data were digitally saved on a computer outside the cabin 
for later offl   ine analysis.
Data analysis
Behavioral data and curve fi  tting
Although we applied a 4-point visibility scale, for analysis the 4-point scale was re-coded 
into a single response category (visibility), collapsing responses 1+2 and responses 3+4 as “invis-
ible” and “visible”, respectively. Th   is dichotomy was based on explicit recognition of the target in 
the stimulus. Th   en, the percentage of the rating “visible” was calculated for each stimulus in the 
sequence. For the main and control EEG experiment we analyzed our data using an unconstrained 
repeated measure ANOVA and a constrained parametric model.  In the unconstrained ANOVA 
we treated degradation level and order as two separate factors with six and two levels (ascending 
and descending sequence) respectively.  In the constrained model we created a new dependent 
variable (infl  exion point) by fi  tting, per subject, a sigmoid function of degradation level to the be-
havioral data to compute an infl  exion point.  We then tried to explain diff  erences in the infl  exion 
point data in terms of a repeated measure ANOVA with one factor (ascending vs. descending se-81
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quence).  Th   e rating scores for visibility were fi  tted with a generalized sigmoid function defi  ned as:
b
e
x f x a 
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1
) (  , 
where a determines the slope (steepness) of the sigmoid, b the off  set, and j the horizon-
tal shift   of the function (the threshold). Th   e sigmoid function was fi  tted to best represent the 
data points by using a gradient descent method to minimize approximation error. Before the fi  t-
ting, values were normalized to the interval [0..1]. For our purposes, the most important param-
eter of the sigmoid was j, because it determines the threshold, i.e., the point on the horizontal 
axis at which the function reaches half of its maximum. If predictions infl  uence visibility this 
point should shift   along the horizontal axis for visibility functions computed from ascending 
and descending sequences, respectively. 
For the behavioral control experiment, we ran an unconstrained repeated measure 
ANOVA with factors sequence type (random, predictable, interrupted) and degradation level 
(4 levels, from L4 to L1). Only four degradation levels were included since only in those inter-
ruptions of expectations could occur (as required to promote target specifi  c expectations). 
In all analyses of variance with more than one degree of freedom we used the Green-
house-Geisser correction. We report adjusted degrees of freedom and adjusted p values. 
In order to investigate whether the increase in visibility observed in the main EEG ex-
periment is the consequence of a top-down perceptual expectation (the generation of target 
specifi  c expectancies) as opposed to mere passive repetition of the stimuli, we run a control 
analysis taking advantage of the fact that the number of repetitions for each stimulus was the 
same in the main EEG and control EEG experiment. For the control EEG experiment, we tested 
whether visibility increased systematically with the number of repetitions. Each stimulus was re-
coded depending on whether it had been previously presented (old) or not (novel). Old stimuli 
were further subdivided depending on the number of previous repetitions (from 1 up to 10). 
Th   us, we could explicitly test whether the number of repetitions had an eff  ect on recognition in 82
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a repeated measures ANOVA with factors repetition, order and degradation level. We further 
compared zero repetitions (new) with the maximal amount of repetitions (10, old) and when 
repetitions were regrouped into few (1-3), intermediate (4-6) and many repetitions (7-9). 
Analysis of event-related potentials
For the analysis of event-related potentials (ERPs) of the main and control experiment, 
the continuous EEG signal was band-pass fi  ltered (0.3-20 Hz) with a phase shift  -free Butter-
worth fi  lter (time constant [s] = 0.530526, slope [db/oct] = 24). For each degradation level, the 
fi  ltered signal was then segmented in series of 1200 ms long epochs. Each epoch started 200 ms 
before the onset of the stimuli. Trials containing voltages exceeding ± 100 μV, or gradients ex-
ceeding ± 50 μV were rejected. Th   e automatic artefact rejection was supplemented by visual in-
spection of every trial to reject cases with electrode drift  s, eye-movements or electromyographic 
activity. Artifact free trials were averaged per degradation level in synchrony with the onset of 
the stimuli, and baseline corrected over a 200 ms window. Since the diff  erent degradation levels 
led to diff  erent ratios of seen vs. unseen trials we did not consider behavioural performance 
in this analysis. We solely compared the electrophysiological responses between diff  erent deg-
radation levels, assuming that diff  erences refl  ect both the degradation level and diff  erences in 
visibility. Linear response modulations are expected for components refl  ecting physical proper-
ties of the stimuli, whereas non-linear responses should refl  ect the behaviorally assessed visibil-
ity (as in Figure 4-2a). Additionally, we directly compared seen and unseen trials (see below).   
Mean amplitudes were analyzed for P1 (110-130 ms), N1 (130-150ms), P2 (180-270ms) and 
P3 (300-500 ms) components. We focused on those ERP components because previous studies 
have related them either to visual awareness (for a review see Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010) or to 
predictions (Garrido, et al., 2009). To increase statistical power, mean amplitude was computed 
over groups of electrodes representative of the topography of each scalp component. Regions of 
interest (ROIs) were selected based on the compound waveform of all conditions to minimize 83
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selection bias favouring a particular condition. For P1 we selected a group of occipito-parietal 
electrodes (P5, P7, PO7, PO5, P6, P8, PO6, PO8), for N1 the occipito-central electrodes (O1, 
OZ, O2, O9, Iz, O10), for P2 the occipito-parietal electrodes (P5, P7, PO7, PO5, PO9, O1, 
O9, Iz, Oz, O2, O10, P6, P8, PO6, PO8, PO10), and for P3 the parieto-central electrodes 
(CP3, CP1, P1, P3, Pz, CPz, PO1, PO2, P2, P4, CP2, CP4). All EEG processing was done us-
ing Brain Vision Analyzer 1 (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany). Th   e Matlab toolbox 
EEGLAB was used for visualization and topographic plots (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). 
We also directly studied amplitude modulations in relation to seen and unseen stimuli 
for the P1, N1, P2 and P3 components. For this analysis, only data from the main experiment 
were included. We further restricted our analysis to Level 4 stimuli in the ascending and to Level 
3 stimuli in the descending part of the stimulation sequence because the ratio between seen and 
unseen stimuli was similar for these levels (~50%). Preprocessing steps were the same as those 
described above for the whole sequence. Trials in which subjects identifi  ed the stimuli (visibil-
ity rating 3 and 4) were categorized as seen, and trials in which subjects could not identify the 
stimuli (visibility rating 1 and 2) were classifi  ed as unseen. Pairwise comparisons confi  rmed that 
aft  er artifact rejection the ratio of seen vs. unseen trials were similar for Level 4 (T(15)=0.816, 
p=0.427) and Level 3 (T(15)=1.020, p=0.324). 
As for the behavioral data, we analyzed the electrophysiological data - mean amplitude 
per ERP component - with an unconstrained ANOVA treating degradation level and order as 
two separate factors. Th   us, both for the behavioral and electrophysiological data, we looked for 
the main eff  ect of degradation, order and their interaction. For some components (P1, P2 and 
P3), region of interest was included as a factor. In all analyses of variance with more than one 
degree of freedom we again used the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Picton et al., 2000). We 
report adjusted degrees of freedom and adjusted p values.
Acknowledging that the preselection of electrodes and components might have pre-
cluded observing additional components related to awareness (e.g., with a diff  erent time course 84
Chapter 4
than the ones already investigated) and to further evaluate the time points at which changes 
in electric fi  eld strength distinguish between seen and unseen trials at threshold, we calculated 
global fi  eld power (GFP, Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980) for level 4 ascending sequence (AS) and 
level 3 descending sequence (DS). GFP allows for investigation of amplitude diff  erences be-
tween conditions without any preselection of electrodes, and thus to contrast conditions across 
the whole scalp. GFP is equivalent to the spatial standard deviation of the scalp electric fi  eld and 
is calculated as the square root of the mean of the squared value recorded at each electrode (vs. 
the average reference). To statistically test for diff  erences in GFP between experimental condi-
tions we performed a series of paired nonparametric statistical analyses based on randomization 
tests (Manly, 1991). Th   e empirical probability distribution of the diff  erences in GFP between 
seen and unseen conditions was created separately for L4(AS) and L3(DS) by randomly shuf-
fl  ing the conditions within subjects in the original data, and recomputing the GFP for these 
shuffl   ed conditions. Th   is procedure was repeated 65536 times (2n, n being the number of sub-
jects; in our case 16) so as to be able to estimate the probability (p<0.01) that the diff  erence 
between the two distributions is observed by chance (M. M. Murray, Brunet, & Michel, 2008). 
We applied an additional criterion of temporal stability for ten consecutive time points, cor-
responding to 10 ms at 1000 Hz sampling rate (for a similar approach see M. M. Murray, et al., 
2008; Pourtois, Delplanque, Michel, & Vuilleumier, 2008). 
RESULTS
Behavioral results
Figure 4-2a shows the percentage of responses signaling a stimulus as seen as a func-
tion of the degradation level of the stimuli and their place in the presentation sequence, when 
the target is predictable. A signifi  cant eff  ect of degradation level was observed confi  rming that 
our manipulation of visibility was successful (degradation level: F(1.702, 25.535) = 407.375, 
p<0.0001): Th   e percentage of “seen stimuli” increases signifi  cantly as degradation level decreas-85
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es. For all subjects, the curve relating visibility to degradation levels was well fi  tted by a sigmoid 
and exhibits a sharp transition between degradation level 3 and 5 from judgments “mainly invis-
ible” to “mainly visible”. Confi  rming the non-linearity in the visibility function we found that 
the rate of increase in subjective visibility was higher between degradation level 3 (L3) and deg-
radation level 5 (L5) - around the threshold of visibility in the ascending sequence-, than for the 
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(D) Random, Interrupted & Predicted Sequences  (C) Main vs. Control experiment
Figure 4-2. Behavioural results. Percentage of seen stimuli per degradation level for ascending sequences and de-
scending sequences for the main experiment with predictable sequences (a) and the control EEG experiment with 
random sequences (b). Black lines refer to ascending sequences, gray lines to descending sequences. (c) Subjective 
threshold data (infl  ection point) for the main (predictable target) and control (random target) EEG experiment. 
(d) Percentage of seen stimuli per degradation level for random, interrupted and predicted sequences. In the ran-
dom sequences, target stimuli varied at each degradation level leading to uncertainty regarding stimulus identity. In 
the predictable sequences, the same target was used throughout the sequence, thus generating high certainty about 
stimulus identity. In the interrupted sequences subjects had high certainty regarding the identity of the upcoming 
target (80% probability) that was in 20% of the cases unexpectedly unfulfi  lled. Visibility ratings in the interrupted 
sequences correspond to ratings given to the unexpected stimuli.86
Chapter 4
increase between L2-L3 and L5-L6  (T(15) = -10.227, p<0.0001)  (for a similar approach, see 
Del Cul, et al., 2007). A clear hysteresis eff  ect was observed between the ascending and the de-
scending part of the stimulus series (F(1,15)=178.819, p<0.0001): subjects reported to detect 
a stimulus more oft  en in the descending (59%) than in the ascending sequence (42%). Th  e  in-
crease in visibility due to the order eff  ect (hysteresis) was not the same for all degradation levels 
(degradation level*order: F(2.064,30.956)=41.900, p<0.0001), and this eff  ect is explained by a 
signifi  cant quadratic function (F(1,15)=126,667, p<0.0001). Pairwise comparisons contrasting 
the same physical stimulus (degradation level) during the ascending and descending sequence 
revealed that all stimuli but L1 – that was clearly not distinguishable - showed hysteresis. In 
order to quantify this eff  ect we fi  tted sigmoid curves, per subjects, to the ascending and descend-
ing series and set the subjective threshold at the infl  ection point of the sigmoid. Th  e  threshold 
for the ascending sequence was at degradation level 3.96 and for the descending sequence at 
2.76.  Th   us, the gain in visibility caused by prior knowledge of the stimulus corresponds to 1.2 
degradation steps.  Accordingly, the threshold of visibility was reached at degradation level 4 in 
the ascending (53.02% seen stimuli) and at degradation level 3 in the descending part (54.01% 
seen stimuli). 
To evaluate whether the hysteresis eff  ect results from a memory–based prediction of 
stimulus identity or from the sequential presentation of the stimuli we used our control ex-
periment in which the target stimuli diff  ered in each trial, both for the ascending and for the 
descending sequence. We ran an ANOVA with factors predictable, degradation level and order. 
As expected, in the ascending part of the curve, main and control experiment showed compa-
rable percentages of seen stimuli (Figure 4-2b). However, during the descending sequence the 
percentage of seen responses was signifi  cantly higher in the main (59.36%) than in the control 
experiment (52.42%) (interaction predictable and order: F(1,8)=28.849, p=0.001; interaction 
predictable*order*degradation level: F(2.069,16.551)=10.273, p=0.001). Similar results were 
obtained when comparing the infl  ection point data for the control and main experiment (Fig-87
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ure 4-2c). Visibility thresholds were similar in the ascending part, but diff  ered signifi  cantly in 
the descending part (T(8)=3.363, p=0.01). In summary, the psychophysical functions exhibit 
clear signs of perceptual hysteresis, suggesting that the buildup of an internal representation of 
the upcoming stimulus enhances visibility. 
Given that the degree of uncertainty regarding the stimulus identity diff  ers between pre-
dictable and random sequences, it can be argued that the introduction of target specifi  c expecta-
tions do not lead to real changes in the threshold of perceptual awareness but simply promote 
subjects to change their response criterion across the predictable sequences. To directly evaluate 
this possibility we turned to our behavioral experiment in which stimuli were presented, only in 
descending visibility order, in three conditions: (i) random sequence, (ii) predictable sequence, 
and (iii) interrupted sequence. Th   e critical manipulation was the degree of certainty regarding 
the identity of the upcoming stimuli. Target stimuli either randomly varied per degradation 
level (random sequences), creating high uncertainty about the stimulus identity or were kept 
the same throughout the sequence (predictable sequence), creating high certainty about the 
stimulus identity. Crucially, for the interrupted sequence subjects had high certainty regard-
ing the identity of the upcoming target (80% probability) that was unexpectedly unfulfi  lled. 
As can be seen in Figure 4-2d, visibility ratings for the unexpected stimuli in the interrupted 
sequences were the same as for stimuli in the random sequences at each degradation level; both 
showed lower visibility ratings than for the predicted stimuli in the predictable sequence (se-
quence type: F(1.635,14.712)=19.358, p<0.001; degradation level: F(2.122,19.100)=163.902, 
p<0.001; sequence type*degradation level: F(3.321,29.891)=1.98, p=0.133). Th   is shows that 
the increases in visibility ratings refl  ect a true change in the threshold of visibility due to target 
specifi  c expectations and not a simple response bias, since such a bias would carry over to unex-
pected targets during the interrupted sequences.
An additional analysis revealed that the mere number of repetitions of a stimulus can-
not explain the improved identifi  cation levels observed in the main experiment (see Figure 4-3).88
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Figure 4-3. Percentage of seen responses as a function of degradation level and repetition for the ascending and 
descending sequence. No eff  ect of or interaction with repetition were found in a repeated measures ANOVA with 
factors repetition, order and degradation level [repetition F(3.798,30.381)=0.600, p=0.657;  repetition x order 
F(3.373,26.984)=1.187, p=0.152; repetition x degradation level F(6.338, 50.704)=0.663, p=0.688; repetition 
x order x degradation level F(5.965,47.716)=0.908, p=0.497]. Further analyses confi  rmed this results when we 
compared zero repetitions (new) with the maximal amount of repetitions (10, old) (all p>0.392), or when repeti-
tions were regrouped into few (1-3), intermediate (4-6) and many repetitions (7-9) (all p>0.1). Th   e above fi  gure 
exemplifi  es that new stimuli lead to similar recognition levels as stimuli repeated between 7 and 9 times, both in 
the ascending and the descending sequence. In sum, we fi  nd no behavioral eff  ect of mere passive repetition in the 
control experiment. Th   us, since the number of repetitions was the same in both experiments (control and main), 
we conclude that mere repetition cannot explain the increased visibility observed in the main experiment. Of note 
is that mere repetition of stimuli can lead to facilitatory eff  ects (e.g., identifi  cation) when intervening stimuli are 
present, even when prime and test are presented several days apart (van Turennout, Ellmore, & Martin, 2000). 
Th   is casts doubt upon the possible concern that facilitatory eff  ects in the control experiment might not have been 
observed because of the intervening items. Table 4-1 summarizes the mean visibility ratings and the mean number 
of trials per repetition.89
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Event-related potentials
We focused on two questions: i) which ERP components correlate with the sharp tran-
sition in visibility and ii) how ERP components are aff  ected by the change in visibility caused by 
the buildup of prior expectations. To determine brain activity (ERP components) that directly 
relates to subjective visibility we used the following criteria: a) ERP components should invari-
ably display diff  erential amplitudes for seen and unseen stimuli irrespective of whether visibility 
is solely caused by stimulus saliency or by a combination of saliency and expectancy, and (b) ex-
hibit a similar response profi  le in terms of their amplitude as the behaviorally assessed visibility. 
In particular, they should exhibit non-linear amplitude modulations with a sharp transition at 
the threshold of visibility. In contrast, linear response modulations were expected for compo-
nents refl  ecting physical properties of the stimuli. 
Inspection of the ERPs revealed four major components: P1, N1, P2 and P3. For each 
of these components we examined whether they exhibited amplitude modulations related to 
the physical properties of the stimuli (degradation level) or subjective visibility, the order of the 
stimuli (hysteresis), or the interaction between stimulus visibility and order.
Table 4-1. Mean visibility and mean amount of trials per repetition (the amount of trials did not diff  er signifi  cantly 
between conditions, all p>0.4).
Repetition
Visibility 
Mean
Visibility 
Std.Error
Count 
Mean
Count 
Std.Error
Rep0 .48 .03 10.98 .06
Rep1 .50 .03 10.87 .07
Rep2 .49 .03 10.93 .06
Rep3 .49 .03 10.83 .04
Rep4 .48 .02 11.00 .07
Rep5 .49 .03 10.94 .07
Rep6 .48 .03 10.83 .07
Rep7 .49 .03 10.89 .09
Rep9 .49 .03 10.86 .07
Rep9 .47 .02 10.97 .05
Rep10 .48 .02 10.89 .0390
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Th   e P1 component showed no modulation neither for degradation nor order and also 
no interaction between these factors (all p>0.2, Figure 4-4a). Th   ere was only a trend towards 
reduced amplitude for the stimuli with lowest visibility. Th  is  confi  rms previous results show-
ing that P1 is not related to perceptual awareness (Del Cul, et al., 2007; Sergent, Baillet, & 
Dehaene, 2005). Th   e N1 component, when averaged across the ascending and descending se-
quence, respectively, had a reduced amplitude for the descending as compared to the ascend-
ing part  (eff  ect of order F(1, 15)=6.122, p=0.026, Figure 4-4b). N1 changes further showed 
an interaction between degradation level and order (degradation level x order: F(3.335, 
50.030)=2.822, p=0.043), suggesting that the modulation of this component diff  ers for the 
ascending and descending part. A clear eff  ect of degradation existed for the ascending part 
(F(3.647, 54.702)=3.386, p=0.018). Th   e N1 amplitude decreased linearly with increasing vis-
ibility (F(1, 15)=9.639, p=0.007) as would be predicted by a decrease in prediction error un-
der predictive coding (Garrido, et al., 2009). In contrast, no eff  ect of degradation was observed 
for the descending part (p>0.9). Th   us, in the ascending part the N1 modulation mainly refl  ects 
diff  erences in sensory stimulation, while in the descending part it seems to refl  ect expectations. 
To test whether expectations diff  erentially modulate responses to the same stimuli we per-
formed pairwise comparisons between responses to the same physical stimuli (degradation lev-
el) in the ascending and descending parts. Th   is analysis revealed amplitude modulations only 
for those stimuli that were barely visible but not for the highly visible stimuli [(L1 (p=0.058), 
L2 (p=0.010), L3 (p=0.037), L4 (p=0.316), L5 (p=0.116)]. Th   is suggests that top-down ef-
fects selectively aff  ect the processing of stimuli with poor visibility (bottom-up information). 
In fact, the generation of a memory trace seems to change responses to sensory stimulation in 
such a way that once expectancy is established, stimuli evoke similar N1 amplitudes irrespec-
tive of degradation level. In summary, the amplitude of the N1 component is modulated by 
expectations indicating that prior knowledge aff  ects responses already 130 ms aft  er stimulus 
presentation. Importantly, however, the modulation of the N1 component does not refl  ect 91
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subjective visibility. Th   e latter follows a sigmoidal function while the N1 component follows 
the linear change of stimulus degradation, at least in the ascending sequence.
Th   e other components, P2 and P3, showed clear but diff  erent amplitude modulations 
related to degradation level and subjective visibility. For the P2 component a within subject 
ANOVA with factor degradation level, order and electrode location (region of interest, ROI) 
(3 levels: left  , right and central sensors) revealed that P2 amplitude decreases signifi  cantly with 
decreasing degradation (degradation level: F(1.530,22.954)=52.667, p<0.001), and this rela-
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Figure 4-4. Electrophysiological Results (Main Experiment). Amplitude modulations as a function of degradation 
level and order (ascending sequence/descending sequence) for P1 (a) N1 (b) P2 (c) and P3 (d). Scalp topographies 
are shown for ascending sequence at degradation level 1 (invisible), degradation level 4 (threshold of visibility) and 
degradation level 6 (highest visibility). 92
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tion can be well described by a cubic function (F(1,15)=15.019, p=0.001) (see Figure 4-4c and 
4-5), thus resembling the non-linear behavior of the psychometric curve. Th   is suggests that the 
amplitude of the P2 component is inversely related to the visibility of the stimuli. P2 ampli-
tude was also signifi  cantly smaller for the descending than for the ascending sequence (order:   
F(1,15)=12.641, p=0.003), suggesting that perceptual expectations also attenuate this ERP 
component. However, the attenuation of the P2 component by prior knowledge depends on the 
degradation level (degradation level*order: F(3.449,51.738)=6.228, p=0.001). Pairwise com-
parisons between responses to the same physical stimuli (degradation level) in the ascending 
and descending sequence revealed that only responses to barely visible stimuli showed lower am-
plitudes whereas responses to clearly visible stimuli showed similar amplitudes (L1 (p=0.169), 
L2 (p=0.003), L3 (p=0.001), L4 (p=0.116), L5 (p=0.479), Figure 4-4c). Th   is indicates that top-
down eff  ects on P2 amplitudes are stronger when bottom-up saliency of the stimuli is low. Th  is 
suggests that P2 attenuation is mainly related to visibility rather than degradation or expectancy 
per se. Th   ere was also a lateralization eff  ect. P2 amplitudes were higher for the right than for 
central and left   sensors (F(1.708,25.615)=10.251, p=0.001, Figure 4-5), which is in agreement 
with previous fi  ndings (Freunberger, Klimesch, Doppelmayr, & Holler, 2007). Scalp topogra-
phies of P2 modulation are shown in Figure 4-6. Both the lateralization eff  ect and the decreases 
in amplitude with increasing visibility are clearly visible. It is important to note that contrary to 
the modulations observed in N1 amplitude where an eff  ect of degradation level was only observed 
for the ascending sequence, P2 showed amplitude modulations as a function of visibility in both 
the ascending and descending sequences. Th   us, P2 is the fi  rst ERP component whose amplitude 
modulation corresponds well to the behaviorally assessed visibility levels, following the nonlinear 
function of visibility in both the ascending and the descending sequences. 
Th   e P3 component diff  ered from the P2 component in that it showed no main eff  ect of or-
der. Its amplitude increased signifi  cantly with decreasing degradation (F(2.387,35.798)=35.593, 
p<0.001). In addition, a signifi  cant interaction between degradation level and order was found 93
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(F(2.588,38.826)=7.179, p=0.001). In the ascending sequence, stimuli which were judged as 
visible (4 to 6) elicited a signifi  cantly higher (T(15)=-7.072, p<0.001) amplitude than invisible 
stimuli (1 to 3), with a sharp transition at the visibility threshold between degradation 3 and 4 
(Figure 4-4d). In the ascending sequences, no diff  erences in amplitude were found across stimuli 
judged as visible (all p>0.08) or invisible (all p>0.4), respectively. Th   is non-linearity replicates 
previous fi  ndings relating P3 amplitude to subjective visibility (Del Cul, et al., 2007). In con-
trast, when the analysis was carried out on the descending sequence, the separation between 
visible and invisible stimuli disappeared. Instead, all stimuli but stimulus 1 elicited a P3 response 
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of similar amplitude, despite marked dif-
ferences in visibility and physical proper-
ties (for L1 against all others, all p>0.03 
; for comparisons of L2 to L5, all p>0.2; 
Figure 4-4d). As for the P2 component, 
there was a lateralization eff  ect.  Re-
sponses in the right sensors were more 
pronounced, especially for stimuli with 
lower visibility.
To further confi  rm these results 
we analyzed the diff  erent ERP compo-
nents in the condition where the target 
stimuli diff  ered for every step in the as-
cending and descending sequences such 
that perceptual expectations could not 
be built up. 
As displayed in Figure 4-7, none 
of the components showed variations in 
amplitude when comparing responses to 
stimuli at equal degradation levels in the 
ascending and descending sequence (all 
p>0.2). In contrast, a clear eff  ect of deg-
radation level was observed for all com-
ponents (P1: F(2.678, 21.423)=4.209, 
p=0.020;  N1: F(2.925, 23.402)=4.227, 
p=0.016; P2: F(1.611, 12.886)=34.809, 
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Figure 4-6. P2 Scalp Topographies (Main Experiment). 
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p<0.001; P3: F(2.618, 20.940)=17.836, p<0.001). With decreasing degradation P1 ampli-
tude increased (F(1, 8)=11.459, p=0.010), while the amplitude of the N1 and P2 decreased 
(F(1, 8)=11.510, p=0.009, F(1, 8)=8.804, p=0.018, respectively). For the P1 and N1 com-
ponent the functions relating degradation with amplitude were linear, for the P2 compo-
nent this function was quadratic. Th   e quadratic relation is mainly explained by a saturation 
eff  ect at degradation 1 (Figure 4-7c). If this degradation level is removed, the modulation 
of the P2 component becomes also linear both for the ascending and descending sequence. 
Th   e modulation of the P3 component followed a cubic function (F(1, 8)=6.386, p=0.035), 
with a sharp transition between seen and unseen stimuli, thus correlating well with the psy-
chometric function of visibility. Furthermore, two clear clusters of amplitudes emerged dis-
sociating seen from unseen stimuli: P3 amplitudes were similar for the groups of stimuli 
with low (1-3) (all p>0.05) and high visibility (4-6) (all p>0.05) respectively, whereas clear 
amplitude diff  erences existed between the groups. Th   is was true for both the increasing and 
Figure 4-7. Electrophysiological Results (Control Experiment). Amplitude modulations as a function of degrada-
tion level and order (Ascending sequence/descending sequence) for P1 (a) N1 (b) P2 (c) and P3 (d).
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for the decreasing sequence (increasing: T(8)=-5.481, p=0.001; decreasing: T(8)=-5.193, 
p=0.001). Waveform traces can be seen in Figure 4-8 for the main and in Figure 4-9 for the 
control experiment. 
Effects of visibility at threshold
Finally, we directly tested the factor visibility (seen vs. unseen responses) for the data ob-
tained from the main experiment to determine which ERP component varied with subjective vis-
ibility when the visual stimulus remains constant. To this end, we used only stimuli at the threshold 
of subjective visibility: stimuli with degradation level 4 for the ascending sequence, and degra-
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dation level 3 for the descending sequence. Th   ese stimuli produced similar numbers of seen and 
unseen trials even though the physical properties of the stimuli diff  ered. We reasoned that ERP 
components that diff  erentiate between seen and unseen trials at both degradation levels are likely 
to be related to visibility and not to expectations or diff  erences in sensory stimulation. Th  e  only 
ERP component that diff  erentiates between seen and unseen trials at both degradation levels was 
P2 (see Figure 4-10). Signifi  cant amplitude reductions for visible stimuli as compared to invisible 
stimuli were found during the ascending sequence for degradation level 4 (seen: 3.450 μV; unseen: 
4.810 μV; T(15)=-4.711, p=0.00028) and during the descending sequence for level 3 (seen: 4.331 
μV; unseen: 5.030 μV; T(15)=-3.091, p=0.007). None of the other components (P1, N1 or P3) 
distinguished visible from invisible trials at both degradation levels (interaction visibility x degra-
dation level: P1 F(1, 15)=7.748, p=0.014; P3 F(1, 15)=20.429, p=0.0004). Th   e N1 component 
showed no modulations in relation to visibility during the ascending and descending sequence (N1 
all p>0.4). Th   e P1 and P3 component showed higher amplitudes for seen as compared to unseen 
stimuli only for the ascending sequence (P1 T(15)=3.721, p=0.002; P3 T(15)=6.601, p>0.001). 
Additional time-resolved analyses support the conclusion that the diff  erence between seen and 
unseen trials is captured by the amplitude of the investigated ERP components (see Figure 4-11).
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DISCUSSION
Our results indicate that expectations alter the threshold of visibility. Subjects identifi  ed 
more stimuli in the descending than in the ascending sequences. Since stimuli in both sequenc-
es were identical, changes in visibility must be attributed to predictions about the upcoming 
stimulus. Th   is was refl  ected in a shift   of the psychometric function. Control experiments ruled 
out that the eff  ects were due to response bias. Predictions have been shown to aid perception 
(Biederman, 1972; Snodgrass & Feenan, 1990). For example, prior knowledge about the direc-
tion and velocity of moving targets enhances their detectability (Schwiedrzik, Alink, Kohler, 
Singer, & Muckli, 2007; Sekuler & Ball, 1977). Similarly, previous exposure aids the recognition 
of incomplete or ambiguous fi  gures (Dolan, et al., 1997; Kleinschmidt, et al., 2002). Predictions 
can also have detrimental eff  ects on perception when they are wrong (Bruner & Potter, 1964) or 
not updated (as in change blindness, Rensink, 2000). 
Signatures of visibility and expectations
By parametrically manipulating stimulus evidence and expectations, we distinguished 
brain activity related to visibility from activity refl  ecting sensory properties and/or perceptual 
expectations of the upcoming stimuli. Our results indicate that even the earliest ERPs change 
in the presence of expectations. However, not all refl  ect visibility. Such components should a) 
diff  erentiate between seen and unseen stimuli irrespective of whether visibility was solely due 
to stimulus saliency or a combination of saliency and expectancy, and  b) show a non-linear de-
pendence of their amplitude on degradation as the psychophysical function. In contrast, linear 
response modulations refl  ect physical stimulus properties. 
Th   e control EEG experiment where no predictions about stimulus identity could be 
established revealed that P1 and N1 were the only ERPs that followed a linear profi  le: P1 am-
plitude increased with decreasing degradation, while N1 amplitude decreased. In the presence 
of expectations, P1 amplitude was not modulated by physical stimulus properties. N1, however, 100
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showed linear amplitude decrements as a function of degradation, but only during the ascend-
ing sequence. During the descending sequence, N1 amplitude was low and not further modu-
lated. Th   is suggests that N1 is reduced once a hypothesis is built and subsequently remains low, 
irrespective of visibility. Th   is is consistent with predictive coding which anticipates decrements 
in prediction error as a function of predictability (i.e., top-down predictions that explain away 
bottom-up inputs via recurrent interactions). Simulations of predictive coding in the auditory 
domain show that unpredicted stimuli evoke large N1 components, refl  ecting prediction er-
ror when expecting the predicted standard (Garrido, et al., 2009). Th   e neuronal processes as-
sociated with the visual N1 represent, then, the fi  rst stage at which top-down predictions are 
compared to bottom-up information (Hopf, Vogel, Woodman, Heinze, & Luck, 2002). Studies 
investigating the eff  ect of predicting words by previous text (Dambacher, Rolfs, Gollner, Kliegl, 
& Jacobs, 2009) and target location by previous experience in visual search (Chaumon, Drouet, 
& Tallon-Baudry, 2008) similarly found eff  ects of predictions around 100 ms post stimulus. 
Perceptual expectations seem to increase visibility if they are verifi  ed by bottom-up information, 
shortly aft  er input is available. 
Th  ese  eff  ects cannot be explained by attention: Spatial and temporal attention were 
kept constant in our paradigm. It could be argued that attentional load declines as contrast 
◀◀ Figure 4-11. Global fi  eld power (GFP) and scalp topographies for seen, unseen and diff  erence between seen and 
unseen conditions at threshold - level 4 ascending sequence (AS) and level 3 descending sequence (DS). Periods of 
signifi  cant diff  erences in GFP between conditions are marked in red and labelled period 1-5. Horizontal dashed 
lines refer to the periods in which ERP-components (P1, N1, P2 and P3) were investigated in a previous analysis. 
For L4 (AS), GFP diff  ered signifi  cantly between seen and unseen conditions in three periods: 116-123 ms (period 
1), 209-286 ms (period 2), and 466-500 ms (period 3). For L3 (DS), GFP diff  ered signifi  cantly between seen 
and unseen conditions during two periods: 206-241 ms (period 4) and 299-311 ms (period 5).  All fi  ve periods 
temporally coincide with the ERP components P1, P2 and P3, which were investigated in the previous analyses. 
GFP did not reveal an additional component related to awareness: evidence for such a component would be ob-
tained if diff  erences in GFP were present in time windows not corresponding to the originally investigated ERP 
components or if a diff  erence was present continuously throughout several components without inverting sign. 
Scalp topographies at the moment of signifi  cant diff  erences between seen and unseen trials are presented in the 
upper and lower panel. Th   ey show that seen and unseen trials do not diff  er in fi  eld topography, and accordingly the 
scalp topography of the diff  erence wave is maximal where the maximal power of the ERP components is found. 
Altogether, this suggests that the diff  erence between seen and unseen trials is captured by the amplitude of the 
investigated ERP components.102
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increases, because the number of distracting dots decreases as the target stimulus evolves. N1 
amplitude has been shown to be higher for high as compared to low load (Rorden, Guer-
rini, Swainson, Lazzeri, & Baylis, 2008). In the main experiment, load decreases during the 
ascending and increases during the descending sequence. However, N1 amplitude remains 
low throughout the descending sequence. Th   us, attentional load cannot fully explain the ob-
served N1 modulations. Furthermore, a hallmark of attention is the increase in neural activity 
elicited by attended relative to unattended stimuli (Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000; Luck & 
Hillyard, 1995; Mangun, 1995). However, the main eff  ect of expectations on N1 was a reduc-
tion in amplitude, similar to what is observed for the auditory mismatch negativity (Garrido, 
et al., 2009). Amplitude attenuation for predicted stimuli have also been reported in fMRI 
experiments (Alink, et al., 2010; Summerfi  eld, et al., 2008). Th   us, attention and expectations 
boost saliency, but their signatures are reversed (Summerfi  eld & Egner, 2009). 
Components following N1 also showed an eff  ect of expectations. However, these ef-
fects were related to visibility. At threshold, P2 exhibited lower amplitudes for seen as com-
pared to unseen stimuli independently of physical stimulus properties. Also, P2 amplitude 
decreased as visibility increased, with a sharp transition at threshold. Furthermore, during 
the descending sequence, when expectations are fi  rmly established, P2 amplitude was lower 
than during the ascending sequence, when responses depended mainly on stimulus proper-
ties. Th   us, the neuronal processes associated with P2 are related to perceptual awareness and 
as the latter, modulated by prior knowledge. 
Th   e inverse relationship between visibility and P2 amplitude is proposed to refl  ect 
reentrant mechanisms by which perceptual expectations are compared with bottom-up infor-
mation (Freunberger, et al., 2007; Kotsoni, Csibra, Mareschal, & Johnson, 2007). Higher ar-
eas send predictions to lower areas which detect divergence between prediction and evidence, 
generating an error signal that increases with mismatch (Friston, 2010; Mumford, 1992). If 
a prediction fails and a stimulus is not seen, the error signal is highest. Di Lollo et al. (2000) 103
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and Lamme (2006) propose that feedback-feedforward interactions are the core of conscious 
perception. Preconscious, top-down hypotheses about incoming stimuli are sent to lower ar-
eas where they are iteratively compared with the input (Di Lollo, et al., 2000). Consequently, 
conscious perception is the result of a hypothesis test that iterates until information is consis-
tent across higher and lower areas. 
Th  e proposal that P2 indexes reentrant activity is substantiated by source analysis 
indicating that P2 refl  ects reactivation of early visual areas including V1 (Di Russo, Aprile, 
Spitoni, & Spinelli, 2008), latency data from intracranial ERPs (Olson, Chun, & Allison, 
2001), and increased fl  ow of mutual information from extrastriate to striate areas at around 
220 ms (Hinrichs, Noesselt, & Heinze, 2008). For object substitution masking thought to 
target reentrant processing, Kotsoni et al. (2007) found that seen trials elicited lower P2 am-
plitudes than unseen trials, a pattern also refl  ected by BOLD activity in V1 (Weidner, Shah, 
& Fink, 2006). 
P3 amplitude also correlated with visibility. P3 amplitudes were higher for seen than 
for unseen trials. However, this was only so during the ascending sequence when perception 
relied mostly on sensory stimulation. In the descending phase when expectations had been 
established, P3 amplitude did not diff  erentiate seen from unseen trials. Moreover, the nonlin-
ear increase of P3 amplitude as a function of visibility was only present during the ascending 
sequence. Th   us, P3 fulfi  lls all criteria for a signature of visibility, but only in the absence of 
expectations. Previous studies have found correlations between P3 amplitude and visibility 
(Del Cul, et al., 2007; Sergent, et al., 2005). In a masking paradigm, Del Cul et al. (2007) 
found that P3 was the only component whose amplitude distinguished visible and invisible 
stimuli and followed visibility sigmoidally. Had we not manipulated expectations, we would 
have drawn similar conclusions. However, controlling expectancy we found that already P2 
was related to visibility. Considering P3 latency, it is likely that it refl  ects post-perceptual 
processes related to visibility (e.g., update of memory) and not visibility as such, at least in our 104
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experiment. However, in our control experiment, when no predictions were generated, only 
P3 showed a sharp transition at threshold, clearly distinguishing between seen and unseen 
stimuli. Th   us, in the absence of expectations, P3 refl  ects visibility more closely than P2. 
Signatures of visibility: early or late? 
Previous studies have suggested either early (~100 ms) (Pins & Ffytche, 2003; Roeber 
et al., 2008) or late (~300 ms) (Del Cul, et al., 2007; Sergent, et al., 2005) activity correlated 
with visibility. Our results however suggest that the signatures of visibility are not bound to 
processes with a strict latency, but depend on the presence of expectations (Banquet & Gross-
berg, 1987). Latencies are short (indexed by P2, ~200 ms) when expectations are present, and 
long (indexed by P3, ~300 ms) when expectation are absent. Similar changes in latency have 
been reported in fMRI experiments as a function of previous exposure (James, Humphrey, 
Gati, Menon, & Goodale, 2000; Kleinschmidt, et al., 2002). 
An open question is why expectations shorten the latency of signatures of visibility. 
One possibility is that previous experience speeds up the accumulation of evidence necessary 
for visibility (James & Gauthier, 2006). Predictions could also take the form of a decisional 
bias, i.e., a change in the weight of a particular stimulus (higher prior evidence) over others. 
Th   us, the starting point for the accumulation of evidence lies closer to the decision bound, 
accelerating the collection of information. Biasing signals correlating with detectability have 
been observed in lateral occipital complex before stimulus onset (Stokes, Th  ompson,  Nobre, 
& Duncan, 2009). 
In light of our results it appears necessary to reinvestigate the neuronal correlates of 
consciousness, taking into account how cognitive functions (attention, expectations, memory, 
etc.) infl  uence the timing (and potentially other features) of processes required for access to 
consciousness. A thorough understanding of the neuronal correlates of consciousness might 
require a departure from the strategy of merely comparing seen with unseen conditions, and 105
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instead necessitates a proper characterization of the interactions among all cognitive process-
es that ultimately lead to conscious experience (Melloni & Singer, 2010). 107
Schwiedrzik CM, Ruff CC, Leitner F, Singer W, Melloni L (in preparation).
The fact that previous experience plays a pivotal role in perception is well documented. Critically, previous 
experience can affect perception in two opposing ways: It can either render us more likely to perceive the same 
stimulus again (hysteresis), or more likely to see something else (as in various aftereffects, thought to result from 
adaptation). However, it is currently unknown what determines the direction of such experience-dependent 
perceptual effects and whether they result from the same neuronal mechanism. To address these questions we 
combine functional magnetic resonance imaging with a paradigm with which we can dissociate hysteresis from 
adaptation in behavior. We provide clear evidence that adaptation and hysteresis map into two distinct corti-
cal networks: Hysteresis engages a widespread network including higher order parietal and frontal regions. In 
contrast, adaptation is conﬁ ned to early sensory, extrastriate areas only. Thus, although affecting our perception 
concurrently, hysteresis and adaptation are functionally dissociated in the human brain: Higher order areas stabilize 
perception, while early sensory areas display adaptation. This separation may explain how the brain maintains the 
balance between exploiting redundancies and staying sensitive to new information.
UNTANGLING PERCEPTUAL MEMORY: 
HYSTERESIS AND ADAPTATION MAP INTO 
SEPARATE CORTICAL NETWORKS
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Our perception depends on the currently available sensory information, but also 
strongly on previous experience (Fecteau & Munoz, 2003; O. Schwartz, Hsu, & Dayan, 
2007). Th   is is evident, for instance, in the waterfall illusion, where prolonged exposure to 
one direction of motion causes subsequently viewed stimuli to appear moving in the op-
posite direction (Purkinje, 1820). Such repulsive aft  ereff  ects are commonly attributed to 
neuronal adaptation (e.g., Anstis, et al., 1998). Interestingly, however, previous experience 
can also have the opposite eff  ect: Aft  er brief exposure to a moving stimulus, the subsequent 
ambiguous probe appears to move in the same direction (Kanai & Verstraten, 2005; also 
see Long, Toppino, & Mondin, 1992), a phenomenon known as “hysteresis” or “priming”. 
Whereas adaptation has been proposed to prepare the brain for the uptake of new informa-
tion (Barlow, 1990), hysteresis might help to stabilize percepts in face of constantly chang-
ing low-level stimulus features (Kleinschmidt, et al., 2002). What then determines the direc-
tion of the eff  ect of previous experience? 
Here, we address this question in the context of multistable stimuli. For long, multi-
stable perception has been considered to be memoryless (R.  Blake, Fox, & McIntyre, 1971; 
Borsellino, De Marco, Allazetta, Rinesi, & Bartolini, 1972; R. Fox & Herrmann, 1967). 
However, it is now clear that when multistable stimuli are presented intermittently, percep-
tion on any given trial will depend on hysteresis and adaptation (for a review, see Pearson & 
Brascamp, 2008). Despite much eff  ort devoted to the study of such eff  ects of previous ex-
perience in multistable stimuli, it is still poorly understood whether and how hysteresis and 
adaptation jointly and concurrently determine perception and what the underlying neuronal 
mechanisms are. One type of models postulate that both eff  ects can be explained by a single 
mechanism (Gepshtein & Kubovy, 2005), most prominently the amount of neuronal adapta-
tion (R. Blake, Sobel, & Gilroy, 2003; Chen & He, 2004; Orbach, Ehrlich, & Heath, 1963), 
whereas other models propose two distinct mechanisms that separately account for either 
hysteresis or adaptation (Brascamp, et al., 2009; Noest, et al., 2007; Wilson, 2007). Further-109
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more, the neuronal stage at which hysteresis and adaptation occur is under debate: While 
some authors have ascribed hysteresis and adaptation to early sensory processing (Brascamp, 
et al., 2009; Noest, et al., 2007; Wilson, 2007), other accounts suggest that both eff  ects arise 
from interactions between early and higher-order processing stages (Gigante, Mattia, Braun, 
& Del Giudice, 2009; Kanai & Verstraten, 2005, 2006; Maier, Wilke, Logothetis, & Leop-
old, 2003; Pastukhov & Braun, 2008; Sterzer & Rees, 2008). Progress on these questions has 
been hampered by the fact that none of the previous brain imaging studies (Kleinschmidt, 
et al., 2002; Raemaekers, van der Schaaf, van Ee, & van Wezel, 2009; Sterzer & Rees, 2008) 
have experimentally separated hysteresis from adaptation, hence studying mixtures of both 
eff  ects that may be diffi   cult to compare and to interpret.  Here we resolve these limitations by 
measuring brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while partici-
pants complete a paradigm that enables us to investigate hysteresis and adaptation concur-
rently but to dissociate them experimentally. With this paradigm, we are thus able to eff  ec-
tively isolate the brain areas showing eff  ects of hysteresis from those showing adaptation. We 
fi  nd that adaptation and hysteresis cannot be accounted for by the same mechanism, because 
they involve diff  erent cortical networks: Hysteresis is refl  ected by activity not confi  ned to vi-
sual areas in which the relevant feature (orientation) is explicitly coded, but involves higher-
order areas in parietal and frontal cortices. In contrast, adaptation is confi  ned to activity in 
early visual, extrastriate areas only. We propose that these results are fundamentally at odds 
with models that defi  ne both hysteresis and adaptation as expressions of the same underlying 
neuronal process. Instead, our data seem more consistent with a Bayesian model of percep-
tual memory in which hysteresis is the result of a change of the prior coded in higher-level 
cortices, whereas adaptation changes the available stimulus evidence computed in sensory 
cortex. Keeping these two eff  ects of previous experience separated in this way may allow the 
brain to maintain the balance between exploiting redundancies and staying sensitive to new 
information. 110
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METHODS
Participants
Th   irty healthy human subjects (mean age 25.1, range 21-38, 11 male) participated in 
the psychophysical part of this study. Twenty nine were right handed, as assessed with the Ed-
inburgh Inventory (Oldfi  eld, 1971). All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disease, and gave written informed consent 
before participation. Twenty of these subjects (mean age 24.6, range 21-29, 7 male, all right 
handed) also participated in the fMRI study. Two further subjects participated in the fMRI 
study but their data were excluded due to technical artifact. Subjects received monetary com-
pensation for their participation.
Procedure and stimuli 
For the psychophysical experiments, stimuli were displayed on a CRT monitor (HP 
p1230, resolution 1024×768, visible screen size 30°×22.9° at 75 cm distance, 150 Hz refresh 
rate). Inside the scanner, a video goggle system was employed (Resonance Technology MR Vi-
sion 2000, resolution 800×600, visible screen size 30°×22.5° at 1.2 m virtual distance, 60 Hz re-
fresh rate). Stimuli were generated using Matlab (R2007a, Th   e MathWorks). Stimulus presenta-
tion and response collection were controlled by Presentation soft  ware (v13.1, Neurobehavioral 
Systems). All stimuli were presented on a gray background (7.62 cd/m2); a red fi  xation circle was 
continuously present in the center of the screen (6.72 cd/m2). 
We adapted a paradigm originally introduced by Gepshtein and Kubovy (2005), in 
which we used sequences of stimuli with diff  erent degrees of multistability: a rectangular and a 
hexagonal dot lattice. Dot lattices (11.5° diameter) were made up from ordered spatial arrange-
ments of white Gaussian blobs (‘dots’, 0.25° diameter), presented at the center of the screen. 
Dots were aligned along several orientations, depending on the dot lattice geometry. Dots are 
perceptually grouped along the shortest inter-dot distance according to the Gestalt law of prox-111
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imity (Kubovy, Holcombe, & Wagemans, 1998), hence giving the impression of oriented lines. 
Rectangular dot lattices are bistable, i.e., observers are equally likely to observe 0° or 90° orienta-
tions if the dots are evenly spaced. Hexagonal dot lattices are tristable; when dots are uniformly 
spaced, observers are equally likely to see 0°, 60°, or 120° orientations (Kubovy & Wagemans, 
1995).
Th   e likelihood to perceive the 0° [p(0°)] or 90° [p(90°)] orientation in rectangular dot 
lattices can be manipulated by changing the aspect ratio (AR), i.e., the inter-dot-distance along 
the 0° and 90° orientation (Figure 5-1a). Th   e shorter the distance between the dots in one of the 
orientations, the more likely is the perception of the organization along that orientation. Hence, 
to examine carry-over eff  ects between rectangular and hexagonal dot lattices, we systematically 
manipulated the AR of the rectangular stimulus while keeping the tristable stimulus identical 
and maximally instable (Kubovy & Wagemans, 1995). We used seven ARs: 1.3-1, 1.2-1, 1.1-1, 1, 
1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. At AR=1, p(0°)=p(90°) with an inter-dot-distance of 1°. Th   us, the stimulus is 
fully bistable. At AR<1, p(0°)>p(90°). At AR>1, p(0°)<p(90°). Th   e product of the inter-dot-
distances for 0° and 90° was kept invariant (~1), so as to ensure roughly equal dot density for 
all ARs. Th   e total area of any dot lattice was smoothed with a Gaussian (SD 0.15) to give the 
impression that the lattice lines continue behind a virtual aperture (Nikolaev, Gepshtein, Gong, 
& van Leeuwen, 2010). Th   is avoids interactions of the oriented lines with the edges of the stim-
uli. Th   e exact position of the dot lattice was pseudo-randomly jittered within the aperture (0°-
1.15°) to prevent dots of subsequent displays to occupy systematically related portions of space. 
On each trial, we presented two dot lattices, the fi  rst of which was rectangular (800 
ms) and the second hexagonal (300 ms) (Figure 5-1b). Both lattices were oriented along the 
same orientation (henceforth referred to as 0°), but this orientation was randomly varied from 
trial to trial, covering 90° in 1° steps. Aft  er each presentation of a dot lattice, subjects chose the 
orientation they had perceived from a screen displaying four alternative orientations (0°, 90° 
and the two diagonal orientations for the rectangular dot lattices; 0°, 60°, 120° and the unlikely 112
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90° orientation for the hexagonal dot lattices). Th   e position at which the alternatives appeared 
(and thus the response buttons) was fully randomized within and between trials. Subjects were 
instructed to be accurate, to fi  xate on a central fi  xation dot (as ascertained by eye tracking, see 
below), and to report the fi  rst perceived orientation in case the percept switched during the pre-
90° 0° 90° 0° 90° 0°
Stimulus 1 Stimulus 2 Mask
Response 1
800 ms 300 ms 550 ms
Response 2
A
B
AR=1.3-1
p(0°) > p(90°)
0°
90°
AR=1
p(0°) = p(90°)
0° 90°
AR=1.3
p(0°) < p(90°)
0°
90°
Figure 5-1. Stimuli and experimental procedure. (a) Examples of rectangular dot lattices with diff  erent aspect ratios 
(AR), i.e., the inter-dot distance along the 0° and 90° orientations. Small arrows indicate the two dominant per-
cepts, 0° and 90°. Th   e likelihood of perceiving a particular orientation depends on the shortest inter-dot distance. 
At AR=1.3-1 (left   panel), the inter-dot distance along the 0° orientation is shorter (see inset). Th  us  perception 
favors 0° over 90° and subjects tend to perceive the dot array as tilted to the right (p(0°)>p(90°)). In contrast, 
at  AR=1.3 (right panel) perception favors 90° over 0°, and the array is likely to be perceived as tilted to the left   
(p(0°)<p(90°)). At AR=1 (middle panel), 0° and 90° orientations are equally likely, thus, the stimulus is bistable 
(p(0°)=p(90°)). (b) On a given trial, we fi  rst presented a rectangular dot lattice with varying AR followed by a re-
sponse screen on which subjects chose the perceived orientation. Th   en, we presented a hexagonal dot lattice (with 
fi  xed AR), also followed by a response screen. Last, we presented a dynamic random dot mask to avoid carry-over 
eff  ects to the next trial. All stimuli were presented centrally and subjects were instructed to fi  xate a red fi  xation dot 
at the center of the screen. Rectangular dot lattices are bistable, i.e., observers are equally likely to observe 0° or 
90° orientations if the dots are evenly spaced. Hexagonal dot lattices are tristable; when dots are uniformly spaced, 
observers are equally likely to see 0°, 60°, or 120° orientations. Hysteresis can be investigate by assessing how the 
likelihood to perceive 0° in the second stimulus depends on whether 0° were already perceived in the fi  rst stimulus 
(hysteresis). Adaptation can be investigated by assessing how the likelihood to perceive 0° in the second stimulus 
depends on AR, i.e., the amount of stimulus evidence for 0° in the fi  rst stimulus. 113
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sentation of an individual dot lattice. Note that subjects were never required to judge whether 
they had seen the same orientation in the two stimuli. Aft  er the response to the hexagonal dot 
lattice, a dynamic random dot mask (updated at 25 Hz) was presented for 550 ms to avoid aft  er-
images and between-trial carry-over eff  ects.
Subjects completed nine blocks of 70 trials. Conditions were pseudo-randomized such 
that each AR occurred equally oft  en during each block. We monitored eye position using a 
binocular infrared eye tracker in all psychophysical experiments (SR Research Eyelink 1000, 
1000 Hz sampling rate). Th   e eye tracker was recalibrated using a standard nine point calibra-
tion procedure at the beginning of each block. Th   e experiments were conducted in a darkened, 
sound-attenuating chamber. Constant head position was assured by the use of a chinrest with 
forehead support. Before the experiments started, subjects received 30 practice trials. 
Procedure and stimuli - functional magnetic resonance imaging
Stimuli and procedure during fMRI were essentially identical to the psychophysical 
experiment, with the following exceptions: We reduced the number of ARs to three (AR=1, 
1.1, 1.2). Th   us, rectangular dot lattices would either be bistable or biased towards 90°. We also 
introduced trials in which the second stimulus was omitted. In such a “partial trial design”, these 
trials enable us to separate the hemodynamic response to the second stimulus from the con-
volved responses to both stimuli (Ollinger, Corbetta, & Shulman, 2001; Ollinger, Shulman, & 
Corbetta, 2001; see below).
Subjects completed ten blocks of 72 trials in two sessions. Each block consisted of 30 tri-
als with two stimuli, 30 trials with one stimulus, and 10 “null” baseline trials (during which only 
the fi  xation cross was visible on the display). Th   e trial types were presented in pseudo-random 
order, avoiding long sequences of identical trial types (this was achieved by shuffl   ing conditions 
in sequences of 14 stimuli, 5 times per block). Furthermore, the fi  rst trial was randomly chosen 
from all available conditions and later discarded from all analyses to eliminate T1 saturation 114
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artifacts in the fMRI data. Th   e last trial in each block was always a baseline trial in order to not 
curtail the hemodynamic response for the last event in a block. Subjects were instructed to respond 
accurately within 1.7 s. Th   is was practiced inside the scanner before the experiment started. 
Parameters - functional magnetic resonance imaging
MRI data was acquired on a 3T scanner (Siemens Allegra), using a 4 channel head coil. For 
the main experiment, we acquired 216 volumes of 29 slices per run of functional (T2*-weighted) 
echoplanar imaging (EPI) data (TR=2.5 s, TE=30 ms, voxel size 3×3×3 mm, gap thickness 0.3 
mm). Anatomical images were acquired using a T1-weighted magnetization prepared rapid gradi-
ent echo (MPRAGE) sequence (160 slices, TR=2.25 s, TE=4.38 ms, voxel size 1×1×1 mm). All 
sequences covered the whole brain.
Data analyses - psychophysics
Behavioral data was analyzed with a logistic regression using Generalized Estimating 
Equations (GEE, Liang & Zeger, 1986) in SPSS (v17 and v18, SPSS Inc.). GEE is an extension of 
the generalized linear model developed for the analysis of repeated-measures designs (for an intro-
duction to GEE see Hanley et al. (2003)). Following Gepshtein and Kubovy (2005), we restricted 
our analyses to the response alternatives with equal likelihood at AR=1, i.e., cases were subjects re-
sponded either 0° or 90° to the rectangular dot lattices, and 0°, 60° or 120° to the hexagonal dot lat-
tices. However, note that analyses using all response alternatives yielded comparable results. Data 
was sorted by subject, block, and trial number. To account for the correlations between successive 
trials we used a working correlation matrix with a 1st order autoregressive relationship. 
Data analyses - eye tracking
To ensure that none of the behavioral eff  ects were ascribable to eye movements, we ac-
quired eye tracking data during the psychophysical experiments (n=26). Temporal windows 115
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for analyses of fi  xation stability were defi  ned from 200 ms before stimulus onset until stimulus 
off  set (800 ms for stimulus 1, 300 ms for stimulus 2). A trial was excluded from the analyses if a 
blink occurred within 100 ms before stimulus onset or aft  er stimulus off  set. We then calculated 
the percentage of eye position samples falling into a square window around the fi  xation dot for 
two levels of precision (window size 1.5°×1.5° or 2°×2°). Repeated measures analyses of variance 
(rmANOVA) were run separately at each level of precision for stimulus 1 and stimulus 2, with 
factors eye (left  , right) and hysteresis (0°-0°, 90°-0°) to control for the eff  ect of fi  xation stability 
on the hysteresis eff  ect, and with factors eye (left  , right) and aspect ratio (1.3-1, 1.2-1, 1.1-1, 1, 1.1, 
1.2, 1.3) to control for the eff  ect of fi  xation stability on the adaptation eff  ect. 
Data analyses - functional magnetic resonance imaging
MRI data was analyzed in Brain Voyager QX (v2.1, Brain Innovation), SPSS, and in 
Matlab using the Brain Voyager Toolbox and custom code. Prior to preprocessing, the fi  rst three 
volumes of each functional run were excluded to prevent T1 saturation eff  ects. Th  e  remaining 
data was slice scan time corrected with cubic spline interpolation, 3D motion corrected using 
trilinear/sinc interpolation, and temporally high-pass fi  ltered at 0.01 Hz. Functional and ana-
tomical data were brought into ACPC space using cubic spline interpolation and then trans-
formed into standard Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) using trilinear interpola-
tion. For the whole brain analyses, data was spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (8 mm 
FWHM). To create infl  ated surface reconstructions, the grey-white matter boundary in the 
structural scans was segmented, reconstructed, smoothed and infl  ated (Kriegeskorte & Goe-
bel, 2001) separately for each hemisphere. For the main experiment, blood oxygenation level 
dependent (BOLD) responses were estimated using a deconvolution model in a random eff  ects 
(RFX) general linear model (GLM). For each condition, we defi  ned appropriately placed series 
of eight fi  nite impulse response (FIR) predictors (one per volume) to model the 20 seconds 
BOLD response following the onset of each trial. Contrasts were run over the 3rd and 4th 116
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predictor (corresponding to 5 and 7.5 s post stimulus), thus covering the peak of the BOLD 
response while accounting for variability in the peak time in diff  erent subjects and brain regions 
(Handwerker, Ollinger, & D’Esposito, 2004). To reduce the number of voxel-by-voxel compari-
sons, we restricted the analyses by use of a cortex mask based on the individual grey-white matter 
boundary. Th   is reduced the number of voxels to 47405. For follow-up region of interest (ROI) 
analyses, we extracted the mean deconvolved time courses of the clusters identifi  ed in the whole 
brain analysis per subject from the unsmoothed data.
To identify cortical regions involved in perceptual hysteresis, we fi  rst defi  ned a GLM 
with seven independent predictors (each modeled with the FIR set comprising 8 post stimulus 
periods): (1) Hysteresis (two stimuli trials where subjects responded 0° to both stimuli); (2) no 
hysteresis (two stimuli trials where subjects responded 90° to the fi  rst stimulus and 0° to the 
second); (3) 0° (one stimulus trials where subjects responded 0°); (4) 90° (one stimulus trials 
where subjects responded 90°); (5) a predictor for two stimuli trial where subjects chose one of 
the remaining orientations on the fi  rst, second stimulus or for both stimuli; (6) a predictor for 
one stimulus trials where subjects chose a diagonal; and (7) a predictor for trials where subjects 
failed to respond. We then created beta maps per subject for two contrasts: [hysteresis vs. no 
hysteresis] and [0° vs. 90°]. In a second level analysis, we contrasted [hysteresis vs. no hysteresis] 
> [0° vs. 90°] to reveal brain areas with signifi  cant changes related to hysteresis. Th   is map was 
thresholded at a voxel level of p<0.01, T(19)=2.860, and cluster size thresholded at p<0.05 
(5000 iterations) to correct for multiple comparisons. Th   e resulting cluster size threshold was 
263 mm3/297 voxels. Since perceptual memory can only build up with the presentation of the 
fi  rst stimulus, solely areas showing a signifi  cant BOLD response to the fi  rst stimulus (post-hoc 
t-test on the mean of 0° and 90° one stimulus trials, p<0.05, uncorrected) were considered to be 
directly involved in perceptual hysteresis. 
To identify regions expressing adaptation, we fi  rst defi  ned a GLM with seven indepen-
dent predictors (each modeled with the FIR set comprising 8 post stimulus periods): one predic-117
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tor per AR for one and two stimuli trials, respectively, and one for trials where subjects failed to 
respond. We then created beta maps per subject for the contrasts [AR=1 vs. baseline], [AR=1.1 
vs. baseline] and [AR=1.2 vs. baseline] for trials with two stimuli, and ran an F-test to com-
pare between the three conditions. Th   e resulting map was thresholded at a voxel level of p<0.05, 
F(2,38)=3.244, and cluster size thresholded at p<0.05 (5000 iterations) to correct for multiple 
comparisons. Th   e resulting cluster size threshold was 749 mm3/783 voxels. For each of the clus-
ters, we extracted the deconvolved time courses per subject. Areas showing a signifi  cant positive 
BOLD response to the fi  rst stimulus (post-hoc t-test on the mean of 0° and 90° one stimulus tri-
als, p<0.05, uncorrected) and a linear trend (as assessed by linear trend analysis, Howell, 2002, p. 
408f) of the peak BOLD response over the three ARs for the second stimulus were considered to 
be involved in perceptual adaptation. Note that a trend analysis requires that the factor for which 
the trend is investigated is signifi  cant in the preceding omnibus F-test, but that the presence or 
absence of a linear trend is statistically independent of this preceding test. Th   us, ROI analyses 
were statistically independent of the contrasts performed for the whole brain. 
Eye tracking was not available inside the scanner, however, to assess whether eye move-
ments could account for the observed eff  ects, we used a method introduced by Beauchamp 
(2003). Th   is method exploits the fact that major signal changes during eye movements can be 
observed in the eyeballs themselves. Th  us,  diff  erential eye movements in diff  erent conditions can 
be assessed by comparing signal changes in the eyeballs. We fi  rst identifi  ed for each functional run 
voxels with time course jumps >=4 SD. Th   e resulting maps were averaged per subject. Based on 
the average maps, we then defi  ned ROIs for each eyeball in each subject (mean number of voxels 
left   eye: 108.2, SE 3.93; mean number of voxels right eye: 111.86, SE 2.79), and joined these 
ROIs into one ROI per subject. If ROIs could not be identifi  ed this way, we defi  ned a sphere (ra-
dius 3 voxels, size 123 voxels) around the group-average peak voxel of the respective eyeball. Th  is 
was done for six eyeballs. ROIs could be defi  ned for 19 subjects. Th   ese ROIs were used as control 
regions for all other contrasts. 118
Chapter 5
RESULTS
Behavioral results
For the behavioral data, we fi  rst analyzed the responses to the rectangular dot lattices (R1) 
using a logistic regression with aspect ratio (AR) as the predictor. AR refl  ects the inter-dot dis-
tance, such that grouping by proximity is more likely to occur along the orientation with the short-
est inter-dot distance. Th   us, grouping along the 0° orientation is expected for AR<1 and along 
the 90° orientation for AR>1 (Gepshtein & Kubovy, 2005; Kubovy, et al., 1998; Nikolaev, et al., 
2010). Confi  rming this prediction, our data (shown in Figure 5-2a) reveal that the probability 
of responding 0° decreased as AR increased (Wald’s χ2(1)=111.880, p<0.01, Table 5-1). We also 
confi  rmed bistability of the rectangular dot lattice at AR=1, as the probability to respond 0° or 90° 
was close to chance2. 
For the responses to the second stimulus (R2) – the hexagonal dot lattice – we modeled 
R2 as a function of the AR of the fi  rst stimulus and the response given to the fi  rst stimulus (R1). 
Th   e interaction term was not included, as a previous model had revealed no signifi  cant interaction 
between AR and R1 (Wald’s χ2(1)=0.251, p=0.617). Both AR and R1 predicted R2 (AR: Wald’s 
χ2(1)=58.797, R2: Wald’s χ2(1)=146.186, both p<0.01, Table 5-1)3. Figure 5-2b shows the carry-
over eff  ect from R1 to R2: Th   e black line in the fi  gure shows trials in which subjects perceived 0° 
in the fi  rst dot lattice and continued perceiving 0° in the second dot lattice, thus exhibiting percep-
tual hysteresis. Th   e gray line shows trials in which subjects fi  rst perceived 90° and then switched 
to perceiving 0° in the second stimulus. Importantly, the two lines run in parallel, showing that 
perceptual hysteresis does not interact with or depend on the AR of the fi  rst stimulus. Th  e  vertical 
separation between the two lines refl  ects the size of the perceptual hysteresis eff  ect, indicating that 
2   Regression models per subject showed that AR was a signifi  cant predictor at p<0.01 and that 
its slope was negative in all 30 subjects. Exact binomial tests per subject restricted to AR=1 showed that at p<0.05, 
12 subjects favored 0° over 90°, 14 subjects chose 0° and 90° with equal likelihood, and 4 subjects favored 90° over 
0°. Th   is imbalance is refl  ected in the slight off  set towards responding 0° at AR=1 in the group data.
3   Regression models per subject showed that both predictors were signifi  cant at p<0.01 in all 
subjects, and both predictors were positive in 28 out of 30 subjects (2 subjects had a negative slope for AR).119
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subjects were likely to perceive the same orientation in the fi  rst and in the second lattice. Th  e  eff  ect 
of adaptation becomes apparent when comparing the slope in Figure 5-2a with Figure 5-2b: While 
the likelihood to respond 0° decreases with AR for the fi  rst stimulus, it increases with AR for the 
Figure 5-2. Behavioral results. (a) Responses to the fi  rst stimulus (logit). Th   e likelihood to perceive 0° decreased 
as a function of aspect ratio. At AR=1.3-1, subjects were more likely to perceive 0°, while at AR=1.3, subjects were 
more likely to perceive 90°. (b) Responses to the second stimulus (logit) as a function of the aspect ratio of the fi  rst 
stimulus. Th   e likelihood to perceive 0° increases with AR, in contrast to the responses to the fi  rst stimulus. Th  is 
inversion is the signature of adaptation. Th   e black line shows hysteresis trials (subjects perceived 0° in both stimuli), 
the grey line shows no hysteresis trials (subjects perceived 90° in the fi  rst stimulus and 0° in the second stimulus). 
Th   e vertical separation between the two lines indicates the size of the hysteresis eff  ect. Note that both lines run 
parallel indicating that hysteresis and adaptation are independent.120
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second stimulus. Th   us, the more likely subjects were to perceive 0° or 90° in the fi  rst dot lattice, the 
less likely they were to perceive it in the second lattice. Such negative correlations are characteris-
tic of adaptation eff  ects. Interestingly, adaptation was even present for orientations that were not 
perceived. For instance, in the black line in Figure 5-2b, adaptation to 90° is evident by the posi-
tive slope (i.e., the inverse slope of Figure 5-2a). However, on these trials, subjects twice reported 
perceiving 0°. Th   is indicates that both 90° and 0° orientations are always processed, regardless of 
whether they are perceived or not (R. Blake & Fox, 1974; Gepshtein & Kubovy, 2005; Hock, 
Schöner, & Hochstein, 1996). None of these results could be explained by diff  erences in fi  xation 
stability (no signifi  cant main eff  ects or interactions at p<0.05, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). Im-
portantly, all results could be reproduced in the scanner (Table 5-1). Here, we also found that AR 
signifi  cantly predicted whether subjects would respond 0° or 90° on trials with only one stimulus 
(Wald’s χ2(1)=78.286, p<0.01, Table 5-1). 
Imaging results
Having established that hysteresis and adaptation are independently expressed in the 
behavioral response patterns, we now turned to the brain imaging data to investigate the cortical 
Response Predictor β (log odds) SE β Wald’s χ2 df p eβ (odds ratio)
R1 constant 5.091 0.4966 105.087 1 <0.01 162.524
aspect ratio -4.924 0.4655 111.880 1 <0.01 0.007
R2 constant -4.399 0.4228 108.232 1 <0.01 0.012
aspect ratio 2.509 0.3271 58.797 1 <0.01 12.287
R1 2.623 0.2169 146.186 1 <0.01 13.776
R1 (fMRI) constant 7.293 0.9470 59.308 1 <0.01 1469.697
aspect ratio -6.789 0.8444 64.583 1 <0.01 0.001
R2 (fMRI) constant -6.923 .9151 57.230 1 <0.01 0.001
aspect ratio 4.843 0.6738 51.665 1 <0.01 126.837
R1 3.048 0.4237 51.774 1 <0.01 21.080
R1 (one 
stimulus)
constant 6.550 0.7739 71.630 1 <0.01 698.995
aspect ratio -6.146 0.6946 78.286 1 <0.01 0.002
Table 5-1. Logistic regression analysis of the behavioral data of the psychophysical and fMRI experiments.121
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areas underlying each eff  ect. To this end, we employed a logic that closely followed the analyses 
of the behavioral data. To identify regions involved in hysteresis, we contrasted trials in which 
subjects expressed hysteresis (subjects reported twice the same percept, i.e., 0°) with trials in 
which they did not express hysteresis (subjects reported a perceptual switch, i.e., 90° followed by 
0°). Given the hemodynamic lag, BOLD responses to the fi  rst stimulus are convolved with the 
responses to the second stimulus on trials with two stimuli. Th   us, in order to discard the diff  er-
ence between perceiving the 0° or 90° orientation in the fi  rst stimulus, we also contrasted these 
two percepts on trials with only one stimulus and subtracted this diff  erence from the diff  erence 
between hysteresis and no hysteresis trials. Th   e result of the contrast [hysteresis vs. no hysteresis] 
> [0° vs. 90°] was thus matched for the percept and the response to the second stimulus and was 
not confounded by potential diff  erences in perceiving or reporting 0° or 90° in the fi  rst stimulus. 
Figure 5-3 shows that hysteresis is expressed in a distributed network of brain areas spanning 
ventral visual areas (including bilateral fusiform gyrus), superior parietal (bilateral intrapari-
etal sulcus [IPS]), and frontal cortices (right anterior insula, right pre-supplementary motor 
area [pre-SMA], and right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex [dmPFC]). Th   e time course of fMRI 
signal change in these regions is displayed in Figure 5-3, and illustrates graphically that in all 
regions the absolute response on hysteresis trials was smaller than on no hysteresis trials, resem-
bling repetition suppression (Grill-Spector, et al., 2006). It is interesting to note that expected 
stimuli are oft  en found to elicit smaller BOLD responses than unexpected stimuli (e.g., Alink, et 
al., 2010), and have thus been proposed to refl  ect an eff  ect of top-down perceptual expectations 
(Friston, 2005; Summerfi  eld & Egner, 2009). 
While the previous results suggest a network of brain areas involved in perceptual hys-
teresis, in the next analysis we attempted to tie the contribution of those regions more directly 
to percept maintenance. To that end, we took advantage of the interindividual variability in the 
size of the behavioral hysteresis eff  ect (log odds) and correlated this with the diff  erence in acti-
vation between hysteresis and no hysteresis trials for each brain region. Regions showing a cor-122
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relation with behavior are likely to carry out central computations that determine the likelihood 
of percept maintenance. From all the areas identifi  ed in the hysteresis contrast that also showed 
stimulus-evoked responses, only the right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex positively correlated 
with the propensity to maintain perception across successive stimuli (r=0.59, p=0.0058, Figure 
5-3e; all other p>0.1). 
To identify regions expressing adaptation we searched for areas that showed a linear ef-
fect of AR, as observed in the behavioral data. To that end, we sorted all trials with two stimuli 
according to the aspect ratio of the fi  rst stimulus. We then identifi  ed voxels which showed a 
signifi  cant diff  erence between ARs. Subsequently, we tested which of these areas showed a sig-
nifi  cant positive BOLD response to the fi  rst stimulus (on trials with only one stimulus) and a 
signifi  cant linear increase of the peak BOLD response with AR (on trials with two stimuli). Th  is 
procedure was motivated by the following rationale: Th   e three ARs used were parametrically 
biased towards perceiving 90° in the fi  rst stimulus. Th   us, assuming that neurons are adapted 
by the presentation of the fi  rst stimulus and that the response to the second stimulus should 
refl  ect their state of adaptation, adaptation to 0° should be lowest for AR=1.2 and highest for 
AR=1. Th   is entails that the BOLD response in any region displaying this pattern of adaptation 
should be highest for AR=1.2 and lowest for AR=1. Th   e only region exhibiting this profi  le 
was found in the left   occipital cortex (Figure 5-4, F(1,19)=12.672, p=0.002, η2=0.400), slightly 
dorsal from the occipital pole, whose location [-17  -100  5] is in good agreement with the local-
ization of human V2/V3 by Shipp et al. (1995) and Wohlschläger et al. (2005). Th   is result was 
◀◀ Figure 5-3. fMRI results hysteresis: Results of the contrast [hysteresis vs. no hysteresis] > [0° vs. 90°]. (a) Sagit-
tal view of the right dmPFC and the right pre-SMA, and their deconvolved time courses. Note that although the 
dmPFC shows a negative time course, the absolute BOLD response is higher for no hysteresis than for hysteresis 
trials. (b) Transversal view of bilateral IPS and respective deconvolved time courses. (c) Transversal view of the 
bilateral fusiform gyrus and respective deconvolved time courses. (d) Transversal view of the right anterior insula 
and deconvolved time course. (e) Correlation between the size of the individual hysteresis eff  ect (log odds of R1) 
and the diff  erence between the peak BOLD amplitude for hysteresis and no hysteresis trials in the right dmPFC. 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean, coordinates are given in standard Talairach space. Results are 
overlaid on the Montreal Neurological Institute standard brain, in radiological convention (left   is right). Time axes 
are in TRs (1 TR = 2.5 s).124
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Figure 5-4. fMRI results adaptation. (a) Group activity in the dorsal occipital cortex, overlaid on the retinotopic 
map of the left   infl  ated hemisphere of a representative subject (cps07) for whom retinotopic mapping was avail-
able. Th   e cluster showing a linear eff  ect of aspect ratio encompasses dorsal V2 and V3. Light and dark gray depict 
gyral and sulcal surfaces, respectively. White lines indicate the borders of early visual areas shown in diff  erent col-
ors. (b) Peak BOLD amplitude per aspect ratio on trials with two stimuli. Error bars represent the standard error 
of the mean, corrected for between-subject variability (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
also obtained when the ROI analyses were based on the same data as for the hysteresis contrast, 
i.e., only trials in which subjects responded 0° or 90° to the fi  rst and 0° to the second stimulus 
(F(1,19)=10.587, p=0.004, η2=0.358). It is interesting to note that this location coincides with 
the representation of the lower right quadrant of the visual fi  eld, which exhibits the highest 
switch rate in binocular rivalry (Chen & He, 2003). 
We fi nally investigated whether areas exhibiting hysteresis and adaptation would also 
express the respective other eff  ect. To this end, we tested whether the areas expressing adap-
tation showed a diff  erence between hysteresis and no hysteresis trials, and whether the areas 
expressing hysteresis showed a linear eff  ect of AR. To assure that our conclusions were based on 
the same set of data, we used only the trials in which subjects responded 0° or 90° to the fi  rst and 
0° to the second stimulus for this analysis. None of the eff  ects were signifi  cant, mirroring the 
behavioral results in which hysteresis and adaptation also did not interact (no signifi  cant linear 125
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trend in hysteresis areas, all p>0.2; no signifi  cant diff  erence between hysteresis and no hysteresis 
in V2/V3, p>0.3). 
None of the eff  ects could be accounted for by eye movements.  When we ran the same 
contrasts as for the main analyses on ROIs defi  ned for the eyeballs (see Methods), we did not 
observe any signifi  cant eff  ect at p<0.05. Th   is is in line with the eye tracking data from the psy-
chophysical experiment.
DISCUSSION
Taken together, our results reveal that hysteresis and adaptation are functionally dis-
sociated in the human brain. Whereas a widespread network of frontal, parietal, and ventral oc-
cipital brain areas is involved in perceptual hysteresis, BOLD responses following the behavioral 
profi  le of the adaptation eff  ect are only evident in extrastriate cortex. Previous psychophysical 
work and computational models have explained hysteresis and adaptation as resulting from the 
same mechanism, either the amount of neuronal adaptation alone (R. Blake, et al., 2003; Chen 
& He, 2004; Orbach, et al., 1963), or a “persistent bias” (Gepshtein & Kubovy, 2005). Th  e  func-
tional division observed in our data directly refutes these interpretations. More recent models 
which propose separate mechanisms for hysteresis and adaptation seem to account better for our 
results. However, several of these models co-localize the mechanisms for hysteresis and adapta-
tion to the same early sensory area (Brascamp, et al., 2009; Noest, et al., 2007; Wilson, 2007), 
an idea that also seems at odds with our data. A parsimonious explanation of the coexistence of 
hysteresis and adaptation can be given if both phenomena are understood in a Bayesian frame-
work. In this framework, perception is the result of an inference, in which the available sensory 
information is compared to a prediction derived from previous experience (Yuille & Kersten, 
2006). In our case, such a prediction can be derived from the fi  rst stimulus and is subsequently 
tested against the evidence provided in the second stimulus. Several models propose that this 
process indeed involves an interaction between higher-level brain areas generating predictions 126
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and earlier brain areas testing these predictions (Friston, 2005; Mumford, 1992; Rao & Ballard, 
1999). As will be outlined below, hysteresis can be understood as the result of a prediction, 
whereas adaptation changes the available sensory evidence (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006). Th  us, 
a Bayesian model may explain the diff  erent perceptual eff  ects of adaptation and hysteresis, as 
well as their separation into diff  erent brain areas. 
A Bayesian account of hysteresis and adaptation
Both the multistability (Hohwy, Roepstorff  , & Friston, 2008; Sundareswara & Schrater, 
2008) and the divergent eff  ects of previous experience (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006) can be ac-
counted for by the Bayesian framework. Importantly, the Bayesian framework assumes that per-
ception depends on the probability distribution of the available evidence on the one hand, and 
on a prior (the expectation that the world will be in a particular state) on the other hand. Th  e 
probability distribution of sensory evidence (the likelihood function) in multistable stimuli is 
multimodal, refl  ecting the diff  erent possible interpretations. What we perceive is the result of a 
multiplication of the likelihood function with the prior, i.e., the posterior distribution. Th  is  pos-
terior distribution is again multimodal, but given the interaction with the prior, one of the peaks 
will be maximal, and this is the perceptual interpretation that gains dominance. Importantly, 
previous evidence for one interpretation (e.g., a previous percept) changes the prior distribution 
towards this interpretation, thus inducing hysteresis. Adaptation, however, does not aff  ect the 
prior, but the likelihood function (i.e., the sensory evidence) itself: It narrows the conditional 
probability density around the adapted interpretation (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006). Such an 
asymmetric change of the shape of the likelihood function produces the repulsive aft  ereff  ect 
typical for adaptation. Th   us, a Bayesian framework of multistable perception is compatible with 
a dissociation between adaptation and hysteresis in neural space: One network computes the 
prior, whereas another, sensory network changes its function through adaptation, thus changing 
the likelihood function. 127
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The cortical network expressing hysteresis
Understood in a Bayesian framework as outlined above, our contrast [hysteresis vs. no 
hysteresis] should reveal brain areas involved in the generation and testing of a prior against 
the incoming evidence. Following recent models of how the brain implements Bayesian infer-
ence, we expect that this occurs in an interaction between lower sensory and higher, prediction 
generating areas (Friston, 2005; Mumford, 1992; Rao & Ballard, 1999). Th   e network express-
ing diff  erential activity for hysteresis versus no hysteresis trials comprised the bilateral fusiform 
gyrus, bilateral intraparietal sulcus (IPS), right pre-SMA, right anterior insula, as well as the 
right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (the mesial aspect of Brodmann Area 8). In our paradigm, 
the sensory feature for which a prior was generated and which was perceptually stabilized was 
the orientation of the dot lattices. Several of the areas we have identifi  ed are indeed processing 
orientation, in particular the fusiform gyrus (Orban, Dupont, Vogels, Bormans, & Mortelmans, 
1997) and the IPS (Faillenot, Decety, & Jeannerod, 1999; Faillenot, Sunaert, Van Hecke, & 
Orban, 2001; Shikata et al., 2001). Furthermore, a recent study in macaque monkeys found that 
neurons in the IPS participate in grouping dots into oriented lines (Yokoi & Komatsu, 2009), 
which is another basic operation required to perceive orientation in our stimuli. Th   ese areas are 
thus prime candidates for the testing of predictions against incoming evidence. Regarding the 
higher order areas, it has been proposed that perceptual hysteresis might be closely linked to 
working memory (Maier, et al., 2003; Sterzer & Rees, 2008), which would not be predicted by 
a Bayesian account. Th   e pre-SMA (Petit, Courtney, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1998) and also the 
IPS (Todd & Marois, 2004) have been shown to be active in working memory tasks, however, 
the remaining areas do not show strong overlap with regions that are specifi  cally involved in 
working memory for orientations, in particular because of the relative lack of lateral frontal ac-
tivity in our study (Cornette, Dupont, & Orban, 2002; Cornette, Dupont, Salmon, & Orban, 
2001). Th   is might be explained by the fact that hysteresis is a form of implicit memory, whereas 
working memory is explicit. Importantly, Bayesian inference in perception is implicit. Th  e  IPS 128
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(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), pre-SMA (M. D. Fox, Corbetta, Snyder, Vincent, & Raichle, 
2006) and the right anterior insula (Eckert et al., 2009; Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008) are 
also implicated in the control of top-down attention. Importantly, Kanai and Verstraten (2006) 
have shown in a perceptual memory paradigm employing ambiguous motion that if attention 
is distracted during the presentation of the fi  rst stimulus or even in the blank period before the 
presentation of the second stimulus, perceptual stabilization fails. Th   us, top-down attention 
seems to be essential to instantiate perceptual memory. In a Bayesian framework, spatial atten-
tion can be understood as a prediction of where a particular stimulus (or percept) will appear 
(Chikkerur, Serre, Tan, & Poggio, 2010). A test or update of the prior would then evoke tran-
sient activity in these areas, as has been found for perceptual switches in investigating binocular 
rivalry (Lumer, Friston, & Rees, 1998) and apparent motion (Muckli et al., 2002; Müller et al., 
2005; Sterzer, Russ, Preibisch, & Kleinschmidt, 2002). Last, the only region in the network 
expressing perceptual hysteresis showing a correlation with the individual size of the hysteresis 
eff  ect was the right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, indicating that it plays a central role in the 
processes underlying perceptual hysteresis. Crucially, this area has been shown to be involved in 
generating predictions under uncertainty (Volz, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2003). In a Bayesian 
framework, this area would serve the crucial function of generating and updating predictions 
about the upcoming stimulus, which are then tested in the remaining areas. 
A local network expressing adaptation
In contrast to hysteresis, adaptation was only evident in early extrastriate cortex, likely 
dorsal areas V2/V3. Areas V2/V3 contain orientation tuned neurons (Felleman & Van Essen, 
1987; Levitt, Kiper, & Movshon, 1994). More importantly, however, these neurons also respond 
to dots which are perceptually bound into oriented lines (Peterhans, Heider, & Baumann, 2005) 
and more generally to illusory contours (Peterhans & von der Heydt, 1991; von der Heydt, 
Peterhans, & Baumgartner, 1984). Such a binding operation is required in order for dot lattices 129
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to appear as having an orientation. Th   e involvement of an early sensory area fi  ts well with the 
Bayesian framework, which predicts that adaptation does not change the prior, but the shape of 
the distribution of the available evidence (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006), which is thought to be 
computed by early sensory areas. Interestingly, the fact that adaptation was evident at an earlier 
level of the visual hierarchy than hysteresis is in accordance with a previous fi  nding (Gepshtein 
& Kubovy, 2005): Adaptation eff  ects in multistable dot lattices were found to be orientation 
specifi  c, i.e., the eff  ect of AR on the second lattice vanishes when the orientation of the main 
axis diff  ers by more than 15°. In contrast, hysteresis persists up to off  sets of 30°, again speaking 
for a dissociation of the underlying mechanisms and for an involvement of regions with less 
precise orientation tuning in hysteresis. Th   e absence of a hysteresis eff  ect in areas V2/V3 indi-
cates that the priors are not tested against the evidence in these early areas, only at a later stage. 
In fact, Figure 5-2b shows that hysteresis can overrule the eff  ects of adaptation. For example, it 
is possible to stabilize a 0° percept even at AR=1.3-1, at which strong adaptation to 0° should 
lead to a repulsive aft  er eff  ect. Th   us, it is conceivable that the output of areas V2/V3 serves as 
input for subsequent processing stages, e.g., in the fusiform gyrus or IPS, where the hypothesis 
test is carried out. In fact, if hysteresis serves to stabilize percepts against constantly changing 
low-level stimulus features (Kleinschmidt, et al., 2002), the larger receptive fi  elds of higher vi-
sual areas are advantageous as compared to small receptive fi  elds in earlier visual areas because 
they allow for a certain degree of invariance. Psychophysical evidence suggests larger receptive 
fi  elds involved in hysteresis by showing that hysteresis is retinotopically organized, but extends 
beyond the exact location where the fi  rst stimulus was presented (Knapen, Brascamp, Adams, & 
Graf, 2009). Interestingly, our psychophysical data indicates that the adaptation eff  ect persists 
even if the adapting orientation is not consciously perceived, whereas hysteresis is by defi  nition 
a conscious perceptual process. Th   is dichotomy might be explained by the fact that hysteresis 
involves distributed processing, whereas adaptation is a purely local phenomenon: Several cur-
rent theories of conscious perception predict that the spatial scale at which neuronal processing 130
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occurs determines whether content enters awareness or not (Dehaene, et al., 2006; Edelman, et 
al., 2011; Melloni & Singer, 2010). 
Conclusions
Hysteresis and adaptation in multistable stimuli illustrate how we generally use previous 
experience to guide perception: Th   e brain needs to cope with constantly changing and oft  en un-
reliable or ambiguous input, and exploiting the regularities of the world is an effi   cient strategy to 
achieve this goal. Reoccurring patterns are informative, because they allow predicting what will 
happen next. Th   is is refl  ected by the hysteresis eff  ect. On the other hand, reoccurring patterns 
are redundant and could be discarded from further processing, thus emphasizing new informa-
tion. Th   is is evident in the repulsive aft  ereff  ects resulting from adaptation. Apparently, the brain 
is optimized for both strategies. Our study shows that they are implemented in diff  erent neural 
circuits. Th   is separation possibly endows the brain with the fl  exibility to switch between two 
modes, one that emphasizes the new, and one that exploits already available information. Such 
fl  exibility is crucial in a non-stationary environment where one should always be prepared to 
predict the unexpected. 131133
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In the following, I will discuss the major fi  ndings of this thesis, and their implication for 
the study of consciousness. In particular, I will present a dual route model that can explain the 
commonalities and dissociation in subjective and objective learning eff  ects presented in Chap-
ters 2 and 3, as well as dissociations between conscious perception and unconscious processing 
reported in the literature. Furthermore, I will discuss how a Bayesian account of brain process-
ing implicated by the data presented in Chapters 4 and 5 can account for the diff  erence between 
conscious and unconscious processing, and how this relates to current theories of consciousness. 
A DUAL ROUTE MODEL FOR LEARNING EFFECTS ON    
  PROCESSING AND EXPERIENCING
Th   e data presented in Chapters 2 and 3 provide evidence for a plastic threshold of con-
scious perception. In particular, not only the processing of initially indiscriminable stimuli im-
proves with practice, but training also leads to a change in subjective experience of the masked 
stimuli. Th   ese practice eff  ects persist up to several months. Importantly, I found that improve-
ments in subjective experience and objective performance are not simple byproducts of each 
other: Th  ey  diff  er in their learning time courses, but strikingly also in the spatial extend of the 
training eff  ects. Th  e  diff  erential transfer across the retinotopic map allows for the conclusion 
that the receptive fi  eld structure underlying both learning eff  ects is diff  erent and thus, that the 
brain areas in which the learning eff  ects take place must also diff  er. Contrary to what might be 
intuitively expected, subjective experience was neither necessary nor suffi   cient for objective per-
formance; also, objective performance was not suffi   cient to explain subjective experience. To-
gether, the data speak for the intriguing possibility that the learning eff  ects on objective perfor-
mance and subjective experience occur in parallel channels with independent sources of noise. 
It is oft  en assumed that conscious perception arises at the end of a serially progress-
ing sequence of processing steps (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Lau, 2008b). Since subjective 
awareness of a stimulus and objective performance on a task are usually highly correlated, such 135
General Discussion
proposals fare well with a single route model (Figure 6-1a) in which input is fi  rst processed by 
unconsciously operating modules and then fed into downstream processors which ultimately 
give rise to conscious experience and objective performance. However, models of this kind oft  en 
fail to explain dissociations between objective performance and subjective awareness. Th  is  can 
be achieved by adding a second source of noise that renders conscious perception always noisier 
than the unconscious processing of the input (Lau, 2011), thus accounting for phenomena like 
blindsight (Figure 6-1b). However, my data speak for a parallel model, in which unconscious 
computations and computations giving rise to conscious experience proceed in parallel, based 
on the same input but with independent sources of noise (Figure 6-1c). Physiologically, this 
+ noise
input
objective
performance
subjective
experience
a) single channel
+ noise + noise
input
objective
performance
subjective
experience
c) dual channel
+ noise
+ noise
input
objective
performance
subjective
experience
b) single channel
hierarchical
Figure 6-1. Illustrations of three diff  erent models of the relationship between objective performance and subjective 
experience. (a) Single channel model. Th   e output of a single channel determines both subjective experience and 
objective performance. Th   is model predicts a perfect correlation between subjective experience and objective per-
formance. (b) Hierarchical single channel model. Th   e input is fi  rst processed by unconsciously operating modules. 
Th   e output of these modules determines objective performance. In a second step, it is further processed to give 
rise to subjective experience. Th   is additional processing adds more noise, thus, subjective experience will always be 
noisier than objective performance. (c) Dual channel model. Unconscious computations and computations giving 
rise to conscious experience proceed in parallel. Th   ey are based on the same input but have independent source of 
noise. Th   e common input accounts for the correlation between subjective experience and objective performance, 
while the independent sources of noise account for the dissociations between them.136
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could be thought of as a mapping of sensory input to relatively small receptive fi  elds coding for 
shapes (square or diamond) in one area (likely V4), and to larger receptive fi  elds coding for the 
subjective quality of the percept in another area. Both types of receptive fi  elds receive informa-
tion from one sensory input stage. Th   e learning-induced change happens not at the sensory in-
put stage, but aff  ects the mapping from the sensory input to the receptive fi  elds coding for shape 
or the subjective quality of the percept (for example through channel weighting, Dosher & Lu, 
1999). If the stimulus is moved to another position, the mapping to the smaller receptive fi  elds 
breaks down, whereas the mapping to the larger receptive fi  eld is preserved. 
My results are in line with a growing number of empirical fi  ndings pointing to a dis-
sociation of subjective experience and objective performance in the healthy human brain (Bar 
& Biederman, 1999; Lau & Passingham, 2006; Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & 
Lau, 2010; Sahraie, et al., 1997). Neuroimaging data points to the dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (DLPFC) as an important node in the neural processes underlying subjective experience 
(Lau & Passingham, 2006; Sahraie, et al., 1997). Th   e DLPFC exhibits a receptive fi  eld structure 
which is compatible with our results (Rainer, et al., 1998; Suzuki & Azuma, 1983) and shows 
plastic changes in response to perceptual learning tasks (Rainer & Miller, 2000). Importantly, 
electrophysiological experiments in monkeys show that the pattern of changes observed in V4 
as a result of learning is quite diff  erent from that observed in the DLPFC even under identical 
stimulation conditions (Rainer, Lee, & Logothetis, 2004). For example, while neurons in the 
DLPFC respond to objects independently of their degradation level aft  er training, neurons in 
V4 respond diff  erentially to degraded and undegraded learned objects. Also, the average fi  ring 
rate in the DLPFC is reduced aft  er training, while the fi  ring rate of V4 neurons does not change. 
Th   is indicates that the prefrontral cortex does not simply inherit the physiological learning ef-
fects from V4. Th   e existence of multiple parallel connections from striate and extrastriate cortex 
to the prefrontal cortex (Barbas, 1988; Barbas & Mesulam, 1985; Young, 1992) lends further 
credibility to a dual route model as I propose. 137
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Alternatively to the DLPFC, it has been proposed that regions in the anterior infero-
temporal cortex underlie subjective experience (Bar & Biederman, 1999; Bar et al., 2001). For 
example, Bar and colleagues (2001) found in an fMRI experiment that only the fusiform gyrus 
follows the behavioral profi  le of subjective recognition of visually presented, degraded objects, 
while for instance the BOLD response of area V4 was indistinguishable for recognized and un-
recognized objects. Plasticity in monkey inferotemporal cortex (reviewed in Hoff  man & Logo-
thetis, 2009) and its human homologue (Kourtzi, Betts, Sarkheil, & Welchman, 2005) is well 
established, and the receptive fi  elds in the anterior inferotemporal cortex would also be able to 
support the spatial transfer of 6.6° in our experiment (Desimone & Gross, 1979). Tracing stud-
ies in monkeys have shown that not all information enters the inferotemporal cortex via area V4, 
but that there is direct input from areas V2 and V3 to areas TEO (Distler, Boussaoud, Desim-
one, & Ungerleider, 1993) and perhaps even TE (Baizer, Ungerleider, & Desimone, 1991). 
Th   us, a dual route model could also be established along ventral visual areas. 
Th  e  diff  erential transfer of learning eff  ects across the retinotopic map is also compat-
ible with theories that pose that mere processing occurs in isolated modules, while experiencing 
requires global availability (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001) or long-distance synchrony between 
brain areas (Melloni & Singer, 2010). Here, the learning eff  ects on processing would be the 
result of local changes in V4 (as above), however, the transfer of learning eff  ects on subjective 
experience would be the result of the global distribution of information that is thought to be the 
signature of conscious access (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). Modeling work suggests that the 
parallel processing of information for objective performance and subjective experience can be 
envisaged as a race between a conscious route and an unconscious route of processing (Del Cul, 
et al., 2009). If the route for subjective experience wins and information is eventually globally 
available, it is not longer bound to a specifi  c receptive fi  eld size. Still, this model requires that 
information can become globally available even without suffi   cient processing in V4, and thus 
constitutes a dual route model as well. 138
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Taken together, a dual route model off  ers a parsimonious explanation for the results of 
Chapter 2 and 3. Furthermore, the data substantiate recent modeling work which had only sug-
gested that dual route models of conscious perception and unconscious processing are indeed 
feasible, but did not provide empirical evidence (Del Cul, et al., 2009; Pasquali, Timmermans, 
& Cleeremans, 2010). Last, the dual route model proposed here can also account for other re-
sults reported in the literature. For example, blindsight in normal observers (Lau & Passingham, 
2006; Meeres & Graves, 1990) can arise in this model if there is more noise in the channel lead-
ing to the area(s) involved in subjective experience than in the channels responsible for merely 
processing the stimulus to subserve objective performance. Also, apparently illusory percepts 
(Boehler, et al., 2008; Del Cul, et al., 2009; Summerfi  eld, et al., 2002), i.e., high subjective vis-
ibility ratings on objectively incorrect trials, can be explained by higher noise in the channel for 
objective performance and lower noise in the channel for conscious perception. Neuroimaging 
studies are now on the way to map out the two channels suggested by psychophysics and to 
identify their temporal relationship. 
CONSCIOUS VS. UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING AND    
  B AYESIAN INFERENCE
Th   e data presented in Chapters 4 and 5 fi  t well with current theories of perception that 
frame the brain as a Bayesian inference or Helmholtz machine (Dayan, Hinton, Neal, & Zemel, 
1995; Di Lollo, et al., 2000; Friston, 2010; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Rao & Ballard, 1999). In 
particular, these theories highlight that perception is the result of (or at least in accordance 
with) an unconscious inference, which utilizes both the available evidence and priors (built in 
and fl  exibly acquired) to arrive at a probable percept. However, in the context of conscious per-
ception, these theories do not specify how such Bayesian computations are related to conscious 
or unconscious processing. Rather, the concept of hypothesis testing is claimed to be a general 
mechanism of brain function (e.g., Friston, 2010), i.e., it equally applies to conscious and uncon-139
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scious processing. Given that we know that only some processing leads to conscious experience, 
is it possible to account for the diff  erence between conscious and unconscious processing with a 
Bayesian model of the brain? Here, I will consider three possibilities which map into three theo-
retical views of conscious perception currently discussed in the scientifi  c community. 
1. Higher order thought
So called “higher order thought” theories of consciousness postulate that to be con-
scious of something (a stimulus), the representation of the stimulus itself needs to be the target 
of yet another, higher order representation (Lycan, 2009). Th   us, one is conscious by virtue of a 
higher order (meta-)representation, and not the representation of the stimulus itself. Th  ere  is 
fi  erce philosophical debate regarding the cogency of this argument (Block, 2011; Rosenthal, 
2002), however, several neuroscientifi  c and cognitive theories of consciousness have strongly 
embraced this view (Cleeremans, 2008; Dienes, 2004; Lau, 2008b; Rolls, 2007; Singer, 2000). 
Does higher order thought theorizing allow for a distinction between conscious and uncon-
scious processing within a Bayesian framework of brain function? Since higher order thought 
theories postulate two representations, one of the stimulus, and a meta-representation of the 
stimulus, Bayesian inference could underlie the computations leading to both of them. Th  e 
brain would then iteratively test and update hypotheses about the sensory evidence, and in 
parallel or in a second step test the prediction that one has a meta-representation of the stimu-
lus. Th   us, Bayesian processing would be a general currency of conscious and unconscious pro-
cessing, but it would be the type of representation that diff  erentiates them. A similar proposal 
has been put forward by Lau (2008b). Here, higher order representations are learned from 
internal, unconscious signal and noise distributions of the stimulus. Decisions on both levels 
(signal and noise distributions as well as the higher order distributions) are made according to 
Bayesian decision theory relative to a respective criterion. Since the higher order representa-
tions need to be learned, they can in principle misrepresent the underlying signal and noise 140
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distributions, which is why the proposal can account for dissociations between subjective ex-
perience and objective performance. 
2. Global Workspace models
One of the leading neuroscientifi  c theories of consciousness posits that consciousness 
arises when a Global Neuronal Workspace has been ignited (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; De-
haene & Naccache, 2001). In particular, unconscious processing is thought to occur in parallel 
in local modules, and if the information processed by these modules is strong enough or ampli-
fi  ed through directed attention, it is dispatched to a network of neurons with long axons, pref-
erentially located in the frontal and parietal cortices, that make the information “globally avail-
able” (Baars, 1997). Several other models make less strong predictions about the involvement 
of specifi  c brain areas, but in principle agree that conscious access depends on global availability 
of information (Lamme, 2006; Melloni & Singer, 2010). In these frameworks, Bayesian infer-
ence could be a mechanism by which information is processed unconsciously in local modules. 
Bayesian inference could also operate at the global level, estimating a coherent solution from the 
distributed available evidence. Conscious experience would then refer to this global solution. 
Such a model would also account well for the observation that conscious perception is usually 
phenomenally unifi  ed, and not of disparate features. A similar solution has been proposed by 
Dehaene (2008) using an accumulator model. Here, it is postulated that sensory evidence is ac-
cumulated in parallel in local modules, which transmit their ‘decisions’ to the Global Neuronal 
Workspace, which in turn accumulates these decisions and then dispatches a global decision to 
the rest of the brain. Awareness is then of this global decision. However, it has to be noted that 
optimal Bayesian decision making takes all available information into account: If an object is 
composed of multiple features, independent processors can in principle fi  nd Bayesian solutions 
for the complete object even if only using the information available to them (e.g., one solution 
based only on orientation, one solution based only on color, etc.). However, if the processors 141
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are informed of each other, the solution they fi  nd together is usually better than the sum of the 
individual solutions (Adelson & Pentland, 1996). Human subjects have indeed been found to 
combine cues in a Bayesian optimal fashion (e.g., Ernst & Banks, 2002; Jacobs, 1999). Avoiding 
local maxima this way can be computationally formalized as “particle fi  ltering” (Lee & Mum-
ford, 2003), and could in principle occur vertically throughout a processing hierarchy as well as 
laterally between modules on the same hierarchical level. 
3. Partial awareness 
A relatively recent proposal is that in fact, we have conscious access not only to the glob-
al, unifi  ed solution, but also independently to all the individual parts making up that solution 
(Kouider, de Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010). Th   is so-called “partial awareness hypothesis” 
posits that representations at each level of the processing hierarchy can be accessed indepen-
dently; this allows on the one hand access to global meaning without detail (higher level in the 
hierarchy) and on the other hand access to low level features, which in turn accounts for the 
subjective impression of phenomenal richness. Awareness is usually complete, which amounts 
to having access to all levels, but can also be partial, i.e., access is possible to some, but not to 
other levels of the hierarchy. At the other extreme, subjects can also be completely unaware, i.e., 
they do not have access to any level of the processing hierarchy. Here, Bayesian inference could 
again operate at each level of the hierarchy, and one would be only aware of the outcome of the 
Bayesian operation that one has currently access to. However, the partial awareness hypothesis 
currently does not specify whether it is possible to be aware of several levels of the hierarchy in 
parallel, or whether conscious access is always limited to one level at a time. Th   us, it actually fails 
to fully account for consciousness. 
Taken together, Bayesian models of perception can in theory be expanded to account 
for a distinction between conscious and unconscious processing. Which of the above solutions 142
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(or any other) is the correct solution is still an open question for research. In a way, the number 
of possible solutions to expanding the Bayesian framework to incorporate conscious and un-
conscious processing refl  ects the multitude of proposals that currently exist to explain conscious 
perception in the fi  rst place. It also has to be taken into account that although Bayesian models 
are currently very popular and can account for a very wide range of data, there is also evidence 
that can be interpreted to speak against Bayesian optimal perception. Anderson, O’Vari and 
Barth (2011) recently reported that when moving occluders are used to generate illusory con-
tours, subjects perceive multiple surfaces, although one surface would be suffi   cient to “explain” 
the sensory input. Since the additional surface seems superfl  uous, it can be argued that percep-
tion is not Bayesian optimal in this case (but see Fleming, 2011). Th   us, further research is also 
needed on this side to establish whether the Bayesian approach is indeed ideal to understand 
perception and its neural underpinnings (also see Colombo & Seriès, 2011). 
CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that previous experience is a key factor in several important models of 
brain function, its role in conscious perception has so far been severely neglected. Th   is thesis was 
aimed at fi  lling this ostensible gap. Studying the role of previous experience in conscious percep-
tion revealed several important characteristics of conscious perception itself. First, my data show 
that the threshold of conscious perception is not fi  xed, since I found that conscious perception 
is indeed malleable both by long-term and short-term experience: We can learn to see initially 
indiscriminable stimuli, and we can use our prior information to continue seeing stimuli even if 
they are massively degraded. Th   is questions a wide spread belief and poses a serious challenge to 
research that needs to establish fi  xed thresholds in order to investigate unconscious perception. 
Second, my data show that the neural correlates of consciousness do not invariantly occur late 
but can arise with fl  exible latencies, depending on how conscious experience comes about. Th  is 
fi  nding raises the possibility that yet other factors, like attention (Noguchi, Tanabe, Sadato, 143
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Hoshiyama, & Kakigi, 2007), exert similar eff  ects, moving the neural correlates of consciousness 
forward or backward in time. Th   ird, conscious perception can be aff  ected by previous experience 
in at least two ways, rendering us more likely to perceive the same stimulus again (hysteresis), or 
more likely to see something else (adaptation). Th   e role of previous experience is thus not only 
to stabilize conscious perception by exploiting experience-based predictions, but also to retain 
sensitivity for new information. Overall, conscious perception exhibits a remarkable degree of 
plasticity that is not but should be taken into account by current theories of consciousness. 
In addition, my data also speak against theories that equate performance with experi-
ence. In accord with studies on brain damaged patients, my data evidence that conscious experi-
ence and the mere processing of stimuli are distinct. An important new proposal that can be de-
rived from my studies is that the neural processes underlying these two functions rely on parallel 
channels. Although the brain is widely conceived as processing input in a highly parallel fashion, 
this notion had not been fully taken on by theories distinguishing conscious from unconscious 
processing. Furthermore, the distinction has to be taken into account not only when theorizing 
about consciousness, but also when measuring it. 
Beyond that, the paradigms used in this thesis may off  er an alternative way of studying 
the neuronal correlates of consciousness. Rather than contrasting seen with unseen conditions 
by manipulating stimulus evidence or relying on the spontaneous fl  uctuations of brain activity, 
one can train the brain to go from unconscious processing to conscious perception without 
changing anything but the brain itself. Th   is way, we might understand how the brain itself gen-
erates appropriate conditions to decipher the visual world and to generate a conscious percept. 
Th   is is in the end the question that really has to be solved: How does the brain bring conscious-
ness onto itself? 145
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Welche Faktoren bestimmen, ob ein Reiz bewußt wahrgenommen oder unbewußt ver-
arbeitet wird? In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird untersucht, wie sich bestehendes Wissen auf 
die bewußte Wahrnehmung und auf die ihr zugrundeliegenden neuronalen Prozesse auswirkt. 
Ferner wird untersucht, ob bewußte Wahrnehmung erlernbar ist. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, daß 
bewußte Wahrnehmung nicht nur davon abhängt, wieviel Information ein Reiz liefert. Viel-
mehr ist sie das Ergebnis eines plastischen und integrativen Prozesses, im Zuge dessen aktuell 
eingehende Information mit zuvor erworbenem Wissen interagiert.
Die Frage, wie aus der Aktivität von Neuronen bewußte Wahrnehmung entsteht, ist 
eines der großen Rätsel der Neurowissenschaft  en (Koch, 2004). Wir haben den Eindruck, daß 
wir alles, was sich im uns umgebenden Raum befi  ndet, klar wahrnehmen, doch dieser Eindruck 
täuscht. Man weiß inzwischen, daß ein Großteil der Information, die durch unsere Sinnesor-
gane aufgenommen wird, verarbeitet wird, ohne daß wir uns ihrer bewußt werden (Kouider 
& Dehaene, 2007). Was den Unterschied zwischen bewußter und unbewußter Wahrnehmung 
ausmacht, konnte bislang nicht abschließend geklärt werden. Fest steht, daß starke Reize das 
Bewußtsein normalerweise stets erreichen. Schwächere Reize werden hingegen häufi  g nur dann 
wahrgenommen, wenn ihnen aktiv Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt wird (Dehaene, et al., 2006). 
In den hier vorgestellten Studien wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob es neben den Fak-
toren Intensität und Aufmerksamkeit noch andere Faktoren gibt, die bestimmen, ob ein Reiz 
bewußt wahrgenommen oder unbewußt verarbeitet wird. Insbesondere wird untersucht, wie 
sich eine vorherige Erfahrung auf die subjektive Wahrnehmung auswirkt und welche neurona-
len Prozesse und Schaltkreise dem zugrunde liegen.
In den Kapiteln 2 und 3 wird untersucht, ob Wahrnehmung durch langfristiges, syste-
matisches Üben beeinfl  ußt werden kann. Es ist inzwischen etabliert, daß die Verarbeitung von 
Reizen in der Hirnrinde auch noch im Erwachsenenalter hochgradig plastisch ist (Ahissar & 
Hochstein, 1998; Fahle, 2009; E. J. Gibson, 1963; Goldstone, 1998). So können Versuchsperso-
nen trainiert werden, sogar extrem kleine Unterschiede zwischen Stimuli zu unterscheiden (zum Zusammenfassung
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Beispiel Poggio, et al., 1992). Allerdings ist bisher nicht untersucht worden, ob sich ein solches 
Training auch auf die subjektive Wahrnehmung der Reize auswirkt oder ob die Verbesserungen 
in der Unterscheidbarkeit der Reize allein auf unbewußte Verarbeitungsprozesse zurückführbar 
sind. Diese Frage ist auch klinisch relevant: So können manche Schlaganfallpatienten, die in 
Folge einer Schädigung der Sehrinde in einem Teil Ihres Gesichtsfeldes erblindet sind, Reize 
unterscheiden, die in den erblindeten Teil des Gesichtsfelds fallen. Allerdings geben diese Pati-
enten an, daß sie die Reize nicht bewußt wahrnehmen. Diese Dissoziation zwischen Wahrneh-
mung und Verarbeitung wird als „blindsight“ bezeichnet (Cowey, 2004; Stoerig, 2006). Reha-
bilitationsversuche haben bislang ergeben, daß durch gezieltes Üben die Fähigkeit der Patienten 
verbessert werden kann, die in das erblindete Gesichtsfeld fallenden Reize zu verarbeiten, und 
dies in seltenen Fällen auch mit zunehmender subjektiver Wahrnehmung der Reize einhergeht 
(Sahraie, et al., 2006; Zihl & von Cramon, 1985). Diese Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, daß 
bewußte Wahrnehmung ähnlich wie andere kognitive Fähigkeiten durch gezieltes Training ver-
änderbar ist. In gesunden Versuchspersonen kann dieser Frage nachgegangen werden, wenn an 
sich gut erkennbare Reize durch schnell aufeinanderfolgende Darbietung in ihrer Sichtbarkeit 
eingeschränkt werden („Maskierung“). So können Bedingungen hergestellt werden, in denen 
die Versuchsperson die dargebotenen Zielreize nicht auseinanderhalten kann. Gleichzeitig ge-
ben die Versuchspersonen an, der Reiz sei für sie unsichtbar. Wie in den Kapiteln 2 und 3 gezeigt 
wird, steigt im Zuge eines mehrtägigen Trainings die Fähigkeit, die Zielreize zu unterscheiden. 
Die Frage ist nun, ob das Training auch einen Zuwachs der subjektiven Wahrnehmung bedingt. 
Tatsächlich geben die Versuchspersonen als Folge des Trainings an, die Zielreize klarer wahr-
zunehmen. Dies zeigt, daß bewußte Wahrnehmung durch gezieltes Training verbessert werden 
kann, sogar wenn der Stimulus anfänglich objektiv unsichtbar ist. Hier zeigt sich, wie fl  exibel 
die neuronalen Prozesse sind, die der bewußten Wahrnehmung zugrunde liegen. Allerdings ist 
weder die bewußte Wahrnehmung die triviale Folge besserer Verarbeitung, noch die bessere 
Verarbeitung die Folge gesteigerter bewußter Wahrnehmung. Vielmehr zeigen die in Kapitel 3 Zusammenfassung
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vorgestellten Experimente, daß bewußte Wahrnehmung und die (unbewußte) Verarbeitung der 
Reize parallel vor sich gehen und daß die Hirnareale, die beiden Funktionen zugrunde liegen, 
nicht identisch sind. Diese Ergebnisse eröff  nen nicht nur ein neues Forschungsgebiet zur Pla-
stizität bewußter Wahrnehmung und zum Zusammenhang von bewußter Wahrnehmung und 
der Verarbeitung von Stimuli, sondern liefern auch wichtige Informationen für Rehabilitations-
programme, deren Ziel darin besteht, die Plastizität des Gehirns auszunutzen, um beispielsweise 
Wahrnehmungsdefi  zite nach Hirnläsionen zu mildern.
Tritt die Plastizität der bewußten Wahrnehmung nur als Folge langfristigen Trainings 
zutage? In Kapitel 4 wird untersucht, wie sich Informationen, die kurz vor dem aktuell darge-
botenen Stimulus erworben wurden, auf dessen bewußte Wahrnehmung auswirken. Wahrneh-
mung ist in den seltensten Fällen allein durch die Information, die ein Reiz trägt, bestimmt. 
Vielmehr wird die gerade eingehende Information mit bereits bestehenden Informationen inte-
griert. So ist es zum Beispiel einfacher, ein Tier in seiner natürlichen Umgebung trotz Tarnung 
zu erkennen, wenn man weiß, welches Tier man sucht. Hier wird die bereits vorhandene Infor-
mation über das Tier genutzt, um eine Vorhersage zu machen und so die Suche zu beschleuni-
gen. In Kapitel 4 gehe ich der Frage nach, wie Vorhersagbarkeit mit der Stärke eines Reizes inter-
agiert und wie dies zur bewußten Wahrnehmung des Reizes führt. Die Vorhersage beruht dabei 
auf Informationen, die erst kurz zuvor erworben wurden. Im hier genutzten Paradigma werden 
zunächst visuelle Reize mittels Rauschens unkenntlich gemacht. Durch schrittweise Reduktion 
des Rauschanteils wird der Reiz langsam sichtbarer, bis er schließlich klar erkennbar ist. Nach 
jedem Schritt gibt die Versuchsperson an, ob sie den Reiz wahrgenommen hat. Anschließend 
wird der Rauschanteil erneut schrittweise erhöht. Hat die Versuchsperson den Stimulus einmal 
erkannt, so erlaubt dies ihr, den Stimulus in der Folge auch trotz höheren Rauschanteils bewußt 
wahrzunehmen. Dieser die Wahrnehmung begünstigende Eff  ekt wird als „Hysterese“ bezeich-
net. Mittels Elektroenzephalographie kann man nun die neuronalen Prozesse vergleichen, die 
wahrgenommene von nicht wahrgenommenen Reizen unterscheiden. Auf diese Weise läßt sich Zusammenfassung
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der Eff  ekt erfassen, den die zwischenzeitlich klare Erkennbarkeit auf die neuronalen Prozesse 
hat, die der bewußten Wahrnehmung zugrunde liegen: In der Phase, in der die Versuchsperson 
den Reiz noch nicht klar wahrgenommen hat, die bewußte Wahrnehmung also nur durch die 
im Reiz selbst vorhandene Information bestimmt wird, fi  nden sich die ersten Unterschiede in 
den neuronalen Prozessen zwischen gesehenen und nicht gesehenen Durchgängen etwa 300 ms 
nach der Darbietung des Stimulus. Hingegen fi  ndet sich diese Diff  erenzierung schon bei 200 
ms, wenn die Versuchsperson den Reiz vorher schon einmal klar erkannt hat und infolgedessen 
voraussagen kann, wie der Stimulus aussieht. Dies zeigt, daß vorherige Erfahrung einen starken 
Einfl  uß darauf hat, ob wir einen Stimulus bewußt wahrnehmen. Zudem deutet die zeitliche 
Verschiebung der neuronalen Korrelate der bewußten Wahrnehmung von 300 ms ohne Vorher-
sage zu 200 ms mit Vorhersage darauf hin, daß die Prozesse, die der bewußten Wahrnehmung 
zugrunde liegen, keine feste zeitliche Beziehung zum Reiz haben. Sie hängen vielmehr davon ab, 
wie schnell aktuelle und bereits bestehende Informationen konvergieren. Hier zeigt sich erneut, 
daß die Prozesse, die zur bewußten Wahrnehmung führen, wesentlich fl  exibler sind als bisher 
angenommen. Die Ergebnisse stellen somit Th   eorien, die vorhersagen, daß die neuronalen Kor-
relate der bewußten Wahrnehmung unweigerlich spät in der Verarbeitungshierarchie auft  reten 
(Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Lamme, 2006), direkt in Frage. 
Vorherige Erfahrung führt allerdings nicht immer dazu, daß die bewußte Wahrneh-
mung eines Stimulus erleichtert oder stabilisiert wird. Vielmehr kann vorherige Erfahrung auch 
das Gegenteil bewirken. Betrachtet man zum Beispiel für längere Zeit einen Stimulus, der sich 
in eine Richtung bewegt, und lenkt dann seinen Blick auf einen statischen Stimulus, so scheint 
sich letzterer in die gegensätzliche Richtung des zuerst betrachteten Reizes zu bewegen (Purkin-
je, 1820). Solche repulsiven Eff  ekte werden allgemein auf neuronale Adaptation zurückgeführt 
(zum Beispiel Anstis, et al., 1998). In Kapitel 5 gehe ich der Frage nach, ob die stabilisierende 
Wirkung vorheriger Erfahrung („Hysterese“) und die destabilisierende Wirkung vorheriger Er-
fahrung („Adaptation“) auf denselben Mechanismus zurückführbar sind. Zu diesem Zweck ver-Zusammenfassung
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wende ich sogenannte „multistabile Stimuli“. Diese Stimuli sind so konstruiert, daß sie mehrere 
perzeptuelle Interpretationen zulassen. Der Stimulus allein bestimmt dann nicht, welche Inter-
pretation bewußt wahrgenommen wird. Vielmehr ist die Wahrnehmung hier stark davon ab-
hängig, welche Interpretation kurz zuvor wahrgenommen wurde (Pearson & Brascamp, 2008). 
Mittels funktioneller Magnetresonanztomographie untersuche ich, ob die Verhaltenseff  ekte 
Hysterese und Adaptation auf Aktivität in denselben Hirnarealen zurückgehen. Die Ergebnisse 
zeigen, daß Hysterese mit Aktivität in einem weitverzweigten Netzwerk korreliert, das visuelle, 
aber auch parietale und frontale Areale einschließt, wobei der mediale präfrontale Cortex eine 
entscheidende Rolle zu spielen scheint. Im Gegensatz dazu ist der Adaptationseff  ekt nur mit lo-
kaler Aktivität in frühen visuellen Arealen korreliert (V2/V3). Diese räumliche Auft  eilung liegt 
vermutlich der Fähigkeit des Gehirns, eine Balance zwischen Vorhersagbarkeit und Sensitivität 
für Neues aufrechtzuerhalten, zugrunde. 
Zusammenfassend zeigen die hier vorgestellten Studien, daß die Prozesse, die der be-
wußten Wahrnehmung zugrunde liegen, fl  exibel und sogar plastisch sind. Zum einen kann lang-
fristiges Training dazu führen, daß Reize, die unter normalen Umständen nicht bewußt wahr-
genommen werden, Zugang zu unserem subjektiven Empfi  nden fi  nden (Kapitel 2 und 3). Zum 
anderen können Erfahrungen, die kurz vor dem aktuellen Reiz gemacht wurden, die Wahrneh-
mung und ihre neuronalen Korrelate verändern (Kapitel 3 und 4). Diese Befunde stellen ver-
schiedene Annahmen, die häufi  g bezüglich der bewußten Wahrnehmung gemacht werden, in 
Frage: Zum einen zeigt sich, daß die Schwelle der bewußten Wahrnehmung nicht fest, sondern 
fl  exibel ist. Zudem sind auch die neuronalen Korrelate der bewußten Wahrnehmung keinesfalls 
zeitlich stabil, sondern können durch vorherige Erfahrung beschleunigt werden. Dies eröff  net 
die Möglichkeit, daß auch andere kognitive Prozesse wie zum Beispiel Aufmerksamkeit (Nogu-
chi, et al., 2007), die neuronalen Korrelate der bewußten Wahrnehmung zeitlich beschleunigen 
oder auch verlangsamen könnten. Schließlich zeigen meine Daten auch, daß Th   eorien, in de-Zusammenfassung
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nen die reine Verarbeitung von Reizen mit ihrer bewußten Wahrnehmung gleichgesetzt wird, 
revidiert werden müssen. Die Ergebnisse stehen somit im Einklang mit Daten von Schlagan-
fallpatienten, bei denen bewußte Wahrnehmung und unbewußte Verarbeitung ebenfalls ausein-
anderfallen. Ein von mir vorgeschlagenes Modell, in dem die Prozesse der unbewußten Verar-
beitung und die Prozesse, die zur bewußten Wahrnehmung führen, parallel ablaufen, kann diese 
Dissoziationen erklären. Zu guter Letzt stellen die hier genutzten Paradigmen eine neue Mög-
lichkeit, die neuronalen Korrelate der bewußten Wahrnehmung zu untersuchen, dar. Anstatt 
Bedingungen zu vergleichen, in denen die bewußte Wahrnehmung von der Stärke des Reizes 
oder von spontanen Fluktuationen der Hirnaktivität abhängt, kann man das Gehirn trainieren, 
die Grenze zwischen unbewußter Verarbeitung und bewußter Wahrnehmung zu überschreiten. 
Auf diese Art besteht die Chance zu verstehen, wie das Gehirn selbst Bewußtsein erzeugt. Dies 
ist letztendlich die entscheidende Frage. 
Dieser Text beruht zum Teil auf folgender Publikation: Melloni L, Schwiedrzik CM 
(2011). Bewußte Wahrnehmung als dynamischer und plastischer Prozeß. Max Planck Gesell-
schaft   Jahrbuch 2011, http://www.mpg.de/166008/jahrbuecher. 153
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